The design differences between the American and Soviet helicopters have an odd history. The Mi-24 Hind and its mission closely resemble the notions held by the U.S. Army in the 1960s before the Vietnam experience. Had the American AH-56 Cheyenne helicopter program succeeded, the aircraft would have been very similar to the Soviet Hind. According to Soviet sources, the Mil design bureau was heavily influenced by the Sikorsky entry in the Cheyenne program. Like the Sikorsky S-67 Black Hawk, the Hind has a troop compartment in the center of the aircraft. This allows the Hind to transport eight troops or additional supplies. However, it also makes the helicopter a good deal bulkier than its American counterpart, the AH-1S Cobra.
The next generation of attack helicopter, the American AH-64 Apache and Soviet Mi-28 Havoc, exhibits a greater convergence in design philosophy. The Mi-28, like the AH-64 Apache, places greater emphasis on tank fighting, and so would be better suited to the standoff and hover role. This has real advantages in an area full of antiaircraft defenses like the scenario depicted here. A helicopter that can stand off two or three kilometers from the target and hide in the trees is far less vulnerable to air defenses than one that continues toward the target during the firing pass.
The fictional scenario also illustrates two of the major questions about the nature of helicopter fighting in a future war: the vulnerability of helicopters to air defenses and the probability of helicopter versus helicopter fighting. Although the U.S. lost many helicopters to ground fire in Vietnam, the losses per sortie were so low that they never seriously compromised the use of helicopters in the fighting. In contrast, in 1986-87, the Soviets began losing so many helicopters to the mujihadeen once the Stinger missile appeared, their support missions were seriously curtailed. The presence of man-portable antihelicopter missiles like the Stinger will force attack helicopters to use standoff tactics like those described. A helicopter with a long-range antitank missile can remain masked behind trees, nearly invisible to enemy missile gunners. Furthermore, an infrared seeking missile like the Stinger, or the Soviet SA-16, has a harder time tracking a helicopter flying near the ground, due to the presence of extraneous heat sources such as burning vehicles, building smokestacks, and the like.
The other approach to lessening the threat of the missiles is infrared countermeasures. There are two approaches to this. The simplest is to drop infrared flares, designed to emit heat at the same frequency as the sensitivity of the antihelicopter missile's seeker. These lure the missile away from the helicopter. The other approach is the so-called "Hot Brick" systems, which emit a heat signal that confuses the missile seeker. The problem with these approaches is that newer missiles have multispectral seekers, which look for emissions in several frequencies. The countermeasures may jam one but not the other. The Soviets adopted both approaches in Afghanistan. They proved very effective against old anti-helicopter missiles like the SA-7 Grail but not very effective against the Stinger. The best defense against these missiles may prove to be tactics rather than technology, tactics such as low-altitude flying and standoff weapons attacks.
The proliferation of helicopters on the battlefield also will lead to encounters between helicopters. This already happened in 1982 in the fighting between Israel and Syria in Lebanon, and in the Iran-Iraq war. Helicopters do not have to worry much about fixed-wing aircraft, since they tend to operate so close to the ground and can easily outmaneuver a fixed-wing aircraft. But there are very good chances of running into other helicopters. There has been some talk of special antihelicopter weapons. The first type to be adopted by NATO and the Warsaw Pact is a simple adaptation to carry antihelicopter missiles like the Stinger. Although they were normally designed to be launched from the ground, it has proven fairly easy to design a system to launch them from helicopters.
Many helicopter forces have been slow to adopt specialized weapons for helicopter dogfighting, however. The reason is that existing helicopter weapons may prove adequate for these chance encounters. During encounters with Syrian Gazelle helicopters, the Israelis used TOW wire-guided antitank missiles to shoot down at least one Syrian helicopter. Many attack helicopters also have turret gun systems, which can be used in dogfighting. Reportedly, an Iraqi Mi-24 Hind shot down an Iranian F-4 Phantom jet fighter that was chasing it, using its turreted gun!
One of the most interesting aspects of the helicopter dogfighting controversy is the role of the new Soviet Kamov Hokum helicopter. Many Western analysts see the Hokum as a helicopter fighter, designed primarily to attack NATO helicopters. The Hokum has yet to enter service, and its intended role is not at all clear. It remains to be seen whether the Soviets really think it is worthwhile to invest so much money in a specialized antihelicopter aircraft when existing attack helicopters can perform this function. It is also not clear how survivable such a helicopter would be, since the helicopter role implies that it would be operating over NATO lines where it would be vulnerable to missiles and other air defenses.
In spite of these new threats to the helicopter, the Soviets remain deeply committed to heliborne warfare. The main attraction of the helicopter is the mobility it offers to ground forces. In the transport role, the helicopter offers an alternative to paratroop forces, and paratroop operations are always very risky. The wind can scatter the attacking force, or they can be dropped into the wrong landing zone. Heliborne landings have the classic advantages of paratroop operations— surprise and deep penetration — but the helicopter can reduce the risks of the landing itself. In the fictional scenario, the Soviets used a helicopter force in an operation that probably would have involved paratroops in World War II.
Soviet interest in this type of operation has increased dramatically since the Afghanistan fighting. Afghanistan favored the use of helicopters, as did Vietnam, due to the rough terrain.
The Soviets found that they could move combat units rapidly to counter the elusive Muslim guerrilla forces only by helicopter. In mountainous terrain, road traffic is forced to use narrow mountain roads, which can be easily ambushed. Helicopters have fer fewer problems operating in such conditions.
During the Afghanistan war, the Soviets began using their airmobile units for the first time in combat. Prior to this fighting, the Soviet Ground Forces had planned to use normal motor rifle troops to carry out airmobile operations. However, Afghanistan convinced them that specially trained units, more familiar with airmobile tactics, were more effective. Airmobile units also have to have a different organization than regular motor rifle troops. Airmobile units do not have armored vehicles or motor vehicles to provide fire support and logistical support during most missions. So the units have to be more self-contained, with additional antitank weapons, mortars, and other fire support to make up for the lack of other weapons. The Soviets also found that airmobile tactics require a higher caliber of troops than the run-of-the-mill motor rifle troops. So fer, Soviet airmobile troops are part of the DShB branch of the elite VDV Air Assault Force. These units have fer stricter training demands than normal motor rifle troops and also have higher priority in recruitment. In the Soviet Army, the airmobile units are elite formations, intended for specialized, high-risk operations. It would not be surprising to see the number of Soviet air assault (paratroop) divisions decrease over the next few years, while the air assault (heliborne) and other airmobile units increase.