The next two flights went in, losing two more helicopters to Stingers. There seemed to be two or three Stinger teams, but it was impossible to locate them. It took them time to reload, however, so it was possible to evade them if the flights went in fast enough. In the process of the attack, the squadron claimed eight tanks and the Gepard. It was very hard to tell. The battlefield was awash in smoke and dust. Leonov and Popov made a firing pass without incident, claiming two more tanks. The Stinger fire abated, probably because they were running out of missiles. Two more flights went in without resistance. On the final flight, Mikhail Reiter radioed that he had spotted reinforcements coming in from the west. Another armored column.
Leonov was over the east bank of the Danube when he noticed something moving in the tree line about three kilometers to the west of the landing zone. Then he saw the flashes. Enemy helicopters! The enemy was making a major counterattack from the west, with helicopter support. He radioed a warning to Dudarek's flight, but it was too late. The two surviving helicopters of 4th Flight were hit solidly on the side by antitank missiles. Leonov could now make out two enemy attack helicopters. Apaches! He and Popov broke out of the circle heading toward the enemy helicopters. He steered his helicopter toward the lead aircraft. As he was about to squeeze off the first round, he saw the helicopters fire at least two missiles. Much to his chagrin, the helicopters simply dropped into the forest in a fast vertical descent. His Mi-24 was approaching too fast to follow them, and he turned aside, trying to evade the oncoming missiles. The first missile struck the tail area of Mikhail Popov's helicopter. It spiraled into the forest in flames.
The second missile struck the stub winglet of Leonov's helicopter. It shook violently from the impact. At first, Leonov could not determine where he had been hit. But the helicopter was responding strangely to the controls. Looking back into the troop compartment, he could see jagged holes in the side of the fuselage. Fragmentation from the explosion had apparently damaged the left engine as well. He was getting warning signs of an oil leak. He decided to try to make it back to friendly lines. The enemy helicopters did not follow. They turned their attention to other Soviet aircraft.
Leonov crossed the Danube again, but there was little evidence of Soviet forces. The Germans began firing small arms at his helicopter. He could hear the pitter-patter of rifle fire cutting into the rear fuselage. The main line of fighting became evident about four kilometers east of the river. Judging from all the flashes and fires, an intense land battle was going on. Leonov passed over the main battle area, only to be hit by more small arms fire. This time the right engine simply gave out. A quick landing was called for. He spotted a large open pasture, littered with several destroyed armored vehicles. The landing gear refused to retract, so he tried to slow down his speed to about fifty before impacting.
The helicopter skidded for several hundred meters before hitting a low stone wall. The impact sheered off the remaining stub winglet, and the helicopter smashed over onto its left side. The rotor blades hit the ground, shattering off in large, frightening pieces. The helicopter finally came to rest.
Leonov and his gunner were strapped in, but were still smacked about by the abrupt landing. Leonov's door was above him, and proved hard to open, but he finally struggled free. Sasha was trapped in the front cockpit. His canopy opened to the left side, which was now jammed against the ground. He took a wrench from the tool kit and began punching a hole through the Plexiglas canopy. Leonov helped him pull away the Plexiglas, and Sasha Bershko wiggled out of the cockpit. They jumped down off the wrecked helicopter and began walking away. A small fire had broken out in the engine, but there seemed little danger of an explosion.
Just then a Soviet BTR-80 troop carrier pulled up and several riflemen came running forward. A short Kirghiz private ran up shouting "Stoi." Leonov put his hands up, but in an irritated voice shouted, "Yestem sovyetskim letchikem." The soldier lowered his assault rifle and signaled him to follow.
Leonov wondered what had happened to the rest of the squadron.
Helicopters are a relatively new innovation in land warfare. Although they first saw action in World War II (in very small numbers), it was not until the advent of turbine-powered helicopters in the 1960s that they really caught on. American use of the helicopter in Vietnam cemented its place in the modern arsenal. Soviet experience with the helicopter in Afghanistan has shaped their own interest in this new technology.
Like most novel military technologies, there is considerable controversy over how the new machines should be used. In many respects, the turmoil over helicopter doctrine today resembles tank doctrine in the 1930s. There are many varying viewpoints, and little consensus on key issues. As was the case with tanks in the 1930s, recent combat experience with helicopters has been mainly in peripheral regions, not entirely resembling the nature of warfare between two well-equipped forces. For example, in the case of both Vietnam and Afghanistan, only one side had helicopters, and the opposing side was not well equipped to deal with them. The question remains how helicopters would fare in a war against a first-rate opponent.
The Soviet tendency has been more conservative than the American. The Soviets came into the helicopter business later than the United States, and there are many organizational differences. In the U.S., helicopters are the property of the U.S. Army. They are viewed as an integral part of the ground forces. In the Soviet armed forces, helicopters have remained in the Air Force. They are attached to the Ground Forces for operations, but are trained and equipped by the Air Force. As a result, there are striking differences in the configuration of combat helicopters and the way they are deployed.
In the U.S. Army, attack helicopters are deployed at divisional level. United States armored and mechanized divisions have large organic helicopter units. A typical U.S. division will have more than one hundred fifty helicopters, consisting of about forty-five attack helicopters, forty-five transport helicopters, and sixty-five scout and utility helicopters. In contrast, only a small percentage of Soviet divisions have any helicopters at all. And the few divisions that do have organic helicopter units have only about twenty helicopters, mixed between attack, transport, and light utility helicopters.