weeks before it did occur. She even suggested on several occasions that the plans be
executed more rapidly, and on one occasion suggested a specific date for the event.
In her news articles, Miss Shaw embraced the cause of the British in the Transvaal
even to the extent of exaggerating and falsifying their hardships under Boer rule.(6) It
was The Times that published as an exclusive feature the famous (and fraudulent)
"women and children" letter, dated 20 December 1895, which pretended to be an appeal
for help from the persecuted British in the Transvaal to Dr. Jameson's waiting forces, but
which had really been concocted by Dr. Jameson himself on 20 November and sent to
Miss Shaw a month later. This letter was published by The Times as soon as news of the
Jameson' Raid was known, as a justification of the act. The Times continued to defend
and justify the raid and Jameson. After this became a rather delicate policy—that is, after
the raid failed and had to be disavowed— The Times was saved from the necessity of
reversing itself by the "Kruger telegram" sent by the German Kaiser to congratulate the
Boers on their successful suppression of the raiders. This "Kruger telegram" was played
up by The Times with such vigor that Jameson was largely eclipsed and the incident
assumed the dimensions of an international crisis. As the official History of The Times
puts it, " The Times was carried so far by indignation against the outrageous interference
of the Kaiser in the affairs of the British Empire that it was able to overlook the
criminality of Jameson's act." A little later, the same account says, "On January 7,
Rhodes' resignation from the Premiership was announced, while the Editor found it more
convenient to devote his leading article to the familiar topic of German interference
rather than to the consequences of the Raid."(7)
All of this was being done on direct instructions from Rhodes, and with the knowledge
and approval of the management of The Times. In fact, Miss Shaw was the intermediary
between Rhodes, The Times, and the Colonial Office (Joseph Chamberlain). Until the end
of November 1895, her instructions from Rhodes came to her through his agent in
London, Dr. Rutherfoord Harris, but, when the good Dr. Harris and Alfred Beit returned
to South Africa in order to be on hand for the anticipated excitement, the former gave
Miss Shaw the secret code of the British South Africa Company and the cable address
TELEMONES LONDON, so that communications from Rhodes to Miss Shaw could be
sent directly. Dr. Harris had already informed Rhodes by a cable of 4 November 1895:
“If you can telegraph course you wish Times to adopt now with regard to Transvaal
Flora will act.”
On 10 December 1895, Miss Shaw cabled Rhodes:
“Can you advise when will you commence the plans, we wish to send at earliest
opportunity sealed instructions representative of the Lond Times European Capitals; it is
most important using their influence in your favor.”
The use of the word "we" in this message disposes once and for all of Miss Shaw's
later defense that all her acts were done on her own private responsibility and not in her
capacity as a department head of The Times. In answer to this request, Rhodes replied the
next day: “We do think about new year.”
This answer made The Times’s manager “very depressed,” so the next day (12
December) Miss Shaw sent the following cable to Rhodes:
“Delay dangerous sympathy now complete but will depend very much upon action
before European powers given time enter a protest which as European situation
considered serious might paralyze government.”
Five days after this came another cable, which said in part:
“Chamberlain sound in case of interference European powers but have special reason
to believe wishes you must do it immediately.”
To these very incriminating messages might be added two of several wires from
Rhodes to Miss Shaw. One of 30 December 1895, after Rhodes knew that the Jameson
Raid had begun and after Miss Shaw had been so informed by secret code, stated:
“Inform Chamberlain that I shall get through all right if he supports me, but he must
not send cable like he sent high commissioner in South Africa. Today the crux is, I will
win and South Africa will belong to England.”
And the following day, when the outcome of the raid was doubtful because of the
failure of the English in the Transvaal to rise against the Boers—a failure resulting from
that the fact that they were not as ill-treated as Miss Shaw, through The times, had been
telling the world for months—Rhodes cabled:
“Unless you can make Chamberlain instruct the high commissioner to proceed at once
to Johannesburg the whole position is lost. High commissioner would receive splendid
reception and still turn position to England advantage but must be instructed by cable
immediately. The instructions must be specific as he is weak and will take no
responsibility.” (8)
When we realize that the anticipated uprising of the English in the Transvaal had
been financed and armed with munitions from the funds of the British South Africa
Company, it is clear that we must wait until Hitler's coup in Austria in March 1938
to find a parallel to Rhodes's and Jameson's attempted coup in South Africa forty-
two years earlier.
The Jameson Raid, if the full story could ever be told, would give the finest
possible example of the machinations of Rhodes's secret society. Another example,
almost as good, would be the completely untold story of how the society covered up
these activities in the face of the investigation of the Parliamentary Select
Committee. The dangers from this investigation were so great that even Lord Rothschild
was pressed into service as a messenger. It was obvious from the beginning that the star
witness before the committee would be Cecil Rhodes and that the chief danger would be
the incrimination of Joseph Chamberlain, who clearly knew of the plot. Milner, Garrett,
Stead, and Esher discussed possible defenses and reached no conclusion, since Stead
wanted to admit that Chamberlain was implicated in plans for a raid but not plans for the
raid. By this, Stead meant that Chamberlain and Rhodes had seen the possibility of an
uprising in the Transvaal and, solely as a precautionary measure, had made the
preparations for Jameson's force so that it would be available to go to Johannesburg to
restore order. The others refused to accept this strategy and insisted on the advantages of
a general and blanket denial. This difference of opinion probably arose from the fact that
Stead did not know that the prospective rebels in Johannesburg were armed and financed
by Rhodes, were led by Rhodes's brother and Abe Bailey, and had written the"women
and children" message, in collaboration with Jameson, weeks before. These facts, if
revealed to the committee, would make it impossible to distinguish between "the raid"
and "a raid." The event of 31 December 1895, which the committee was investigating,
was the former and not the latter merely because the plotters in Johannesburg failed to
revolt on schedule. This is clear from Edward Cook's statement, in his biography of