Zhukov’s eyes were still firmly on Berlin, despite the previously mentioned deployment of most of his forces to clear Pomerania, as the following orders sent to Chuikov show. It is interesting to note that there is no mention of Küstrin, from which one can presume that it was considered too difficult an obstacle to overcome under the immediate circumstances, and that adequate bridging could be provided across the Oder at Reitwein and Kienitz.
On the 4th February we received a Front HQ directive setting the date for the offensive. It said: ‘The Front’s troops shall consolidate their success by active operations in the next six days, bring up all units that have fallen behind, replenish fuel to two allowances per vehicle and ammunition to two establishments, and in a swift assault take Berlin on the 15th–16th February.
In the consolidation period, i.e. 4th–8th February, it is necessary that:
a) The 5th, 8th, 69th and 33rd Armies should capture bridgeheads on the west bank of the Oder. It is desirable for the 8th Guards and 69th Armies to have a common bridgehead between Küstrin and Frankfurt. If all goes well, the 5th and 8th Armies should link their bridgeheads;
b) The 1st Polish and the 47th and 61st Armies, the 2nd Tank Army and the 2nd Cavalry Corps should hurl the enemy back behind the line Ratzebuhr–Falkenburg–Stargard–Altdamm– Oder. Following this, they should leave a covering force pending the arrival of the armies of the 2nd Byelorussian Front, and regroup on the Oder for a breakthrough;
c) Between the 7th and 8th February it is necessary to complete the elimination of the enemy grouping in Posen and Schneidemühl;
d) The means of reinforcement for a breakthrough shall in the main be the same as those available at present;
e) By the 10th February the tank forces and self-propelled artillery shall complete repairs and maintenance so as to put all available resources back into action;
f) The Air Force shall complete deployment and have fuel on the airfields for not fewer than six allowances per aircraft;
g) The Front’s logistical services and the Army rear units shall be fully prepared by the 9th–10th February for the decisive phase of the operation.’[3]
Yet, as Professor Erickson summed up the situation:
For his immediate purposes Zhukov could count on four rifle armies and two tank armies drawn up along ‘the Berlin axis’, but two of the rifle armies–8th Guards and 69th–had detached part of their forces to deal with the fortress of Posen, while Berzarin’s 5th Shock was besieging Küstrin with elements of that army. On the embattled right flank the 1st Polish, 3rd Shock and 61st Armies were forced to leave more divisions to reduce the fortress of Schneidermühl and other strongpoints.
Losses and shortages further denuded Zhukov’s assault forces. Chuikov could only commit 50 per cent of the 8th Guards for the proposed attack on Berlin (the other half of his army was presently held back at Poznan); battle losses had made heavy inroads into Chuikov’s strength, with regiments down to two battalions and the companies reduced to an average strength of 22–45 men. Ammunition was becoming alarmingly scarce and Chuikov had fallen back on using captured German guns with captured ammunition. Berzarin’s 5th Shock Army and the 33rd and 69th Armies also reported growing shortages of ammunition and increasingly depleted ranks. Katukov’s 1st Guards Tank Army mustered 737 tanks and SP guns at the time of breaking through to the Oder, of which 567 were in working order.[4]
Almost at the same time the Soviet troops in the southern bridgehead launched their first major offensive. There was no longer a secure front line, as the German formations clung on to the villages and isolated farms in the almost coverless Oderbruch. Thus Hathenow–almost 5 kilometres from the Oder on the Frankfurt–Küstrin road–was quickly developed into a strongpoint, as was Rathstock, 2 kilometres to the north, but this was soon lost. A few kilometres further on Soviet troops reached and crossed Reichsstrasse 1 near Manschnow, only being stopped when they reached the parallel-running railway. Over-hastily mounted counterattacks failed. Küstrin’s rail and road connections to the hinterland had been severed.
There followed some critical hours during which it was doubtful whether the fortress troops could hold their lines on the southern edge of Kietz and whether they could extend them to the west. However, it was to their benefit that the northern bridgehead remained quiet. The unusually early thaw with its accompanying mud in the Oderbruch valley meant that, with the lack of firm roads, no great counteroffensive could be expected in the near future, and no tanks had appeared in the bridgeheads as yet. The strips of land occupied by the 5th Shock Army to the north and the 8th Guards Army to the south of the fortress were still separated from each other, but at the narrowest point were only 3 kilometres apart, posing an acute and visible threat.
The Soviet occupation of Reitwein attracted considerable harassment from Stuka dive-bombers and from the German artillery, a battery of which was now located in Sachsendorf, where the roads were still congested with refugees, prisoners of war and concentration camp inmates on the move.[5]
For days now the only source of information for the population had been wild rumours. The news that the route to the west was blocked spread more quickly than most. There could be no doubt: there were enough wounded returning to the dressing stations in the town, while all those who had hoped to get a train from Kietz railway station had also returned. No one had been able to leave.[6]
This Saturday, 3 February, however, was the kind of day one sees as a forecast of spring after a long hard winter. The sun was still low in the sky but there was already a pleasant warmth from a cloudless sky, and the last traces of snow were melting away. Some women went out with their babies in prams but kept close to the buildings, aware of the need for flight in an emergency, and, as the only concession to the changed circumstances, never crossing the open squares.
Suddenly there was the sound of aircraft engines and a few heavy explosions marred this peaceful picture for a moment, but the word quickly spread that these were German aircraft and one could see them attacking Reitwein from the Oder bastions. Several dozen people actually gathered on the walls of the Wallkrone to watch a group of Ju 87s and Me 109s flying around and dropping bombs on targets out of sight. Unusually heavy anti-aircraft gunfire filled the sky with sparkling belts of tracer and there were grey-black clouds of smoke from the explosions. Those sightseers busy revelling in memories of Stukas in the ‘Lightning War’ days suddenly fell silent, and were among the first to flee when mortar bombs ripped up the brittle ice at the foot of the bastion. Soon afterwards civilians were barred from the Katte walls, which had been made into a promenade above the river and were popular for taking a stroll.[7]
Luftwaffe Officer Cadet Sergeant Helmut Schmidt witnessed this air activity on 3 February:
At long last our Luftwaffe appeared in the sky. A squadron of Ju 87s made some dashing attacks on targets to the east and south-east of the town. We could watch the dive bombing of the Stukas well from the railway embankment. Their attacks were followed by heavy detonations and mighty clouds of smoke, while our railway hut shook as if in an earthquake. The Ju 87s did not appear to lack for targets.
There was still no sign of the Russian Air Force. Certainly it had not been idle in the meantime. Presumably it had to prepare and occupy airfields nearer to the front line. In my opinion the enemy fighters and bombers would soon be making our life difficult.[8]