It was not possible to conceal these activities completely from the public, and, indeed,
government spokesmen referred to them occasionally in trial balloons. On 3 May,
Chamberlain suggested an Anglo-German nonaggression pact, although only five days
earlier Hitler had denounced the Anglo-German naval agreement of 1935 and the Polish-
German nonaggression pact of 1934. As late as 28 August, Sir Nevile Henderson offered
Germany a British alliance if she were successful in direct negotiations with the
Poles.(19) This, however, was a personal statement and probably went further than
Halifax would have been willing to go by 1939. Halifax apparently had little faith in
Chamberlain's ability to obtain any settlement with the Germans. If, by means of another
Munich, he could have obtained a German-Polish settlement that would satisfy Germany
and avoid war, he would have taken it. It was the hope of such an agreement that
prevented him from making any real agreement with Russia, for it was, apparently, the
expectation of the British government that if the Germans could get the Polish Corridor
by negotiation, they could then drive into Russia across the Baltic States. For this reason,
in the negotiations with Russia, Halifax refused any multilateral pact against aggression,
any guarantee of the Baltic States, or any tripartite guarantee of Poland. Instead, he
sought to get nothing more than a unilateral Russian guarantee to Poland to match the
British guarantee to the same country. This was much too dangerous for Russia to
swallow, since it would leave her with a commitment which could lead to war and with
no promise of British aid to her if she were attacked directly, after a Polish settlement, or
indirectly across the Baltic States. Only after the German Soviet Nonaggression Pact of
21 August 1939 did Halifax implement the unilateral guarantee to Poland with a more
formal mutual assistance pact between Britain and Poland. This was done to warn Hitler
that an attack on Poland would bring Britain into the war under pressure of British public
opinion. Hitler, as usual, paid no attention to Britain. Even after the German attack on
Poland, the British government was reluctant to fulfill this pact and spent almost three
days asking the Germans to return to negotiation. Even after the British were forced to
declare war on Germany, they made no effort to fight, contenting themselves with
dropping leaflets on Germany. We now know that the German generals had moved so
much of their forces to the east that they were gravely worried at the effects which might
follow an Allied attack on western Germany or even an aerial bombing of the Ruhr.
In these events of 1939, the Milner Group took little part. They must have known of
the negotiations with Germany and probably did not disapprove of them, but they had
little faith in them and by the early summer of 1939 were probably convinced that war
with Germany was inevitable in the long run. In this view Halifax probably shared, but
other former members of the Group, such as Hoare and Simon, by now were completely
in the Chamberlain group and can no longer be regarded as members of the Milner
Group. From June 1939 to May 1940, the fissure between the Milner Group and the
Chamberlain government became wider.
From the outbreak of war, the Milner Group were determined to fight the war
against Germany; the Chamberlain group, on the other hand, were very reluctant to
fight Germany, preferring to combine a declared but un-fought war with Germany
with a fought but undeclared war with Russia. The excuse for this last arose from the
Russian pressure on Finland for bases to resist a future German attack. The Russian
attack on Finland began on the last day of November 1939; by 27 December, the British
and French were putting pressure on Sweden to join them in action to support the Finns.
In these notes, which have been published by the Swedish Foreign Ministry, the Western
Powers stated that they intended to send men, equipment, and money to Finland. By
February 1940, the Western Powers had plans for a force of 30,000 to 40,000 men for
Finland and were putting pressure on Sweden to allow passage for this force across
Scandinavia. By 2 March 1940, the British had a force of 100,000 men ready and
informed the Swedish and Norwegian governments that "the force with its full equipment
is available and could sail at short notice." They invited the Scandinavian countries to
receive Allied missions to make all the necessary preparations for the transit. The note to
Norway, in an additional passage, said that forces would be sent to the Norwegian ports
within four days of receiving permission, and the transit itself could begin on 20 March.
On 12 March the Allies sent to the Scandinavian countries a formal request for right of
transit. It was refused. Before anything further could be done, Finland collapsed and
made peace with Russia. On 5 April, Halifax sent a very threatening note to the
Scandinavian countries. It said in part:
“. . . considering, in consultation with the French Government, the circumstances
attending the termination of the war between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and
Finland and the attitude adopted by the Swedish Government at that time . . . they feel
therefore that the time has come to notify the Swedish Government frankly of certain
vital interests and requirements which the Allied Governments intend to assert and
defend by whatever measure they may think necessary. The vital interests and the
requirements which the Allied Governments wish to bring to the notice of the Swedish
Government are the following: (a) The Allied Governments cannot acquiesce in any
further attack on Finland by either the Soviet or German Governments. In the event
therefore, of such an attack taking place, any refusal by the Swedish Government to
facilitate the efforts of the Allied Governments to come to the assistance of Finland in
whatever manner they may think fit, and still more any attempt to prevent such assistance
would be considered by the Allied Governments as endangering their vital interests.... (c)
Any attempt by the Soviet Government to obtain from Norway a footing on the Atlantic
sea-board would be contrary to the vital interests of the Allied Governments."
The Swedish Foreign Minister expressed his government's astonishment at this note
and its determination to decide such questions for itself and to preserve Sweden's
neutrality in the future as it had been preserved in the past.(20)
It is not clear what was the attitude of the Milner Group toward this effort to open
active hostilities against the Soviet Union while remaining technically in a state of war
with Germany. Halifax was still at the Foreign Office and apparently actively concerned
in this project. The Times was wholeheartedly in favor of the plan. On 5 March, for
example, it said of the Finnish war: "It is becoming clearer every day that this war is no
side issue. Finland is defending more than the cause of liberty and more than her own
soil.... Our own cause is being buttressed by her resistance to the evil of tyranny.... Our
interest is clear and there is a moral issue involved as well as the material. The whole
sentiment of this country demands that Finland should not be allowed to fall."
The Round Table, in the only issue which appeared during the Finnish troubles, had a
propagandist article on "The Civilization of Finland." It called Finland "one of the most
democratic nations, on any definition, in all Europe." The rest of the article was a paean