The soldiers managed to get past the blocked bridge, so that despite its rear position at the beginning of the breakout, the 88th Division managed to save a significant share of its men, probably more than had been expected.719
At 13.00hrs on 16 February General Trowitz of the 57th Division personally gave the orders to his regiment commanders. The original orders for the breakout had to be altered somewhat, as Soviet forces had penetrated into Komarovka, on the southern edge of the pocket. As a result, the units of the 57th Division would have to take a slightly northerly route compared to the original plan. At 17.00hrs the infantry regiments defending the eastern part of the pocket were to disengage from the enemy and move toward Shenderovka. The 676th Regiment should thereafter take up positions to screen off the Soviet forces in the Komarovka area.720
In the evening of 16 February the division’s units began to carry out their orders as planned, but many hours passed without the 57th Division receiving any orders from the XI Corps. Orders to begin the final breakout were requested on many occasions, but not received until the order was relayed by 88th Division. As late as 06.15hrs on 17 February Trowitz’s Division finally began its breakout attempt. Despite the late start, enemy opposition was initially no impediment to the troops, but the traffic jam at the western exit of Shenderovka was a major hindrance. Only one of 57th Division’s artillery batteries made it over the bridge, whereupon it took up its designated position.721
The disengagement from Soviet units in the east posed almost no difficulties for the Germans, but Soviet tanks attacked into the southern part of Shenderovka, from where they could threaten the troops of the 57th Division in the flank. The Soviet commander had brought infantry, mortars, antitank guns, tanks, and artillery to the heights on the sides of the German breakout path. The Soviets had recovered from their initial surprise, and the three main routes could not be made out, so Trowitz’s Division followed on the heels of the SS-Wiking Division.722
Heavy Soviet fire from the Khilki area prevented many vehicles and horse-drawn wagons from getting far from Shenderovka. Soviet tanks attacked from both sides, causing casualties, confusion, and disorder. The German escape to the west was made even more difficult by the many ravines and marshy areas that ran across the route in that direction. Many vehicles were lost, and Trowitz was of the opinion that, even without Soviet fire, the terrain alone would have proved impossible for the vehicles.723
Despite the difficulties, the German soldiers continued southwest. Indeed, they had little choice. Following behind the SS-Wiking Division, the troops of 57th Division also encountered opposition at the forest south of hill 239.0. Some elements of the division persisted in moving through the forest, which brought them to Lisyanka almost unmolested. Other elements of the 57th continued south and were forced to cross the Gniloi Tikich River east of Lisyanka. This turned out to be the more dangerous route, as Soviet units directed fire against the Germans who bunched up near the river bank. No bridge was found, and many soldiers drowned in the cold, swift running water. Trowitz estimated that most of the casualties suffered during the breakout were incurred at the Gniloi Tikich River crossing. By the morning of 18 February some provisional bridges had been created, which even allowed about 20 panje wagons with wounded to cross the river. About 600 wounded were brought out of the pocket this way.724
Despite its difficult task the 57th Division managed to save most of its men, but like the other divisions its heavy equipment and vehicles were lost. To the Germans it seemed that Soviet resistance had been weaker than expected. The major hindrance appears to have been the tank screen south of Dzhurzhentsy and the infantry in the forest south of hill 239.0. Otherwise only flanking fire harassed the German columns, but this did cause significant casualties. In retrospect, the route through the Soviet defenses along the Dzhurzhentsy–Potapintchy road and in the forest south of hill 239.0 was the best one to take. Those German soldiers who made it to the Gniloi Tikich River, on the other hand, faced the dual threat from the river itself and from the Soviet units that were able to fire at German soldiers grouped on the river’s banks.
Although the five divisions played the main roles during the breakout, there were many soldiers who did not belong to any of them. For example, the 389th Division had practically been dissolved. Its soldiers had largely been distributed among other units, and the division commander, Major-General Kruse, had little more than his staff to command. He nevertheless managed to assemble about 2,500–3,000 assorted men near the forest south of hill 239.0, from where he led them along the railroad north of the Gniloi Tikich River, to reach Lisyanka. Many wounded on panje wagons were thus brought to the temporary safety at Lisyanka.725
As somewhere around 50,000 men were inside the pocket at the time of the breakout, the fates of individual soldiers could differ considerably. Anton Meiser found himself in Novo Buda when the breakout began, at 23.00hrs on 16 February. He belonged to a unit that was to cover the flank until the morning, when it was to leave its positions and join the breakout. During the nervous night hardly anyone could sleep. Anxiously, the soldiers waited until their part in the breakout was to begin. Finally, at dawn a rider came with the order for Meiser’s group: “Breakout has begun according to plan. Spearheads advance successfully. Enemy must however be pushed back further. All are to advance according to plan.”726
The men cheered briefly before beginning to move westward. Meiser froze in the icy air, as his thin coat provided little shelter. From the hill he could make out the columns of vehicles heading west, using the last of their fuel, and the horse-drawn wagons carrying the wounded. The deep snow made it hard work to get forward, and many vehicles came to a halt because of the ground, the snow, and the traffic jams. Suddenly tank engines were heard. Due to the snowfall, visibility was poor, but occasionally the wind cleared the air and Meiser could see Soviet tanks approaching both from south and east. The nine men of his little group only had six rifles, three machine pistols, two pistols, and a few hand grenades, hardly proper weapons to defeat tanks. There was no alternative but to flee southwest.727
In front of Meiser there was a flat, snow-covered area. He and many others fled over the field, only to discover that it was a small lake, covered by a thin sheet of ice under a blanket of snow. Unable to carry the weight of the large number of soldiers, the ice sheet broke and Meiser, like many around him, sank into the water up to his chest. Some drowned there, but the other soldiers were determined to survive. Meiser continued forward until he finally found solid ground under his feet. He had lost his machine pistol in the water, but he continued southwest as fast as he could, now freezing in his wet clothes.728
All semblance of order had disappeared. Those who were hit were left behind and lost, all who still had strong enough legs continued westward as fast as they could, hastened by the fire from Soviet units on both sides of the corridor. Sometimes Meiser stumbled over a corpse, occasionally an arm from someone who was still dying could be seen above the snow. The frightful sounds from the wounded completed the terrible scene. A lieutenant from the SS-Wallonien Brigade shook his head and said: “What has become of the German army?” He, Meiser, and a sergeant assembled to discuss bringing the rout into some kind of order. They had hardly begun when strange sounds were heard from what was believed to be a corpse. When they looked closer they found a major who had suffered a complete nervous breakdown. The three men asked him to get up, to assume command, and halt the rout, but even kicking him had no effect. Most likely he soon froze to death.729