The crews on the E-8 JSTARS aircraft provided the location of vehicles or convoys that were moving in the KEZ. We found these crews to be very professional and accurate in their assessments of convoy size, makeup, and location. Initially we relied heavily on JSTARS for target information and found ourselves rushing (as fast as a Hog can rush) across Kosovo to identify all convoys, discovering that the vast majority of them were civilian vehicles. The Serbs quickly countered the JSTARS capability by hiding their armored vehicles and mixing their other military vehicles in among the civilian cars, trucks, and tractors that made up the large refugee convoys. Often we were called to identify a convoy while in the process of setting up to attack a valid target. We would abort that attack, fly to the convoy, confirm it was limited to refugee vehicles, run out of gas, and be forced to return to base or go to the tanker. That approach left the original valid targets undamaged. We agreed within the first two weeks to change tactics. The JSTARS crew members would give us an initial target-area briefing, and then we would “pull” information rather than have them “push” it—unless, of course, they saw a particularly interesting target.
There were too few JSTARS aircraft in-theater to provide around-the-clock coverage. The CAOC directed JSTARS to support daylight KEZ operations, which left the night uncovered. We later concluded that the E-8 would have been much more productive had it flown at night. The Serbs generally stopped moving equipment during the day because we had been successful in acquiring them visually and picking them off. However, they became very active at night—moving and digging like crazy. Every morning artillery had been moved to new pits; more revetments, tunnels, and dugouts had been constructed to protect APCs; and the wreckage of the armor and artillery that we destroyed the day before had been recovered and moved.
Our proposal to switch JSTARS from day to night operations was passed to the CAOC. We reasoned that the JSTARS crews would be able to observe the Serbs’ nightly movements and inform us where they had relocated their weaponry, so that at daybreak we could schwack ’em. JSTARS would also be able to assist the nighttime F-16CG and Guard A-10 FACs. The CAOC rejected our proposal, beliving that JSTARS aircraft were needed during the day, when most small Serbian military targets were being struck.
The lack of satellites or drone imagery was also a serious void in our tool kit for locating targets. We did not have a dedicated imagery-production process to provide our unit with photos of the Serbs’ fielded forces. Perhaps those targets did not have sufficient priority or had been deemed “too hard” to locate. Whatever the reason, the CAOC provided imagery on only a few occasions.
The 40th EOG’s operations-intelligence section contained some of the unsung heroes in the A-10’s OAF success. This outstanding group was comprised of elements from the 52d FW at Spang and the 23d Fighter Group at Pope, and was well led by 1st Lt Stephen “Al” Smith and Capt Kenneth R. “Ken” Uhler. Their creative response to the imagery problem provided us with many good pictures that resulted in numerous confirmed kills. They fought hard to acquire the equipment necessary to access the Web sites that contained classified US imagery and then spent two to three hours every night searching and downloading satellite target pictures of Serbian forces in the KEZ. They also built a solid working relationship with the British intelligence section located across the street from our operations building. Their GR-7 Harriers often carried photoreconnaissance pods, and our intel counterparts would process the morning’s film, analyze and enlarge the best prospects, and then bring them over to our unit. From these two sources, Al and Ken built the eagerly anticipated “Hog menu of the day” target list. Some days were richer than others, but the Hog menu usually included at least three and as many as seven targets.
Sadly, there was another source of beautiful imagery for finding Serb army targets that we were unable to exploit. The French army operated ground-controlled reconnaissance drones and routinely collected imagery during the course of the conflict that could have been very valuable. We were unable to use it because we did not even know it existed. I first became aware of this capability a year after OAF while visiting a large open house in September 2000 that was hosted jointly by the French army and the French Joint Defense College. There I met members of the 61st Artillery Regiment as they displayed their CL 289 and Crecerelle optical and IR-imagery drones. They explained that their drones were able to take both day and night pictures, and that they also had data links for real-time imagery transmission. Curious, I asked their leader if they had participated in any recent operations. A lieutenant said, “Yes, Kosovo.” I then asked them from where, and they replied “Kumanovo”—which had been our Macedonian entry point into the eastern half of the KEZ. I asked them how they employed their drones, and they said they flew them daily to determine the positions of Serb army tanks, APCs, and artillery—exactly in the areas where we flew our missions. They normally flew them at night so that they would have a good ground order of battle for the beginning of the day. I asked if their operations had been effective. They said, “Yes,” and added that they got very good, if not complete, information on Serb army dispositions. I asked them to whom they sent their imagery, and they said to the normal French army-intelligence channels.
I was flabbergasted. As the sun went up each day, we were always the first AFACs across the border, and we desperately needed that kind of imagery to find targets. The French imagery would have been perfect for us since it could have been delivered close enough to real time that the enemy could not have moved his weaponry before we arrived overhead. Someone had it—but we didn’t. I can’t speculate on where it went or why it never got to us, but obviously every possibility for obtaining crucial target information should be exploited.
Another good source of current target information was the CAOC’s force-level execution (FLEX) targeting cell. The FLEX cell fused information gained from various sources, using a variety of methods, and was often able to determine the location of actively operating Serb army units and command posts. For example, when a Serb artillery unit fired on a Kosovar village, the US Army’s counterbattery radar could plot the Serbs’ position. Similarly, when a Serb command post transmitted orders on its radios, our electronic warfare (EW) folks could triangulate its location. The FLEX cell also received target information from Predator drones. The cell fused all of this information and passed it to the ABCCC, which would then contact the AFAC in the area nearest the suspected target. The AFAC would then take a look, and our experience confirmed that the FLEX information was usually quite accurate. The marriage of drones and AFACs to locate and engage targets was a first for either combat or training operations. Sometimes it worked well, and sometimes it didn’t. Our pioneering work with Predator is addressed more fully in chapter 7.
