impractical by Lionel Curtis in 1916. If regional blocs could be formed by dividing the
British Commonwealth into four or five geographic groupings, with a Dominion in each
region closely associated with the colonies in the same region, and if this could be done
without weakening the link between the United Kingdom and the colonies, it would serve
to strengthen the link between the United Kingdom and the Dominions. This latter goal
was frankly admitted by Smuts. He also suggested that a federated Western Europe be
included in the United Kingdom regional bloc.
Sir Edward Grigg's suggestion, made in his book The British Commonwealth,
appeared also in 1943. It was very similar to Smuts's, even to the use of the same verbal
expressions. For example, both spoke of the necessity for ending the "dual Empire," of
which one part was following a centralizing course and the other a decentralizing course.
This expression was derived from Lord Milner (and was attributed to this source by Sir
Edward) and referred to the difference between the dependent and the self-governing
portions of the Commonwealth. Sir Edward advocated creation of five regional blocs,
with Western Europe, associated by means of a military alliance with the United
Kingdom, in one. Without any sacrifice of sovereignty by anyone, he visualized the
creation of a regional council ("like a miniature Imperial Conference") and a joint
parliamentary assembly in three of these regions. The members of the council would be
representatives of legislatures and not of governments; the assembly would consist of
select members from the existing national parliaments in proper ratio; and each region
would have a permanent secretariat to carry out agreed decisions. How this elaborate
organization could be reconciled with the continuance of unrestricted national
sovereignty was not indicated.
Lord Halifax's suggestion, made in a speech before the Toronto Board of Trade on 24
January 1944, was somewhat different, although he clearly had the same goal in view and
the same mental picture of existing world conditions. He suggested that Britain could not
maintain her position as a great power, in the sense in which the United States and Russia
were great powers, on the basis of the strength of the United Kingdom alone.
Accordingly, he advocated the creation of some method of coordination of foreign policy
and measures of defense by which the Dominions could participate in both and a united
front could be offered to other powers.
That these trial balloons of Smuts, Grigg, and Halifax were not their isolated personal
reactions but were the results of a turmoil of thought within the Milner Group was
evident from the simultaneous suggestions which appeared in The Times editorials during
the first week in December 1943 and the issue of The Round Table for the same month.
The Winnipeg Free Press, a paper which has frequently shown knowledge of the
existence of the Milner Group, in editorials of 26 and 29 January 1944, pointed out this
effusion of suggestions for a reconstruction of the Empire and said:
“Added to the record of earlier statements, the Halifax speech affords conclusive
evidence that there is a powerful movement on foot in the United Kingdom for a
Commonwealth which will speak with a single voice. And it will be noted that Lord
Halifax believes that this change in the structure of the Commonwealth will be the first
consideration of the next Imperial Conference.... Running through all these speeches and
articles is the clear note of fear. The spokesmen are obsessed by the thought of power as
being the only force that counts. The world is to be governed by Leviathans.... It is tragic
that the sincere and powerful group of public men in England, represented by Lord
Halifax and Field Marshal Smuts, should react to the problem of maintaining peace in
this way.”
These suggestions were met by an uproar of protests that reached unnecessary heights
of denunciation, especially in Canada. They were rejected in South Africa, repulsed by
Mackenzie King and others in Canada, called "isolationist" by the CCF party, censured
unanimously by the Quebec Assembly, and repudiated by Prime Minister Churchill.
Except in New Zealand and Australia, where fear of Japan was having a profound effect
on public opinion, and in the United Kingdom, where the Milner Group's influence was
so extensive, the suggestions received a cold reception. In South Africa only The Cape
Times was favorable, and in Canada The Vancouver Province led a small band of
supporters. As a result, the Milner Group once again rejected any movement toward
closer union. It continued to toy with Grigg's idea of regional blocs within the
Commonwealth, but here it found an almost insoluble problem. If a regional bloc were to
be created in Africa, the natives of the African colonial areas would be exposed to the un-
tender mercies of the South African Boers, and it would be necessary to repudiate the
promises of native welfare which the Group had supported in the Kenya White Paper of
1923, its resistance to Boer influence in the three native protectorates in South Africa, the
implications in favor of native welfare in The African Survey of 1938, and the frequent
pronouncements of The Round Table on the paramount importance of protecting native
rights. Such a repudiation was highly unlikely, and indeed was specifically rejected by
Grigg himself in his book.(4)
The Milner Group itself had been one of the chief, if not the chief, forces in Britain
intensifying the decentralizing influences in the self-governing portions of the Empire.
This influence was most significant in regard to India, Palestine, Ireland, and Egypt, each
of which was separated from Great Britain by a process in which the Milner Group was a
principal agent. The first of these is so significant that it will be discussed in a separate
chapter, but a few words should be said about the other three here.
The Milner Group had relatively little to do with the affairs of Palestine except in the
early period (1915-1919), in the later period (the Peel Report of 1937), and in the fact that
the British influence on the Permanent Mandates Commission was always exercised
through a member of the Group.
The idea of establishing a mandate system for the territories taken from enemy powers
as a result of the war undoubtedly arose from the Milner Group's inner circle. It was first
suggested by George Louis Beer in a report submitted to the United States Government
on 1 January 1918, and by Lionel Curtis in an article called "Windows of Freedom" in
The Round Table for December 1918. Beer was a member of the Round Table Group
from about 1912 and was, in fact, the first member who was not a British subject. That
Beer was a member of the Group was revealed in the obituary published in The Round
Table for September 1920. The Group's attention was first attracted to Beer by a series of Anglophile studies on the British Empire in the eighteenth century which he published in
the period after 1893. A Germanophobe as well as an Anglophile, he intended by writing,
if we are to believe The Round Table, "to counteract the falsehoods about British
Colonial policy to be found in the manuals used in American primary schools." When the
Round Table Group, about 1911, began to study the causes of the American Revolution,