“On February 15, [1945] he [Dudley A. Amoss] was leading his flight away from strafing a German airfield near Amberg when he spotted a Messerschmitt Me 262 jet at two o’clock at 1,000 feet altitude, on a 175-degree course.
“‘It took awhile,’ Amoss recalled. ‘I was studying him as he was coming at me. He was higher than I was, but as he closed I realized, ‘That sonovabitch is a Jerry bastard.’ I kept flying lower like I didn’t see him. We passed each other and I was below him—I figured he was going to a Kraut field. As soon as I passed underneath him I gave it a little seeing room, then I spun around, got the old drop on him and started checking the guns, kind of got him in the position where he wasn’t too happy. I know I drilled the airplane, but I didn’t hurt him, because after the war I got a letter from him. That was fine by me—I didn’t look to kill ’em, just get the planes.’
“A more formal description of the outcome appeared in Amoss’ combat report: ‘He was in a shallow turn to port when I came in behind him and started closing. Observing black smoke, I gave full throttle and started firing between 600 and 800 yards. In a six second burst I noticed hits on the blow job’s engines, and as he slowed down, I pulled out to the side for a closer look. I pulled in behind again and, at 200 yards, gave him a series of short bursts. This time there were strikes all over the Me 262 and after an explosion he burst into flames. I thought the pilot had been killed and pulled out to the side to watch him crash. The pilot then catapulted ten feet straight out the port side and his chute opened almost immediately at 500 feet. The burning plane turned crazily around about and crashed with another explosion and burned furiously.’”
Amoss’ victim on this occasion was Me 262A-1a Werke Nr. 110 942, code letters B3+LS of the III Gruppe (Jagd) of Kampfgeschwader (KG) 54. Its pilot, Unteroffizier Hermann Litzinger, described his experience: “I attempted my fifth try at a landing and reported in by radio at the start point and was advised to be aware of enemy planes over Ammersee at six hundred meters. The landing gear would not retract, so I slowed down and went to three hundred meters in the airfield circuit.
“At this time, I heard a groaning noise and suspected it was the landing gear retracting. I suddenly realized it was the first hits from Mustang gunfire. I was completely unaware until now that I was under attack. I looked quickly outside and saw the left turbine had flame coming out of it. I reacted quickly, cabin cover off, seat belt, off, pulled the machine tightly and quickly up, released the stick, and was pulled by air suction immediately out of the seat. After my parachute opened, two Mustangs circled around me and then shot at me. To immediately quicken my descent, I slipped some air from my parachute and quickly landed on a frozen field near the airfield at Neuburg.”{4}
The early flights of the Me 262 in 1943-44 were invaluable for the test pilots, but until they were flown operationally in combat, the truest test of all, the unknown factors that would normally prove inconvenient could in fact prove deadly. Conditions that were mentioned by early jet pilots were the sluggish takeoff ability and the very fast landing speeds, even with the flaps extended. Georg-Peter Eder discussed one landing he had that was of particular interest:
“I was coming in after a mission, and I had the entire American air force on my ass. I had to get down. Even though I did not have any damage, my fuel light was on, warning me. I had perhaps a minute of fuel left, and then I would be a slow, heavy glider, and more than likely dead. I saw the field, put the nose down, and dropped the gear. The lock light went on, and I realized I was still doing over eight hundred kilometers per hour. The wheels hit the ground, and I knew that if I applied the brakes at that speed I would rip something off of the undercarriage.
“Well, I lowered the flaps and pulled the throttle all the way back. The engines died, probably from lack of fuel, but I was still going faster than if I were taking off. I ran out of airfield and plowed into the grass at the far end. Ironically enough, I was lucky, because every square foot of ground behind me and where I should have stopped was full of large bullet holes. If I had not overshot the runway I would have been hit and probably killed. Such is war I guess.”{5}
The later addition of full-span leading edge slats helped increase the overall lift produced by the wing for faster takeoff and a more controlled landing posture. This improvement also assisted in making tight turns or reducing stall at low speeds, a tactic that some Germans used to great effect when in tight turns while engaged with enemy fighters. The pilots discovered that the Me 262 held its speed in tight turns much better than conventional fighters, and while not as tight, it was more stable at full power, which provided much more energy retention and stabilizing lift in sharp angled and turning maneuvers. Therefore, in effect, as long as a jet pilot was not lured into a low and slow turning fight, or caught landing or taking off, or trying to out-turn an enemy, he had few problems in combat, with exception to pilot error. Walter Krupinski gave his impressions of combat in the jet:
“The only great downside to having the jet was the loss of maneuverability; we could not turn as tight as the other fighters, so speed was our life insurance. The other problem with such a fast attacking and closing speed was that, just as the enemy gunners had little time to lead you for a kill, you had much less time to pick out a target. You had to be right the first time, and if you did not have rockets, you had to adjust your shooting to compensate for the much slower targets. In this case, there was very little deflection shooting. You closed in quickly, fired a quick burst, and then you left.”{6}
However, most jet pilots learned that their greatest nemesis was not air combat, it was takeoff and landing, with landing being a very dangerous business after breaking off contact with the enemy. Losses to enemy fighters in this manner would account for the vast majority of combat losses, far exceeding flying accidents, as stated by Krupinski:
“The one method they would use was going to our airfields and shooting them up. They knew where we were; it was no great secret. These guys would hang around and try to catch us landing, hoping for an easy kill. This was why we had Fw 190s or Me 109s that would fly cover for us to protect our landings. The other problem you had was that after you broke contact, and were usually out of ammunition and low on fuel, the enemy fighters would be following a few miles behind you. On a good day, you probably had about ten to fifteen minutes to approach, extend your gear hoping it would work, land, and get out of the cockpit. Many times, we jumped out of our jets to have the shadows of enemy fighters pass overhead as they strafed us.
“We had many such missions, but we also ran into American fighters. Mustangs were a constant problem, and they would always follow us home, hoping for an easy kill. Taking off and landing, as I have said, were the most tense moments for a 262 pilot, as the plane built up speed slowly, and you could stall out easily if you pushed the throttles forward too quickly, which caused a flameout. This happened several times with pilots, and we finally learned how to throttle up slowly without killing ourselves.”{7}
Oberleutnant Franz Stigler, who also flew the Me 262, had his personal observations on the dangers of even trying to get into the air when under attack: “When the alert sounded, your heart was really in your mouth. You knew that from a cold start it would take about four to five minutes for the engines to get up to the operating temperature, allowing a takeoff. That is an eternity when you have the worry of an enemy fighter swooping down on you, killing you in the traffic pattern or trying to lift off, or landing. Pray that you do not stall or flame out an engine either.”{8}