To better understand how spetsnaz fits into Soviet special operations, it's necessary to briefly examine the many major components of Soviet special forces. It is a complicated matter, since special operations have been undergoing a major change due to the lessons of the Afghanistan war and to the introduction of special helicopter assault units. The Air Assault Force (VDV)
The largest Soviet special force is called the VDV, which is the Russian acronym for Air Assault Forces. The VDV is a semi-independent branch of the army, under central Moscow control for strategic operations. The core of the VDV is the seven air assault divisions stationed around the Soviet Union. The air assault divisions are paratrooper formations, like the U.S. 82d Airborne Division or the British Army's Parachute Regiment. The VDV is a select, elite force and receives a high priority in recruitment. Emphasis is placed on a clean record, and most Soviet paratroopers are recruited out of the Slavic majority: Russians, Ukrainians, and Byelorussians. Athletic ability is prized, especially evidence of leadership skills, such as team leaders in secondary school sports teams. The training is much more rigorous than that in ordinary Soviet units, and is similar to U.S. Marine or airborne training.
Soviet air assault divisions are smaller than tank or motorized rifle divisions but are more heavily mechanized than American or British airborne units. The Soviets use the airmobile BMD armored infantry vehicle as the basis for these formations. However, the Soviets have significant shortages of large transport aircraft to carry so much equipment in a single sortie. So the VDV troops are trained for operations with little mechanized equipment. They are a light infantry force first and foremost, capable of using mechanized equipment if available.
The role of the VDV divisions is to provide the Soviet General Staff with a deep operations force for special missions. A typical operation might involve seizing a bridgehead in advance of a mechanized column. The usefulness of an airborne division is constrained by two factors.
Soviet airlift has decided limits, which probably means that airborne divisions will be used minus their BMDs. When used as light infantry, airborne divisions, in spite of all their fine training, suffer from serious military weaknesses compared to mechanized infantry divisions with less vigorous training. Light infantry divisions are only as mobile as human feet will carry them, and so are less mobile than mechanized infantry in most Western European terrain. More importantly, airborne divisions are very light on firepower. Airborne divisions have little capability to withstand tank attack. They cannot carry sufficient weapons for this contingency by the very nature of their organization. The best enemy of the tank is another tank, and airborne tanks have never really panned out. As was suggested in the fictional scenario where tanks overran Isakov's unit, this problem is endemic to light infantry, and not peculiar to airborne forces alone.
The Soviets concluded as much after World War II. Their study of World War II operations suggested that airborne units are valuable only when used against enemy forces that are already broken, or in peripheral operations. The battle for the Arnhem bridges was one of the clearest examples of the severe limitations of airborne forces during World War H, and the Soviets had several of their own examples with similar outcomes. So in view of these limitations, why do the Soviets still have seven airborne divisions?
The VDV still has its use as a Praetorian Guards. They are an elite force that is more reliable than the rest of the army rabble in the eyes of many Soviet leaders. Like most NATO leaders, the Soviets do not think that a war in Europe is particularly likely. More likely are wars outside of Europe. It is for these wars, not a confrontation with NATO, that the VDV is most useful. The VDV is used in ticklish situations where regular Ground Forces units might be a bit too clumsy. In 1968 in Czechoslovakia, it was the VDV that took over the Prague airport and captured much of the Czech leadership. It is significant that no VDV division is stationed in Central Europe. They are stationed in the USSR itself, and while they may be used in Europe, their orientation is worldwide.
In Afghanistan in 1979, it was a VDV task force that spearheaded the invasion. The VDV units also formed the heart of Soviet counterinsurgency forces in Afghanistan. Many of the regular Ground Forces units were good for little more than guarding towns or conducting futile sweep operations. It was the VDV, with its combination of rugged training and high expectations, that carried out the more successful missions against the mujihadeen.
A recent study of the Afghanistan fighting by the Rand Corporation provided a good example of VDV skills. A mujihadeen unit in Nangrahar province had taken up positions in a mountain overlooking a Soviet base. They had laboriously moved rocket launchers and mortars up the mountain and in September 1986 were bombarding the Soviet base in the valley below. One morning, the mujihadeen was suddenly surprised by a group of about ninety VDV troops, who had scaled the mountain the previous night. One of the soldiers fighting them remarked: "Before that I had thought that the Soviet soldiers are not worth anything, but I must say that I have never seen anything like that. We had good food there and I was in good shape, but I would not have been able to climb that mountain. It was simply impossible for me. These were really tough guys."[34]
The Soviet leadership uses the VDV where the other tough guys fail. The Soviets have a special paramilitary Interior Army (VV), which acts like a state police force. If they need to bust heads during urban disturbances, they call in the Interior Army. But in situations where the Interior Army is unable to quell the rioting, the VDV is put into action. Soviet citizens know when they see the blue berets of the VDV that party time is over. In Azerbaijan and Armenia in 1987, ethnic disputes got out of the control of the local police. The Interior Army was called in. They couldn't handle it. The VDV was called in.
The VDV are classic examples of cold war soldiers. Their training is the best traditional sort— tough, demanding exercises with a focus on the basics of light mfantry. This might not be so useful on a mechanized battlefield, but a mechanized battlefield in Europe is not very likely. Low-intensity wars are probable, and the VDV is the Soviet shock force for these contingencies.
The problem with paratroop operations is the method of delivery. It is strictly one way. You drop them in, then they fight their way out. Or you have to fight your way in to get them out. The Soviets had several airborne operations in World War II in which they dropped a force in and then could not extract it. Helicopter technology is a better solution. Helicopters provide the ability to deposit forces deep behind enemy lines with considerable precision — even better than parachutes, since you don't have to worry about the wind. And better yet, you can extract them once they have completed their mission, or if the going gets too tough.
The Soviets began playing around with airmobile forces in the 1970s. These units are called Desantnaya Shturmvaya (assault landing forces). The concept is closest to U.S. air cavalry or airmobile forces. These forces are organized into brigade-sized formations rather than divisions, called DShB (Day-Shah-Bey) for assault landing brigades. The Soviets have tried a variety of different organizations. The DShB troops are recruited and trained like VDV troops, and appear to be under a similar organization. They are trained in parachuting, but their main means of delivery is the helicopter. There are at least two types of DShB brigades: units that have their own helicopters, and units that depend on regular air force helicopter units to provide the lift.
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The Rand Corporation conducted interviews with Soviet deserters from Afghanistan to prepare an account for the U.S. Army of Soviet military experiences there. Authored by Alexander Alexiev, and entitled "Inside the Soviet Army in Afghanistan," it provides one of the most detailed looks at the capabilities as well as the problems of the Soviet Army today.