The difference between the U.S. and Soviet approach can be traced to two main sources — the Soviet tendency to hoard scarce, high-technology systems at higher echelons; and the cost and maintenance burden posed by helicopters. Since helicopters are air force assets, the Soviets tend to place them under the control of army or front aviation command groups. The Soviets have argued that this allows the army and front commanders to better concentrate these valuable weapons, in much the same way that fixed-wing tactical air support is concentrated. In some respects they see an analogy to the debate over tanks in the 1930s. Then, tanks were usually deployed in small quantities, so-called "penny packets," where their firepower and shock value were diluted. They tended to be subordinated to the infantry for local actions and were not available to higher echelons for grand mobile operations.
While this argument certainly has some merit, it is not particularly illuminating. The U.S. Army not only has divisional helicopter units to provide support in small-scale tactical operations, but it also has larger, independent formations, attached at corps level, for use in large-scale operations by higher echelons of command. The Soviet tendency to argue in favor of concentration above divisional level to some extent masks certain Soviet problems in the combat use of helicopters.
To begin with, helicopters are exceedingly expensive weapons. An attack helicopter will typically cost four or five times as much as a main battle tank. So a battalion of attack helicopters attached to a division costs nearly as much as all of the tanks in a division. For the Soviets to contemplate equipping each division with such precious equipment mandates a major escalation in the cost of each division. It is doubtful that the Soviet Ground Forces will be able to afford this luxury for some time. Instead, an attack regiment (roughly the same size as an American attack helicopter battalion) is attached at army level, to be shared by its three divisions as the situation warrants.
Exclusion of helicopters from the divisions is probably also based on the difficulty and cost of maintaining an aviation branch distinct from the Soviet Air Force. Although helicopters can operate from grass strips, in peacetime they usually operate from paved runways, with prepared hangars and extensive support equipment. For the Soviets to allot helicopters to army divisions would necessitate a major expenditure to build up airfields adjacent to army bases to better integrate the forces. For reasons of economy, it is cheaper to keep the helicopters under air force control, operating out of air force bases and facilities. Expansion of existing air bases is a cheaper alternative to the dispersion of helicopters to a large number of new air bases.
The Soviets also suffer from serious problems in maintaining modern military aircraft. This is in no small measure due to the use of a short-term conscript force. The bulk of ground crews are enlisted personnel who enter the Soviet services with no experience in aviation repair. In the U.S. and much of NATO, teenage boys have access to motorbikes, automobiles, personal computers, CB radios, and other equipment that familiarizes them with the basic concepts of machinery and electronics. Soviet society is far poorer in these consumer products, and Soviet teenagers are more apt to be technologically illiterate when they are drafted into the service. Furthermore, the skills learned in the service are quickly lost as the Soviet NCOs return to civilian life after two years of duty.
The backbone of U.S. Army aviation is a large pool of experienced NCOs and warrant officers. The U.S. can deploy helicopters in the division because it can organize the critical manpower needed to keep the infrastructure running. The Soviet Ground Forces, with low priority in the Soviet manpower pool, has a harder time recruiting suitable personnel for a sizable aviation branch than does the more elite Air Force. The Soviets have tried to alleviate the problem by an emphasis on maintenance simplicity in their helicopter designs. Western operators of civil versions of Soviet military helicopters have found them to be very suitable for use in remote areas due to the ease of maintenance.
On the other hand, Soviet helicopters, like most Soviet aviation products, tend to have much shorter operating lives than comparable NATO designs. For example, the rotor blades of the Mi-2 Hoplite utility helicopter have a retirement life of 1,000 hours. In contrast, the German Bo-105 has a blade life ten times as high, some 10,000 operating hours. The overhaul schedule for the rotor head is 1,000 hours for the Mi-2, and 10,000 hours for the Bo-105. The difference in engine overhaul schedules is less dramatic, but still significant—1,000 hours versus 3,500 hours. The problems are not entirely technological. When queried about the reason for the short blade life, a Soviet engineer indicated that blades were manufactured at factories separate from the helicopter plants where the main incentives are to increase the quantity, not the quality, of blades. Although the designers felt that the blade life could be extended, to do so would lead to a large surplus of rotor blades, endangering the bonuses of the management of the rotor plant. Therefore, the helicopter plant was discouraged from designing more durable rotors. This problem is endemic in the centrally planned economy, which tends to favor quantity of output over quality.
The relative lack of durability of Soviet helicopters also affects the training of pilots. American helicopter pilots who have met their Soviet counterparts in international helicopter sporting events have been favorably impressed by their training and their capabilities. What has shocked the Soviet pilots has been the age of their American counterparts. American helicopter pilots are a good deal younger. The reasons for the difference are easy to trace. American pilots get a great deal more flying time, and therefore build up flying experience much quicker than the Soviets. The Soviets, although as capable as the American pilots, take a longer time to gain experience, due to the restrictions on the number of hours they are allowed to fly. This is directly related to the low durability of Soviet helicopters, and to the high cost of training.
In a wartime situation, these tendencies are likely to have an effect in several areas. To begin with, the Soviet helicopter forces are likely to be the most capable during the initial phases of the war. The relative quality of their forces is likely to drain away faster than that of NATO helicopter units due to the lower durability of the equipment, and to maintenance shortcomings in the ground crews. Furthermore, the Soviet tendency to hoard helicopters at upper echelons of command, and under air force control, implies that Soviet use of helicopters in supporting ground forces will be less flexible than in NATO forces, where there are stronger organic links between the ground and aviation elements. The U.S. Army troops expect helicopter support, since they train regularly with it. Divisions expect scout helicopters to provide divisional reconnaissance, for example. But in the Soviet case, the helicopters are farther up the chain of command, and are less likely to be available for support missions at divisional level. For example, the Soviets still tend to rely on ground units, not on helicopters, for reconnaissance.
Soviet helicopter design is also affected by the orientation of the helicopter forces. Attack helicopters are a good example. A comparison between the AH-1S Cobra gunship and its Soviet counterpart, the Mi-24V Hind D, makes this very clear. The Mi-24 is much more massive than the AH-1S Cobra. The Hind weighs about 10 tons, fully loaded. The Cobra weighs about 7.5 tons fully armed and loaded. The armament load of both helicopters is similar. The difference in weight stems from design factors. The Hind is designed as a fast fire support aircraft, with greater horsepower. It usually fires its weapons during a fast pass, much like a fixed-wing aircraft. The Cobra design places less emphasis on speed and more emphasis on maneuverability in the ground-hugging environment. On antitank missions, the Cobra will usually fire its TOW antitank missiles from a hover. The Hind is not well designed for this role and has difficulty hovering due to the configuration of its stub wings. The mission for the Hind places emphasis on the artillery fire support role in which hovering performance is less important. Typical attack profiles for the Hind call for a fest approach at low altitudes, a pop-up maneuver close to the target, followed by a diving pass and weapons release. Indeed, Soviet helicopters have been used to drop bombs, a practice virtually unheard of in U.S. helicopter units.