The unit had claimed twenty-two enemy aircraft with a loss of twenty-six of their Me 262s, of which eight jets were lost due to accidents and mechanical failures. Like a Phoenix rising from the ashes, following the death of their young kommodore, Kommando Nowotny was re-designated JG-7 under the command of soon-to-be-promoted Major Georg-Peter Eder, and soon afterward Oberstleutnant Johannes Steinhoff, until he was banished to Italy, and then later joined Galland in JV-44 (which is discussed in the next chapter).
As a result of Nowotny’s efforts and Galland’s influence, the unit’s successor, JG-7, was to become the strongest jet unit in terms of number of planes and pilots. By November 19, 1944, III.JG-7 had formed as the first gruppe of the new geschwader. Initially based out of Lechfeld once leaving Achmer and commanded by Major Erich Hohagen, III.JG-7 suffered from an inadequate supply of new aircraft and replacement parts. Another problem was that the headquarters in Berlin was staffed by non-pilots for the most part, so new pilots just out of flight school were being assigned to jet units, which Galland called “a criminal act.”
The first weeks were a period of frantic organization and activity as new jets arrived and pilots were trained in flying them. They also had their share of training accidents, with ten Me 262s being lost in the first six weeks due to mechanical failure or pilot error. Many of these were engine fires due to both faulty parts and student pilots ramming the throttles forward too rapidly in takeoff.
Later, JG-7 was expanded with the addition of I and II gruppe located at Brandenburg-Briest, when Oberstleutnant Johannes Steinhoff was assigned as the new kommodore. For the next six weeks, he worked to mold them into an effective fighting force, as he explained:
“Eder had been wounded again, and Galland called me. This was just before the Fighter’s Revolt, and my being banished to Italy, where I commanded JG-77. When I was asked if I would like to fly jets, I did not hesitate. I caught the next transport to Munich, met with Galland, who was not in the best of moods. The ‘Fat One’ had really been getting under his skin since he had been fired as General of the Fighters. Ironically, he had just been promoted another rank in November [1944] to generalleutnant, but he had no command.
“The unit was named JG-7 from the former Kommando Nowotny, and when I took over command we were receiving a lot of jets. Hohagen had done a marvelous job given what he had to work with. The problem was that many were not combat ready. I had about a dozen or so that did not have engines; they came later. Quite a few did not have the avionics packages, since those were made at a different location, and the train bringing parts had been bombed. Then there was the fuel situation. This was supposed to be delivered by rail also, but since the tracks were out, they decided to bring the drums of fuel by road in trucks, which were strafed.
“I finally had what I needed to place about thirty jets in the air, and I had almost sixty pilots, most not yet qualified in the jet. I also had to get qualified, so I began my transition training, which was an easy thing to do for an experienced pilot. Once I was comfortable, I then began my version of the training model. By the time I was replaced by [Major] Rudi [Rudolf] Sinner and went to Galland’s JV-44, the unit was quite formidable.”{7}
Erich Hohagen described his problems as the first kommandeur of III./JG-7 following the creation of the unit:
“I was in command for a brief time, and when the gruppe was to be expanded as a geschwader, Steinhoff came in. I was very happy, as I hated the idea of being in command, with all of the paperwork, political problems, and operational issues that erupted. I think that any real fighter pilot hates a desk, and I was no exception. Steinhoff felt the same way. When he arrived with Galland, I said to him: ‘Oberstleutnant, I present you your new command,’ and Galland laughed. Steinhoff looked at me, and asked where the operations room was. I pointed to it, and we walked inside. He looked at the small desk, one telephone, and the radio array sitting against the wall to the left.
“He looked around and said, ‘Take the desk outside, I will work from there.’ I had the desk moved, and as the men moved it, I asked him why he wanted the desk outside. He said: ‘Because I want the men to see that I am omnipresent, watching everything, without walls to hide behind.’ I thought that was quite a telling comment, as few leaders worked and walked around the men, so to speak. Steinhoff always wanted to be visible, asking questions, addressing concerns. I would also say that we in the jet units were more relaxed when it came to our military bearing. We still saluted, but the ramrod stiff days of the war were gone; every man chosen to fly was pretty much a veteran of a long war, and we all felt that we had more important things to worry about than clicking our heels together.
“Galland pulled me aside and asked for the reports and paperwork on the jets, fuel, munitions, pilot rosters, everything. I handed him three folders. We all three sat down, all three of us, and went through everything. I think that when Steinhoff saw all of the problems that were beyond our control, he was a little overwhelmed. His quick mind immediately began working out solutions, as he wrote notes to himself.
“We did not even have a flight training manual for the jets. An already qualified pilot gave pilots hands-on instruction. This Steinhoff liked, and I agreed with him that manuals tended to be a waste of time. I worked him, got him checked out along with Franz Schall, and he was qualified within a few hours, a really quick study. He then placed me as the executive officer handling requisitions, and he personally joined Schall in the training program. Within two weeks we had an operational unit on paper. We still had to have working jets.”{8}
The pilots’ straining was apparently the easiest part of the program, as demonstrated by the interviews that were conducted with the jet pilots by this author. A clear example is the following excerpt, as stated in Dr. Alfred Price’s outstanding book The Last Year of the Luftwaffe: May 1944–May 1945:
In March 1945 Leutnant Walther Hagenah, an experienced fighter pilot who earlier had flown with Sturmgruppe JG-3, was posted to III./JG-7 at Lärz. He described the cursory training he received before flying the Me 262:
“Our ‘ground school’ lasted one afternoon. We were told of the peculiarities of the jet engine, the dangers of flaming out at high altitude, and their poor acceleration at low speeds. The vital importance of handling the throttles was impressed upon us, lest the engines catch fire. But we were not permitted to look inside the cowling of the jet engine, we were told it was very secret and we did not need to know about it!