The 123d Airmobile Battalion depicted in this fictional scenario is a DShB formation.
The DShB do not have the long lineage of the VDV paratroopers, but their combat role in Afghanistan was every bit as bold. Afghanistan became a helicopter war favoring Soviet airmobile forces just as Vietnam spurred American interest in helicopters. Helicopters give the infantry an incomparable degree of mobility in the worst terrain. Although physical training is still important, an airmobile unit in a helicopter will be better ready for battle than a crack special forces unit that has just trudged up and down the mountains.
It remains to be seen what the Soviets will do in the wake of Afghanistan with the VDV and DShB. The VDV has lost at least one division, disbanded after Afghanistan. The trend seems to be in favor of the heliborne forces. The question is not one of combat role or training, only the mode of delivery. The traditional silk, or the contemporary rotor?
Although not a distinctly different branch of the Ground Forces, Soviet reconnaissance units have long been treated as an elite force. Called razvedchiki in the Soviet Ground Forces, they are the finest troops in their division or regiment. Razvedchiki are recruited from the conscripts on the basis of their athletic skills, intelligence, and composure under stress. They receive continual and more vigorous training than normal Ground Forces troops. Each regiment has a company of razvedchiki, and each division has a battalion. The razvedchiki are scouts. They are placed in the vanguard of the attack to determine the location of enemy positions, or to locate undefended avenues of advance. They are more lightly armed than other combat forces since their main role is to locate the enemy, not engage in battle.
Because of their superior training and leadership, the razvedchiki are also used for any especially demanding missions. For example, if a forward detachment is needed to seize an objective in advance of the main formation, it will usually be assigned to the razvedchiki. If a division plans a sneak raid against enemy positions, the razvedchiki will be the basis of the raiding force.
The practice of incorporating an elite formation within the ordinary divisions is due to several factors. On the one hand, the organization of large numbers of "elite" formations with an armed force has a detrimental effect on the quality of the army as a whole. Elite units tend to draw away the more adventurous and talented soldiers who seek the prestige of the specialist units. These units often boast that their privates are as good as the sergeants in regular units. This is precisely the problem. Elite formations concentrate the best soldiers and leave the main combat formations with mediocre soldiers. This is especially critical in the Soviet Ground Forces, where the NCO ranks are weak already due to the lack of a professional cadre. By establishing an "elite" formation like the razvedchiki within the ordinary divisions, the normal formations can continue to attract talented young soldiers who might otherwise be lured away into specialist units.
In addition, the Soviet Army has severe training shortcomings due to its sheer size and the turmoil of its draft system. The razvedchiki units allow the Soviets to isolate a portion of the combat units and lavish more attention on it. It gives the divisional or regimental commander an especially capable force for occasions when normal motor rifle troops might be too clumsy.
Like the VDV and DShB, the razvedchiki were extensively deployed in Afghanistan. They are more difficult to distinguish than the VDV and the DShB, since they do not wear distinctive uniforms or an insignia, but they are often mentioned in the Soviet military press.
Much has been written about the spetsnaz, but much of it has been fanciful. The role of the spetsnaz appears to bridge the gap between elite special force combat units like the VDV and DShB, and the divisional razvedchiki. The fact that the spetsnaz are under GRU intelligence control suggests that their main role is operational reconnaissance. Spetsnaz units exist at two levels, companies at the army level and brigades at the front level. The unit described in this fictional scenario is an army-level spetsnaz company.
The composition of these units undermines many of the exaggerated tales that have been told about them over the past few years. As mentioned before, they are conscript units, much like any other Soviet unit, but with higher priority in recruitment and training. They are undoubtedly high-quality units. But it is difficult to believe that they are sophisticated enough to carry out disguised sabotage missions. It is highly unlikely that these troops have either the language skills or experience to convincingly blend into a Western European environment. This is not to say that the Soviets do not possess such forces. But such forces demand long-term, professional personnel and are inevitably much smaller in number than the 20,000 to 30,000 figure quoted for spetsnaz. It is more likely that such forces are under the jurisdiction of the KGB due to its control of intelligence and agent networks outside the USSR.
The role of spetsnaz is probably more akin to American LRRP units. That is to say, the units carry out deep reconnaissance missions, far behind enemy lines, but still in uniform. While they may be used in sabotage missions, their primary task is scouting. It is pointless to send a small, highly trained company with modest firepower to attack a large NATO installation when it could be more effectively neutralized by air or missile attack.
Spetsnaz finds the target and can conduct post-strike damage assessment. Spetsnaz may be used to attack smaller, high-value targets such as nuclear delivery systems (Lance missile units), nuclear storage facilities, or vulnerable ammunition dumps. They could also be used to carry out selected commando-style operations such as attacks on key communications links like bridges.
Nevertheless, front and army commanders will probably be reluctant to fritter away a valuable special force unit on a lot of pinprick commando attacks that may have little if any consequence on the conduct of the ground operations. For this reason, they may be consolidated for special high-risk missions directly connected with the offensive ground operations. As the scenario suggests, one such mission would be to act as the vanguard of army-level special forces operations, such as scouting and securing landing zones for critical air assaults.
It should be noted that there was hardly any evidence of spetsnaz operations in Afghanistan. Many of the operations associated with the spetsnaz were simply VDV or DShB operations, or the activity of the razvedchiki. Spetsnaz operations may have been few because of the small number of large-scale (army and front) operations. Assassination of mujihadeen leaders in Pakistan was mostly in the province of the KGB and their Afghan counterparts, the KHAD, not spetsnaz.
The scenario suggests that special forces, whether VDV, DShB, or spetsnaz, have distinct limitations on a mechanized battlefield. In spite of all their training, special forces units are invariably poorly equipped to deal with tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery. The histories of special forces units are filled with examples of elite formations being sent into missions where their reputations offered no protection against superior firepower and mobility. The attempt to seize the Arnhem bridges is one of the more obvious examples, but the Soviets have their own bloody reminder, the ill-fated Dnepr River operation of November 1943. The primary advantage of a special forces operation is surprise. And once that precious commodity has run out, special forces units had better hope for quick relief from regular, more heavily armed formations.
The Soviet Navy has its own special forces, the Naval Infantry and the naval spetsnaz. The Naval Infantry is the Soviet equivalent of the U.S. Marines or Royal Marines. Each of the Soviet fleets has a Naval Infantry brigade or, in some cases, a division. The Soviet Naval Infantry has much the same task as other marine forces: Their primary role is the conduct of amphibious landings. However, Soviet Naval Infantry forces are very small compared to their U.S. counterparts. While the U.S. Marines have about a third the number of divisions of the U.S. Army, the Soviet Naval Infantry is only about one-hundredth the size of the Soviet Ground Forces. This is largely due to the landlocked nature of the USSR, and the lack of a clear mission for the Naval Infantry in a European war.