“Well, no. I now remember what I said,” the witness admitted. “I believe I did say something like that.”
“Then why are you trying to build up rigor mortis as a more or less infallible time of death in this case and minimizing the body temperature factor?”
“I’m not doing any such thing,” the doctor protested indignantly.
“You have fixed the time of death from two clues which you have stated in your testimony were of value to the.forensic pathologist — postmortem lividity and rigor mortis. Now, what about temperature, Doctor? Did you take the temperature?”
“I did not take the body temperature.”
“Oh, you did not?”
“No, not at that time. The body when I saw it was fully clothed and the only means of taking the body temperature are... well, the body should be unclothed at that time.”
“And when the body was removed it was clothed?”
“Yes.”
“And after the clothes were removed from the body, was the temperature taken?”
“Apparently it was not,” the doctor admitted. “There was some confusion. Someone thought I had taken the temperature. I thought someone else had. In any event, the temperature was not taken.”
“So then,” Mason said, “you’re trying to fix the time of death simply by two things: post-mortem lividity and rigor mortis. Now, in your article, Doctor, you stated that rigor mortis was one of the least dependable indications as to the time of death because varying conditions could affect the onset and development of rigor, and you said nothing whatever about post-mortem lividity. You didn’t even mention it as a factor.”
“Well... no.”
“Isn’t it a fact, Doctor, that someone blundered, and the body temperature was not taken, and because you wanted to make your testimony sound impressive you mentioned post-mortem lividity as being a factor in enabling you to reach your conclusion as to the time of death? Isn’t it a fact that post-mortem lividity, under these circumstances, is meaningless?”
“I object,” Ruskin said. “That question is unfair. It is—”
“What’s unfair about it?” Judge Seymour asked.
“It puts the witness in a bad light.”
“You are evidently assuming,” Judge Seymour said, “that the answer of the witness will be in the affirmative.”
“Well, it is quite apparent from the entire course of the examination,” Ruskin said. “I think that the doctor has tried to be very fair here and—”
“There’s no need for the deputy prosecutor to try and build up the witness in front of the jury at this time,” Mason said. “Let him do that in his argument.”
“I think the objection will be overruled,” Judge Seymour said, “and there will be no further occasion for argument. Answer the question, Doctor.”
The doctor shifted his position on the witness stand, then finally said, “I tried to give my testimony to the best of my ability. It is my considered opinion that death took place between midnight and five o’clock in the morning. I have mentioned certain medical factors which entered into my opinion and influenced it.”
“And isn’t it a fact that you tried to build up your testimony by using the technical term post-mortem lividity simply for the purpose of impressing the Court and the jury?”
“I used the term because I felt under the circumstances of this case it was proper to use it.”
“But according to your own testimony it only showed that, in your opinion, the man had been dead more than five hours.”
“Well, that’s something,” the doctor said.
“It’s something, Doctor, but how did it happen that you didn’t mention post-mortem lividity when you wrote this article?”
“I probably didn’t think of it.”
“Oh, you mean you wrote this article without thinking?”
“I didn’t have to include everything in it.”
“It slipped your mind?”
“I wouldn’t say that.”
“Or did you feel that if you mentioned post-mortem lividity in an article of this kind in an authoritative publication of this kind, your contemporaries who were fully familiar with the phenomenon of postmortem lividity would hold you up to ridicule?”
“Well, it had no place in an article of that sort.”
“It had no place in an article of that sort,” Mason said, “which was an attempt on your part to cover all of the scientific factors in regard to fixing the time of death.”
“That’s right.”
“Then why does it have a place in your testimony here?”
“Because it was a factor. I admit, not an important factor, but a factor.”
“And simply because it showed in your opinion the man had been dead more than five hours, you immediately used it as a barometer to fix the time of death as being within a bracket of fourteen to nineteen hours before you examined the body?”
“There were other factors.”
“Oh, there were?” Mason said. “I asked you to list those factors and you mentioned only rigor mortis and post-mortem lividity.”
“Those were the medical factors,” the doctor snapped. “There were other factors which influenced my judgment.”
“Oh, there were other factors.”
“Certainly.”
“Such as what?”
“The physical factors.”
“And what do you mean by the physical factors?”
“The time element.”
“And what do you mean by the time element?”
“The thundershower, for instance.”
“I see,” Mason said. “Now we’re beginning to get to the gist of your testimony, Doctor. Because you saw tracks in the soft ground, because you were told what time the thundershower took place, you fixed the time of death in your own mind very largely because of those tracks and what you had been told. And now, when you are called on to give your testimony, you attempt to justify those conclusions, based on hearsay, by bolstering them up with medical jargon.”
“That’s not true.”
“But you can’t fix the time of death within definite limits from postmortem lividity?”
“I’ve already answered that question.”
“And you can’t fix it by rigor mortis?”
“It is a factor.”
“But the main factors in your mind when fixing the time of death were the non-medical factors.”
“They helped me arrive at my opinion, yes.”
“And you aren’t an expert in those matters?”
“I have eyes and can see.”
“So you fixed the time of death by taking into consideration what you have referred to as the nonmedical factors.”
“I will say this: that the circumstantial evidence on the ground indicated very definitely and positively that death had taken place before the thunderstorm. Since I found nothing in the medical facts to negative that assumption, I accepted it in my own mind.”
“Now we’re getting down to the real crux of the matter, Doctor,” Mason said. “I want to be fair with you, but I want you to be fair with me. You actually fixed the time of death in your own mind because of that thundershower and the circumstantial evidence on the ground, and simply because you found no medical evidence which would contradict that conclusion, you went on the stand and swore positively that death occurred between midnight and five o’clock in the morning. Now, let’s be fair. Isn’t that what happened?”
“Generally, that’s what happened,” Dr. Jasper said, “and despite your attempt to distort my testimony, the fact remains that death occurred between midnight and five o’clock in the morning.”
“Because of your interpretation of circumstantial evidence rather than medical evidence?”