Fourteen Points (except "freedom of the seas") as implementation of these aims.
Moreover, the Milner Group, and apparently Wilson, made an assumption which had a
valid basis but which could be very dangerous if carried out carelessly. This was the
assumption that the Germans were divided into two groups, "Prussian autocrats" and
"good Germans." They assumed that, if the former group were removed from positions of
power and influence, and magnanimous concessions were made to the latter, Germany
could be won over on a permanent basis from "Asiatic despotism" to "Western
civilization." In its main outlines, the thesis was valid. But difficulties were numerous.
In the first place, it is not possible to distinguish between "good" Germans and "bad"
Germans by any objective criterion. The distinction certainly could not be based on who
was in public office in 1914-1918. In fact, the overwhelming mass of Germans—almost
all the middle classes, except a few intellectuals and very religious persons; a
considerable portion of the aristocratic class (at least half); and certain segments of the
working class (about one-fifth)—were "bad" Germans in the sense in which the Milner
Group used that expression. In their saner moments, the Group knew this. In December
1918, Curtis wrote in The Round Table on this subject as follows: "No one class, but the
nation itself was involved in the sin. There were Socialists who licked their lips over
Brest-Litovsk. All but a mere remnant, and those largely in prison or exile, accepted or
justified the creed of despotism so long as it promised them the mastery of the world. The
German People consented to be slaves in their own house as the price of enslaving
mankind." If these words had been printed and posted on the walls of All Souls, of
Chatham House, of New College, of The Times office in Printing House Square, and of
The Round Table office at 175 Piccadilly, there need never have been a Second World
War with Germany. But these words were not remembered by the Group. Instead, they
assumed that the "bad" Germans were the small group that was removed from office in
1918 with the Kaiser. They did not see that the Kaiser was merely a kind of facade for
four other groups: The Prussian Officers' Corps, the Junker landlords, the governmental
bureaucracy (especially the administrators of police and justice), and the great
industrialists. They did not see that these four had been able to save themselves in 1918
by jettisoning the Kaiser, who had become a liability. They did not see that these four
were left in their positions of influence, with their power practically intact—indeed, in
many ways with their power greater than ever, since the new "democratic" politicians like
Ebert, Scheidemann, and Noske were much more subservient to the four groups than the
old imperial authorities had ever been. General Gröner gave orders to Ebert over his
direct telephone line from Kassel in a tone and with a directness that he would never have
used to an imperial chancellor. In a word, there was no revolution in Germany in 1918.
The Milner Group did not see this, because they did not want to see it. Not that they were
not warned. Brigadier General John H. Morgan, who was almost a member of the Group
and who was on the Inter-allied Military Commission of Control in Germany in 1919-
1923, persistently warned the government and the Group of the continued existence and
growing power of the German Officers' Corps and of the unreformed character of the
German people. As a graduate of Balliol and the University of Berlin (1897-1905), a
leader-writer on The Manchester Guardian (1904-1905), a Liberal candidate for
Parliament with Amery in 1910, an assistant adjutant general with the military section of
the British delegation to the Peace Conference of 1919, the British member on the
Prisoners of War Commission (1919), legal editor of The Encyclopedia Britannica (14th
edition), contributor to The Times, reader in constitutional law to the Inns of Court (1926-
1936), Professor of Constitutional Law at the University of London, Rhodes Lecturer at
London (1927-1932), counsel to the Indian Chamber of Princes (1934-1937), counsel to
the Indian State of Gwalior, Tagore Professor at Calcutta (1939)—as all of these things,
and thus close to many members of the Group, General Morgan issued warnings about
Germany that should have been heeded by the Group. They were not. No more attention
was paid to them than was paid to the somewhat similar warnings coming from Professor
Zimmern. And the general, with less courage than the professor, or perhaps with more of
that peculiar group loyalty which pervades his social class in England, kept his warnings
secret and private for years. Only in October 1924 did he come out in public with an
article in the Quarterly Review on the subject, and only in 1945 did he find a wider
platform in a published book ( Assize of Arms), but in neither did he name the persons
who were suppressing the warnings in his official reports from the Military Commission.
In a similar fashion, the Milner Group knew that the industrialists, the Junkers,
the police, and the judges were cooperating with the reactionaries to suppress all
democratic and enlightened elements in Germany and to help all the forces of
"despotism" and "sin" (to use Curtis's words). The Group refused to recognize these
facts. For this, there were two reasons. One, for which Brand was chiefly responsible,
was based on certain economic assumptions. Among these, the chief was the belief that
"disorder" and social unrest could be avoided only if prosperity were restored to Germany
as soon as possible. By "disorder," Brand meant such activities as were associated with
Trotsky in Russia, Béla Kun in Hungary, and the Spartacists or Kurt Eisner in Germany.
To Brand, as an orthodox international banker, prosperity could be obtained only by an
economic system under the control of the old established industrialists and bankers. This
is perfectly clear from Brand's articles in The Round Table, reprinted in his book, War
and National Finance (1921). Moreover, Brand felt confident that the old economic
groups could reestablish prosperity quickly only if they were given concessions in respect
to Germany's international financial position by lightening the weight of reparations on
Germany and by advancing credit to Germany, chiefly from the United States. This point
of view was not Brand's alone. It dominated the minds of all international bankers from
Thomas Lamont to Montague Norman and from 1918 to at least 1931. The importance of
Brand, from out point of view, lies in the fact that, as "the economic expert" of the Milner
Group and one of the leaders of the Group, he brought this point of view into the Group
and was able to direct the great influence of the Group in this direction.(2)
Blindness to the real situation in Germany was also encouraged from another point of
view. This was associated with Philip Kerr. Roughly, this point of view advocated a
British foreign policy based on the old balance-of-power system. Under that old system,
which Britain had followed since 1500, Britain should support the second strongest
power on the Continent against the strongest power, to prevent the latter from obtaining
supremacy on the Continent. For one brief moment in 1918, the Group toyed with the