of the interests and fortunes of fellow subjects who have not yet attained "to the full
stature of self-government." He then pointed out the two principles of centralization and
disintegration which had applied to the Empire in the early Victorian period, and
declared: "Neither of these theories commands the faintest support today, either at home
or in any part of our self-governing Empire.... Whether in this United Kingdom or in any
one of the great communities which you represent, we each of us are, and we each of us
intend to remain, master in our own household. This is, here at home and throughout the
Dominions, the lifeblood of our polity." Thus spoke Asquith, and even the ultra-federalist
Curtis approved. He also approved when Asquith squelched Sir John Ward's suggestion
for the creation of an Imperial Council, although doubtless from quite a different
motivation.
At the Conference of 1911, as is well known, the overseas members were for the first
time initiated into the mysteries of high policy, because of the menace of Germany.
Except for this, which paid high dividends in 1914, the Conference was largely wasted
motion.
The Conference of 1915 was not held, because of the war, but as soon as Milner came
into the government in December 1915, The Round Table's argument that the war should
be used as a means for consolidating the Empire, rather than as an excuse for postponing
consolidation, began to take effect. The Round Table during 1915 was agitating for an
immediate Imperial Conference with Indian participation for the first time. As soon as
Milner joined the Cabinet in December 1915, he sent out cables to the Dominions and to
India, inviting them to come. It was Milner also who created the Imperial War Cabinet by
adding Dominion members to the British War Cabinet. These developments were
foretold and approved by The Round Table. In its June 1917 issue it said, in the course of
a long article on "New Developments in the Constitution of the Empire":
“At a date which cannot be far distant an Imperial Conference will assemble, the
purpose of which will be to consider what further steps can be taken to transform the
Empire of a State in which the main responsibilities and burdens of its common affairs
are sustained and controlled by the United Kingdom into a commonwealth of equal
nations conducting its foreign policy and common affairs by some method of continuous
consultation and concerted action.... The decision today is against any federated
reconstruction after the war.... It is evident, however, that the institution through which
the improved Imperial system will chiefly work will be the newly constituted Imperial
Cabinet. The Imperial Cabinet will be different in some important respects from the
Imperial Conference. It will meet annually instead of once in four years. It will be
concerned more particularly with foreign policy, which the Imperial Conference has
never yet discussed.... Its proceedings will consequently be secret.... It will also consist of
the most important British Ministers sitting in conclave with the Overseas Ministers
instead of the Secretary of State for the Colonies alone as has been usually the case
hitherto.”
As is well known, the Imperial War Cabinet met fourteen times in 1917, met again in
1918, and assembled at Paris in 1918-1919 as the British Empire delegation to the Peace
Conference. Parallel with it, the Imperial War Conference met in London in 1917, under
the Colonial Secretary, to discuss non-war problems. At the meetings of the former body
it was decided to hold annual meetings in the future and to invite the Dominions to
establish resident ministers in London to insure constant consultation. At a meeting in
1917 was drawn up the famous Imperial Resolution, which excluded federation as a
solution of the imperial problem and recognized the complete equality of the Dominions
and the United Kingdom under one King. These developments were not only acceptable
to Milner but apparently were largely engineered by him. On 9 July 1919, he issued a
formal statement containing the sentences, "The only possibility of a continuance of the
British Empire is on a basis of absolute-out-and-out-equal partnership between the United
Kingdom and the Dominions. I say that without any kind of reservation whatever."
When Milner died, in May 1925, The Times obituary had this to say about this portion
of his life:
“With the special meeting of the War Cabinet attended by the Dominion Prime
Ministers which, beginning on March 20, came to be distinguished as the Imperial War
Cabinet . . . Milner was more closely concerned than any other British statesman. The
conception of the Imperial War Cabinet and the actual proposal to bring the Dominion
Premiers into the United Kingdom Cabinet were his. And when, thanks to Mr. Lloyd
George's ready acceptance of the proposal, Milner's conception was realized, it proved to
be not only a solution of the problem of Imperial Administrative unity in its then transient
but most urgent phase, but a permanent and far-reaching advance in the constitutional
evolution of the Empire. It met again in 1918, and was continued as the British Empire
Delegation in the peace negotiations at Versailles in 1919. Thus, at the moment of its
greatest need, the Empire was furnished by Milner with a common Executive. For the
Imperial War Cabinet could and did, take executive action, and its decisions bound the
Empire at large.”(3)
It was also Milner who insisted on and made the arrangements for the Imperial
Conference of 1921, acting in his capacity as Colonial Secretary, although he was forced,
by reason of poor health, to resign before the conference assembled. It was in this period
as Colonial Secretary that Milner, assisted by Amery, set up the plans for the new
"dyarchic" constitution for Malta, gave Egypt its full freedom, set Curtis to work on the
Irish problem, and gave Canada permission to establish its own legation in the United
States—the latter post filled only in 1926, and then by the son-in-law of Milner's closest
collaborator in the Rhodes Trust.
The Imperial Conferences of 1921 and 1923 were largely in the control of the Cecil
Bloc, at least so far as the United Kingdom delegation was concerned. Three of the five
members of this delegation in 1921 were from this Bloc (Balfour, Curzon, and Austen
Chamberlain), the other two being Lloyd George and Winston Churchill. Of the members
of the other five delegations, only Smuts, from South Africa, is of significance to us. On
the secretarial staff for the United Kingdom delegation, we might point out the presence
of Hankey and Grigg.
In the Imperial Conference of 1923 we find a similar situation. Three of the four
delegates from the United Kingdom were of the Cecil Bloc (Lord Salisbury, Curzon, and
the Duke of Devonshire), the other being Prime Minister Baldwin. Smuts again led the
South African delegation. The secretarial staff was headed by Hankey, while the separate
Indian secretarial group was led by L. F. Rushbrook Williams. The latter, whom we have
already mentioned, had been associated with the Milner Group since he was elected a
Fellow of All Souls in 1914, had done special work in preparation of the Government of
India Act of 1919, and worked under Marris in applying that act after it became law. His
later career carried him to various parts of the Milner Group's extensive system, as can be
seen from the fact that he was a delegate to the Assembly of the League of Nations in