It was during the Six Day War that, reportedly, a group of MiG 21s fell into Israeli hands. Six Algerian MiG 21 pilots flew into El Arish Air Base in the Sinai Desert. The Egyptian and Syrian governments had concealed the magnitude of their losses, so the Algerian pilots did not know El Arish had already been captured by the Israelis.[649]
This was not the only example of wayward pilots delivering MiGs to Israeli control. On August 12, 1968, two Syrian air force lieutenants, Walid Adham and Radfan Rifai, took off in a pair of MiG 17s on a training mission. They lost their way and, believing they were over Lebanon, landed at the Beset Landing Field in northern Israel. (One version has it that they were led astray by an Arabic-speaking Israeli.)
The first plane overran the end of the strip, plowed across a field, and stopped just short of a stand of cypress trees. The second MiG 17 circled again and made a successful landing. Neither plane was damaged, nor were the pilots injured. Yossi Yitzhak, who had witnessed the landings while working in a nearby hay field, told them they were in Israel. He was quoted later as saying, "They both went white with shock." Both pilots were taken away as POWs.[650]
The two MiG 17s were repainted with Israeli insignia and red recognition markings, then were test flown from Hatzor Air Base. As with 007, Dani Shapira flew the missions.[651]
The Israeli MiGs had, by this time, acquired an importance far beyond their intelligence value. In the wake of the Six Day War, France cut off military supplies to Israel. Since the 1950s, France had provided most of Israel's aircraft (as well as secret support for its nuclear program). Israel turned to the United States, seeking A-4 attack aircraft and F-4E fighters.
The U.S. government was reluctant, but Israel could offer in exchange captured Soviet tanks, SA-2 SAMs, and the MiGs. A deal was struck, and 007 and the two MiG 17s were shipped to the United States in 1969.
The U.S. MiG operations were extremely secret — personnel connected with the project were told that if they leaked any information, they would "disappear." Therefore, the item in the "Industry Observer" column in the February 17, 1969, issue of Aviation Week and Space Technology magazine came as a shock. It read:
Soviet MiG 21 fighter was secretly brought to the U.S. last spring and flight tested by USAF pilots to learn first-hand its capabilities and design characteristics. The aircraft, which engaged in simulated combat against U.S. fighters, was highly regarded by the pilots who flew it. The MiG 21 was particularly impressive at altitudes over 25,000 ft. The evaluation was part of a broad effort by USAF to detail the threat of Soviet air power in planning new aircraft, such as the F-15 fighter.[652]
Out at Groom Lake, the MiG program accelerated. Again, it was the U.S. Navy that took the lead.
In April 1969, Jim Foster was named commander of VX-4. He had been an F-8 pilot during the early years of the Vietnam War and had seen the problems with the F-4. He quickly set about to "acquire" the new MiGs for the navy.
Soon after taking command, he selected Foster S. "Tooter" Teague to head the navy exploitation effort. Teague was a fighter pilot who had completed two combat tours in Vietnam. Teague did not know about the MiGs even after his arrival at VX-4. Initially, he was only told he was being sent
"into the desert" for two hundred days. After being told about the MiGs, Teague and his personnel quickly wrote up a test plan for the aircraft. The report was typed and bound in time for the first project meeting. (The air force personnel, in contrast, were only getting started.) The project was code-named "Have Drill."[653]
The Have Drill tests were conducted by a small group of air force and navy pilots under Teague and VX-4 test pilot Ronald "Mugs" McKeown. As with the earlier Black airplanes, the pilots' introduction to the MiGs was a strange and wonderful experience. Foster recalled being taken to the "hidden location" (i.e., Groom Lake) and entering a huge well-lighted hangar where the gleaming silver MiGs were kept. He was amazed by the "secret site." The MiGs' instruments were in Russian, so the pilots had to be briefed extensively. Their systems were very different than those on American aircraft. This made even such basics as taking off and landing a learning experience.
Taxiing was an "unnatural" experience for American pilots, as the MiGs used air brakes activated by a lever on the stick. (United States aircraft used toe brakes on the rudder pedals.) The American MiG pilot tended to wander around as he taxied out to the Groom Lake runway. An F-4 chase plane followed along behind, giving instructions. Before taking off, one of the officers would climb up on the MiG's wing and give the pilot final words of advice.
To lower the landing gear on an F-4, the pilot threw a switch. On the MiG 17, the pilot had to lift a toggle switch, turn on a pump, wait until the pressure built up, and then put the gear handle down. Once the gear was locked, the pilot turned off the pump and closed the toggle switch.
Flying the MiG 17 reminded Foster of the T-33 trainer in the way it handled. Teague called it the best turning aircraft he had ever flown. To demonstrate, Teague would let an F-4 get into firing position on the MiG 17's tail. Within seconds, the F-4 would be out in front and the MiG 17 in firing position. There was simply no way an F-4 could win a close-in turning fight with a MiG 17.
Very soon, the MiG 17's shortcomings became clear. It had an extremely simple, even crude, control system which lacked the power-boosted controls of American aircraft. Although tight turning at low speeds, the control system would lock up at high speeds. At 425 knots, the plane began to roll to the left as the wing began to warp. Above 450 knots, the plane was uncontrollable — it was actually possible to bend the stick without any control response at all.[654]
The solution became obvious — keep the F-4's speed above 500 knots and take advantage of the MiG 17's poor roll rate. One technique for an F-4 to evade a MiG 17 on its tail was to fake a roll one way, then make a hard turn the other direction. When the MiG tried to follow, the F-4's better roll rate and acceleration would open the distance between them, so the F-4 could turn around and reengage. Another maneuver was to make a turn at a right angle to the MiG's flight path, then accelerate away from the MiG.
These maneuvers also made use of the F-4's advantage in acceleration.
The F-4's twin engines were so powerful it could accelerate out of range of the MiG 17's guns in thirty seconds. It was important for the F-4 to keep its distance from the MiG 17. As long as the F-4 was one and a half miles from the MiG 17, it was outside the reach of the Soviet fighter's guns, but the MiG was within reach of the F-4's missiles.
To turn with the MiG 17, a technique called "lag pursuit" was developed.
The F-4 would follow behind and outside the MiG 17's flight path. Rather than trying to turn inside the MiG (which was impossible), the F-4 would stay to the outside. It would use its higher speed and turn rate to stay behind the MiG 17 and close to missile range.[655]
Tests of the MiG 21 indicated a different set of techniques was needed.
The MiG 21 was almost as fast as the F-4, so running was not an option.
The MiG 21's afterburner put out only a few hundred pounds of thrust.
Foster noted, "I hit the burner and I didn't feel any thrust." The delta-wing design of the MiG 21 also lost energy in turns faster than the F-4 did. The technique therefore was to force the MiG 21 to make vertical turns until its air speed fell below a critical value. With the MiG slowed down, the F-4 was in the superior position.
650
Terence Smith, "2 Syrian MiG 17's Flown to Israel,"
651
Hans-Heiri Stapfer,
652
Industry Observer,
654
Ibid., 136-38; and Lou Drendel,