Even with all this high-tech help, we still located about 80 percent of the targets we engaged using our Mk-1 eyeballs, augmented by our trusty 12-power gyrostabilized binoculars. A typical OAF AFAC scenario would begin with thorough flight planning using the best target information available from all sources. After takeoff the AFAC would contact ABCCC and/or JSTARS and integrate their updates into his mission planning while en route to the KEZ. He would then proceed directly to the target areas. The AFAC would focus on either the highest priority target or the one that had the highest likelihood of being found. Failing to find anything to attack at the target coordinates and lacking any other good target information, the AFAC would proceed to areas where his experience suggested that he might find something worth attacking.
When AFACs looked for a particular target around a set of coordinates, their observant, naked eyes could often spot telltale signs of other targets—new revetments, tracks leading into the woods, and unusually configured shapes on a hillside. “Well, looky here!” was our normal reaction. The AFAC would then use his binoculars to get a closer look, and if it proved to be a valid target, he’d set up attacks. After our AFACs returned to the squadron, they compiled their own list of AFAC-located (but not destroyed) targets to be included in the daily mission reports to the CAOC and for follow-on AFACs to use in their flight planning.
Rules of Engagement
Rules of engagement are exactly what the term implies—rules that limit friendly forces’ operations as they engage hostile forces. There were two levels of ROEs during OAF: those imposed by the integrated NATO command authorities and those imposed by nations (or their organic commands) on their own forces. In most cases, national ROEs were more restrictive. For example, out of concern for the vulnerability of their particular aircraft, some nations raised the minimum-attack altitude for their aircraft to above that published in the NATO ROEs.
ROEs were proposed, developed, and changed at several levels within the command hierarchy. In our case, ROEs originated with and were reviewed by political authorities at the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in Brussels; SACEUR at Mons, Belgium; commander, AFSOUTH at Naples, Italy; commander, AIRSOUTH; and the CFACC. We understood that commander of AFSOUTH, at the operational level, was the chief ROE-setting authority.
NATO authorities “published” air-campaign ROEs in several documents that were then disseminated to subordinate headquarters and units. ROEs were published in the air operations directive and special instructions (SPINS). Additionally, because ROEs often changed, the CAOC dedicated a section of the daily ATO to list all of the ROEs applicable to that day’s sorties. All OAF units reviewed that dedicated section during their pre-mission preparation and found it very useful.
ROEs for KEZ operations fell into three general categories: altitude restrictions, restricted (no-attack) zones on the ground, and procedures to lower the risk of collateral damage. Altitude restrictions were designed to minimize the risk to aircrews from SAM and AAA threats. Higher altitude either puts the aircraft above the enemy’s effective capability or provides the aircrew with enough time to react and defeat the surface-to-air threats. On 30 March, at the outset of CAIFF operations, we were given the same minimum-altitude restriction as aircraft flying in interdiction packages—15,000 feet AGL. Although it kept us relatively safe, this altitude made identification of small military vehicles very difficult and rendered A-10 attacks practically impossible. By 6 April the mission-support elements of the standard KEZ package (SEAD, EW, ABCCC, NAEW, and combat air patrol [CAP]) had demonstrated their ability to suppress the most lethal Serb threats, and we were able to convince the CAOC to let AFACs descend to 10,000 feet AGL.
We operated with that minimum ROE altitude until 14 April—the tragic day when a civilian-vehicle convoy was incorrectly identified as a Serb military target and attacked by NATO aircraft. In reaction to this incident, the CAOC changed the minimum altitudes for KEZ operations to improve target confirmation. AFACs could descend to 5,000 feet AGL, and all fighters could descend to 8,000 feet AGL during target attack. These ROEs seemed backwards to us Hog drivers at Gioia. Most enemy missile launches occurred while the AFACs were searching for targets, focused on the ground, and doing very little maneuvering—not during weapons delivery. We immediately directed all of our pilots to conduct target search no lower than 10,000 feet AGL.
No-attack zones were geographically defined areas within Kosovo in which we could not expend ordnance. Restricted areas were also geographically defined areas within Kosovo where weapons could be employed only after receiving CAOC permission. Various authorities had established these zones for a variety of reasons. The first such area to appear in the ROEs was the no-attack zone within 10 nautical miles of the Macedonian border. While at first we did not understand, we later learned that the zone was meant to reduce the risk of possible Serb reprisals on NATO troops in Macedonia. Authorities apparently believed that the Serbs might confuse the source of the ordnance raining down on them. Their concern was that the Serbs would ignore the NATO fighters overhead, credit the attacks to NATO artillery to the south, and expand the war into Macedonia. Other restricted areas were created near the end of the campaign, particularly in areas where it was thought the KLA was operating or where refugees were gathered.
Finally, we followed a variety of rules designed to lower the risk of collateral damage, commonly defined as the unintentional or incidental injury or damage to persons or objects that are not military targets. The various rules included a temporary prohibition on the use of cluster munitions, the requirement for CAOC approval before attacking targets close to civilian structures, and restrictions on the type and color of vehicles that could be engaged.
Each of these rules had intentional and unintentional consequences for target identification and target engagement. ROEs calling for higher minimum made the pilots’ task of judging whether the vehicles on the ground were civilian or military more difficult. The border of a no-attack zone meant the enemy could move from imminent danger on one side of a road to sanctuary on the other side. Other attack restrictions on areas, munitions, and target categories slowed down the prosecution of attacks. During this waiting period targets could escape by moving to a sanctuary area, weather might move in and hide them from attack, or the waiting attack aircraft might run low on fuel and be forced to depart before receiving an attack clearance.
Approval Process
In the beginning of KEZ operations, the ROEs were quite simple: AFACs were their own attack-clearance authority after they had determined that the suspected object was a valid military target. CAOC approval was required only when the AFAC judged that the attack might cause collateral damage—usually to civilian buildings. During the course of the conflict, many additional target types were moved from the discretionary list to one that required CAOC approval. Later, geographic areas were defined, and targets in those new restricted areas required CAOC approval prior to attack.
AFACs often became frustrated when it appeared the CAOC was second-guessing the targets they had chosen to attack. For example, on the second day of KEZ attacks, near the southwestern border of Kosovo, I had located two large, darkgreen military deuce-and-a-half trucks, complete with curved canvas tops. They were parked just off an asphalt road on the north side of high terrain, northwest of Mount Pastrik. As I talked a flight of Dutch F-16s through an attack on these two targets, ABCCC called in-the-clear, on strike frequency, and asked whether I had positively confirmed that the target was military. I responded, “Yes.” The F-16s had missed on their first pass, so I directed them to make another attack. Apparently my answer to the ABCCC wasn’t sufficient for the CAOC. ABCCC then asked me to describe the target—evidently to personally confirm that it was military. Because we had already received AAA fire, I didn’t think we should loiter in this area. Barely able to maintain my composure, I described the trucks in detail. After landing I called our CAOC representative who told me that since JSTARS had not detected trucks in that area, the battle-staff director needed additional assurance on the target. In this case, JSTARS could not see the trucks because a high mountain blocked the line of sight between its radar orbit and the trucks. Likewise, the E-8’s moving-target indicator would not have highlighted the parked trucks.