mechanical term, through the vast machinery of party, of Parliament, and of patronage,
both here and in the East. It is tragical that they should have been able to mislead the
loyalties and use the assets of the Empire to its own undoing. I compliment them on their
skill, and I compliment them also on their disciples. Their chorus is exceedingly well
drilled." This statement was answered by Lord Eustace Percy, who quoted Lord Hugh
Cecil on "profitable mendacity." This led to an argument, in which both sides appealed to
the Speaker. Order was restored when Lord Eustace said of Churchill, "I would never
impute to him . . . any intention of making a charge which he did not believe himself."
It is quite clear that Churchill believed his charge and was referring to what we have
called the Milner Group, although he would not have known it under that name, nor
would he have realized its extreme ramifications. He was merely referring to the
extensive influence of that close group of associates which included Hoare, Hailey,
Curtis, Lothian, Dawson, Amery, Grigg, and Halifax.
After four days of debate on the second reading, the opposition amendment was
rejected by 404-133, and the bill passed to the committee stage. In the majority were
Amery, Buchan, Grigg, Hoare, Ormsby-Gore, Simon, Sir Donald Somervell, and Steel-
Maitland. The minority consisted of three ill-assorted groups: the followers of Churchill,
the leaders of the Labour Party, and a fragment of the Cecil Bloc with a few others.
The Government of India Act of 1935 was the longest bill ever submitted to
Parliament, and it underwent the longest debate in history (over forty days in Commons).
In general, the government let the opposition talk itself out and then crushed it on each
division. In the third reading, Churchill made his final speech in a tone of baneful
warning regarding the future of India. He criticized the methods of pressure used by
Hoare and said that in ten years' time the Secretary of State would be haunted by what
had been done, and it could be said of him,
"’God save thee, ancient Mariner,
From the fiends that plague thee thus.
Why look'st thou so?’ With my cross-bow,
I shot the Albatross.”
These somber warnings were answered by Leopold Amery, who opened his rejoinder
with the words, "Here endeth the last chapter of the Book of the Prophet Jeremiah."
In the House of Lords the bill was taken through its various stages by Lord Zetland
(who replaced Hoare as Secretary of State for India in June 1935), and the final speech
for the government was from Halifax (recently made Secretary of State for War). The Act
received the Royal Assent on 1 August 1935.
The Act never went into effect completely, and by 1939 the Milner Group was
considering abandoning it in favor of complete self-government for India. The portions of
the Act of 1935 dealing with the central government fell to the ground when the refusal
of the Princes of the Indian States to accept the Act made a federal solution impossible.
The provincial portion began to function in 1937, but with great difficulty because of the
extremist agitation from the Congress Party. This party obtained almost half of the seats
in the eleven provinces and had a clear majority in six provinces. The provincial
governments, started in 1937, worked fairly well, and the emergency powers of the
central governments, which continued on the 1919 model, were used only twice in over
two years. When the war began, the Congress Party ordered its ministries to resign. Since
the Congress Party members in the legislatures would not support non-Congress
ministries, the decree powers of the Provincial Governors had to be used in those
provinces with a Congress majority. In 1945 six out of the eleven provinces had
responsible government.
From 1939 on, constitutional progress in India was blocked by a double stalemate: (1)
the refusal of the Congress Party to cooperate in government unless the British
abandoned India completely, something which could not be done while the Japanese
were invading Burma; and (2) the growing refusal of the Moslem League to cooperate
with the Congress Party on any basis except partition of India and complete autonomy for
the areas with Moslem majorities. The Milner Group, and the British government
generally, by 1940 had given up all hope of any successful settlement except complete
self-government for India, but it could not give up to untried hands complete control of
defense policy during the war. At the same time, the Milner Group generally supported
Moslem demands because of its usual emphasis on minority rights.
During this period the Milner Group remained predominant in Indian affairs, although
the Viceroy (Lord Linlithgow) was not a member of the Group. The Secretary of State for
India, however, was Leopold Amery for the whole period 1940-1945. A number of
efforts were made to reach agreement with the Congress Party, but the completely
unrealistic attitude of the party's leaders, especially Gandhi, made this impossible. In
1941, H. V. Hodson, by that time one of the most important members of the Milner
Group, was made Reforms Commissioner for India. The following year the most
important effort to break the Indian stalemate was made. This was the Cripps Mission,
whose chief adviser was Sir Reginald Coupland, another member of the inner circle of
the Milner Group. As a result of the failure of this mission and of the refusal of the
Indians to believe in the sincerity of the British (a skepticism that was completely without
basis), the situation dragged on until after the War. The election of 1945, which drove the
Conservative Party from office, also removed the Milner Group from its positions of
influence. The subsequent events, including complete freedom for India and the division
of the country into two Dominions within the British Commonwealth, were controlled by
new hands, but the previous actions of the Milner Group had so committed the situation
that these new hands had no possibility (nor, indeed, desire) to turn the Indian problem
into new paths. There can be little doubt that with the Milner Group still in control the
events of 1945-1948 in respect to India would have differed only in details.
The history of British relations with India in the twentieth century was
disastrous. In this history the Milner Group played a major role. To be sure, the
materials with which they had to work were intractable and they had inconvenient
obstacles at home (like the diehards within the Conservative Party), but these problems
were made worse by the misconceptions about India and about human beings held by the
Milner Group. The bases on which they built their policy were fine—indeed, too fine.
These bases were idealistic, almost utopian, to a degree which made it impossible for
them to grow and function and made it highly likely that forces of ignorance and
barbarism would be released, with results exactly contrary to the desires of the Milner
Group. On the basis of love of liberty, human rights, minority guarantees, and self-
responsibility, the Milner Group took actions that broke down the lines of external
authority in Indian society faster than any lines of internal self-discipline were being
created. It is said that the road to perdition is paved with good intentions. The road to the
Indian tragedy of 1947-1948 was also paved with good intentions, and
those paving blocks were manufactured and laid down by the Milner Group. The same
good intentions contributed largely to the dissolution of the British Empire, the race wars