There are 96 M109s in four battalions in each U.S. heavy division. For heavy firepower, the U.S. Army has battalions of 24 M110A3 203mm howitzers in the corps. The Soviets have 203mm artillery vehicles like the 2S7, and they are found at army and front levels, and not in the division. Finally, the U.S. Army deploys 36 M270 MLRS 227mm multiple rocket launchers in the division, compared to 24 of the smaller Soviet BM-21 multiple rocket launchers. To give some comparison, a single salvo by the howitzers of a U.S. heavy division delivers 6.2 tons of projectiles, while the Soviet howitzers in a division, though more numerous, deliver 4.9 tons.
The multiple rocket launchers add considerably to divisional firepower — a 68-ton salvo in the case of the U.S. division and 12 tons in the case of the Soviet division.
Although the Soviet division's firepower is less than that of a U.S. Army division, in any confrontation in Europe, NATO divisions are likely to be faced by two or three Soviet divisions, often with additional artillery support from army or front level. Modest advantages at divisional level are meaningless if the NATO divisions are confronted by the artillery of several Soviet divisions. The NATO divisions attempt to counteract their quantitative inferiority with technical superiority and proficiency. The effect of artillery is not purely a matter of mass. The first salvo to strike a target is far more effective than any successive salvo. The reasons are simple. If the first salvo can catch the opponent unaware, the projectiles explode before the opponent can seek cover, whether in a trench or in an armored vehicle. Successive waves may continue to be destructive, but the opponent usually has taken defensive measures after the first impact, reducing the effect.
Therefore, the ability to strike a target accurately on the first fire mission is an important advantage in maximizing the impact and lethality of the artillery. The U.S. Army has some notable advantages in this area due to improvements in fire control data handling. The U.S.
Army uses the Tacfire system, which not only provides rapid computer-based firing solutions, but allows the transmission of critical firing data to the batteries more quickly and accurately than traditional methods.
Although artillery remains the branch responsible for causing the greatest number of casualties on the battlefield, it remains largely ineffective against tanks when used in the normal, indirect fire mode. Tanks were largely developed as an antidote to artillery after World War I. Artillery has not been as decisive a weapon since the advent of the armored vehicle. Numerous attempts are being made, however, to increase the lethality of artillery against tanks. As a result, it is likely that in the future artillery will play a greater role in the antiarmor battle. The new artillery antitank projectiles include high-tech approaches, like precision-guided munitions (PGMs), and novel low-tech solutions, like artillery-scattered mines.
Precision-guided munitions have been the buzzword of advanced artillery since the late 1970s. There were glowing reports of technical advances that would permit artillery to fire guided projectiles capable of destroying a tank with a single round. The first generation of these weapons appeared in the U.S. Army in the early 1980s in the form of the Copperhead laser-guided projectile. A forward observer, equipped with a laser designator, aims the laser at an enemy tank. He radios to the artillery vehicle, which fires a Copperhead roughly into the area where the tank is located. The Copperhead picks up the coded laser light reflecting off the tank and guides itself against the tank.
First-generation PGMs like the Copperhead are an advance in the ability of artillery to oppose tanks, but such systems have many shortcomings. The Copperhead requires secure communication links between the forward observer and the artillery. If the radio link is jammed, the weapon is useless. The Copperhead can also be defeated by bad weather. Laser light can be absorbed or deflected by heavy rain, fog, and certain kinds of smoke. But the real problem is that the Copperhead does not provide any really unique capability on the battlefield. At the moment, it is useful only in attacking tanks along the forward edge of the battlefield, since it can be used only against targets that can be seen by the forward observer. Other weapons like antitank guided missiles can perform the same function. And an antitank missile like the U.S. Army TOW is about half the price of a Copperhead. For a PGM to have a revolutionary impact on the battlefield, it must be capable of striking targets beyond the front line, in the depths of the enemy positions. The Copperhead can be used in this fashion if there is a laser-equipped, remotely piloted vehicle (RPV) drone to designate the targets. At the moment, the U.S. Army does not have such a drone. So to be effective, a new generation of PGMs should be autonomous, that is, able to guide itself against the target without the need for a designator. This has proven to be very tricky.
The first weapon of this sort is likely to be the U.S. Army SADARM, an artillery projectile that contains two or more guided submunitions. The 155mm howitzer or MLRS rocket launcher fires the SADARM roughly into the area behind the lines where the enemy tanks have been spotted by reconnaissance aircraft or drones. The projectile opens up, dispersing the SADARM over the target. The submunitions, which are about the size of a soup can, have special plastic parachutes to slow them down. As the submunition falls to earth, the parachute device gives it a slight spiral motion. The first spiral is about 150 yards across, and then gradually grows smaller so that an area 150 yards in all directions is covered. The submunition has what is called a "hybrid" sensor, which uses a tiny millimeter wave radar and infrared sensor to pick up the target. When it finds a target, the submunition is detonated, firing an explosively formed metal slug at the top of the enemy vehicle.
It was originally hoped that the SADARM would be the long-range tank killer that artillery has long sought. It has not lived up to expectations, however. The "footprint" that its sensor sees is small, so it has little chance of engaging a moving tank formation. The SADARM is likely to be effective against stationary tanks and other targets. One of its main roles, as described in the scenario, will be counterbattery fire, for which the SADARM is ideally suited, since self-propelled guns are stationary when firing, and their gun barrels give off a very evident infrared signature that the submunition can easily see.
A third generation of PGMs is under development even before the second generation, like SADARM, has entered service. The third-generation systems are larger, more complex, and more expensive. They are large enough to incorporate guidance surfaces, so they can steer themselves into moving tank targets. They also are large enough to include highly sophisticated computer-processing systems to discriminate between low-priority targets (like trucks) and high-priority targets (like tanks). The first of these is likely to be the TGW (terminally guided warhead), being developed as a joint NATO program. It will be carried on the MLRS multiple rocket launcher. Similar systems are also being developed for conventional artillery howitzers, but they appear to be much farther down the road.
Systems like SADARM may enter service by the early 1990s, and systems like the TGW by the mid-1990s. Do the Soviets have such systems? Probably not yet. The Soviets do not appear to be as advanced as the United States in the critical microprocessor technologies that are needed for PGMs. From Soviet writing, it is evident that they are interested in such systems. Until their industrial base proves capable of developing them, however, Soviet artillery will have limited capability against armored targets.