maintained ever since, and has been defended by the journal itself in advertisements, on
the grounds that anonymity gives the contributors greater independence and freedom. The
real reasons, however, were much more practical than this and included the fact that the
writers were virtually unknown and were so few in numbers, at first at least, as to make
the project appear ridiculous had the articles been signed. For example, Philip Kerr,
during his editorship, always wrote the leading article in every issue. In later years the
anonymity was necessary because of the political prominence of some of the
contributors. In general, the policy of the journal has been such that it has continued to
conceal the identity of its writers until their deaths. Even then, they have never been
connected with any specific article, except in the case of one article (the first one in the
first issue) by Lord Lothian. This article was reprinted in The Round Table after the
author's death in 1940.
The Round Table was essentially the propaganda vehicle of a handful of people and
could not have carried signed articles either originally, when they were too few, or later,
when they were too famous. It was never intended to be either a popular magazine or
self-supporting, but rather was aimed at influencing those in a position to influence public
opinion. As Curtis wrote in 1920, "A large quarterly like The Round Table is not
intended so much for the average reader, as for those who write for the average reader. It
is meant to be a storehouse of information of all kinds upon which publicists can draw.
Its articles must be taken on their merits and as representing nothing beyond the minds
and information of the individual writer of each."(6)
It is perhaps worth mentioning that the first article of the first issue, called "Anglo-
German Rivalry," was very anti-German and forms an interesting bit of evidence when
taken in connection with Curtis's statement that the problem of the Empire was raised in
1909 by the problem of what role South Africa would play in a future war with Germany.
The Group, in the period before 1914, were clearly anti-German. This must be
emphasized because of the mistaken idea which circulated after 1930 that the Cliveden
group, especially men like Lord Lothian, were pro-German. They were neither anti-
German in 1910 nor pro-German in 1938, but pro-Empire all the time, changing there
their attitudes on other problems as these problems affected the Empire. And it should be
realized that their love for the Empire was not mere jingoism or flag-waving (things at
which Kerr mocked within the Group) (7) but was based on the sincere belief that
freedom, civilization, and human decency could best be advanced through the
instrumentality of the British Empire.
In view of the specific and practical purpose of The Round Table—to federate the
Empire in order to ensure that the Dominions would join with the United Kingdom in a
future war with Germany—the paper could not help being a propagandist organ,
propagandist on a high level, it is true, but nonetheless a journal of opinion rather than a
journal of information. Every general article in the paper (excluding the reports from
representatives in the Dominions) was really an editorial—an unsigned editorial speaking
for the group as a whole. By the 1920s these articles were declaring, in true editorial
style, that " The Round Table does not approve of" something or other, or, "It seems to
The Round Table that" something else.
Later the members of the Group denied that the Group were concerned with the
propagation of any single point of view. Instead, they insisted that the purpose of the
Group was to bring together persons of various points of view for purposes of self-
education. This is not quite accurate. The Group did not contain persons of various points
of view but rather persons of unusual unanimity of opinion, especially in regard to goals.
There was a somewhat greater divergence in regard to methods, and the circulating of
memoranda within the Group to evoke various comments was for the purpose of reaching
some agreement on methods only—the goals being already given. In this, meetings of the
Group were rather like the meetings of the British Cabinet, although any normal Cabinet
would contain a greater variety of opinion than did the usual meetings of the Group. In
general, an expression of opinion by any one member of the Group sounded like an echo
of any of the others. Their systems of values were identical; the position of the British
Commonwealth at the apex of that system was almost axiomatic; the important role
played by moral and ideological influences in the Commonwealth and in the value
system was accepted by all; the necessity of strengthening the bonds of the
Commonwealth in view of the approaching crisis of the civilization of the West was
accepted by all, so also was the need for closer union with the United States. There was
considerable divergence of opinion regarding the practicality of imperial federation in the
immediate future; there was some divergence of ideas regarding the rate at which self-
government should be extended to the various parts of the Empire (especially India).
There was a slight difference of emphasis on the importance of relations between the
Commonwealth and the United States. But none of these differences of opinion was
fundamental or important. The most basic divergence within the Group during the first
twenty years or so was to be found in the field of economic ideas—a field in which the
Group as a whole was extremely weak, and also extremely conservative. This divergence
existed, however, solely because of the extremely unorthodox character of Lord Milner's
ideas. Milner's ideas (as expressed, for example, in his book Questions of the Hour,
published in 1923) would have been progressive, even unorthodox, in 1935. They were
naturally ahead of the times in 1923, and they were certainly far ahead of the ideas of the
Group as a whole, for its economic ideas would have been old-fashioned in 1905. These
ideas of the Group (until 1931, at least) were those of late-nineteenth-century
international banking and financial capitalism. The key to all economics and prosperity
was considered to rest in banking and finance. With "sound money," a balanced budget,
and the international gold standard, it was expected that prosperity and rising standards of
living would follow automatically. These ideas were propagated through The Round
Table, in the period after 1912, in a series of articles written by Brand and
subsequently republished under his name, with the title War and National Finance
(1921). They are directly antithetical to the ideas of Milner as revealed in his book
published two years later. Milner insisted that financial questions must be subordinated to
economic questions and economic questions to political questions. As a result, if a
deflationary policy, initiated for financial reasons, has deleterious economic or political
effects, it must be abandoned. Milner regarded the financial policy advocated by Brand in
1919 and followed by the British government for the next twelve years as a disaster, since
it led to unemployment, depression, and ruination of the export trade. instead, Milner
wanted to isolate the British economy from the world economy by tariffs and other