captured territory. This is what had happened in 1914. To avoid this, the French sought in
vain one alternative after another: (a) to detach from Germany, or, at least, to occupy for
an extended period, the Rhineland area of Germany (this would put the Ruhr, the most
vital industrial area of Germany, within striking distance of French forces); (b) to get a
British-American, or at least a British, guarantee of French territory; (c) to get a "League
of Nations with teeth," that is, one with its own police forces and powers to act
automatically against an aggressor. All of these were blocked by the English and
Americans at the Peace Conference in 1919. The French sought substitutes. Of these, the
only one they obtained was a system of alliances with new states, like Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and the enlarged Rumania, on the east of Germany. All of these states
were of limited power, and the French had little faith in the effectiveness of their
assistance. Accordingly, the French continued to seek their other aims: to extend the
fifteen years' occupation of the Rhineland into a longer or even an indefinite period; to
get some kind of British guarantee; to strengthen the League of Nations by "plugging the
gaps in the Covenant"; to use the leverage of reparations and disarmament as provided in
the Treaty of Versailles to keep Germany down, to wreck her economically, or even to
occupy the Ruhr. All of these efforts were blocked by the machinations of the Milner
Group. At the moment, we shall refer only to the efforts to "plug the gaps in the
Covenant."
These "gaps," as we have indicated, were put in by Cecil Hurst and were exactly to the
taste of the Milner Group. The chief efforts of the French and their allies on the Continent
to "plug the gaps" were the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance (1923) and the Geneva
Protocol (1924). What the Milner Group thought of both of these can be gathered from
the following extracts from The Round Table's denunciation of the Protocol. In the
December 1924 issue, in an article entitled "The British Commonwealth, the Protocol,
and the League," we find the following: "What is to be the British answer to this
invitation to reenter the stormy field of internal European politics? Can the British
Commonwealth afford to become permanently bound up with the internal political
structure of Europe? And will it promote the peace and stability of Europe or the world
that Europe should attempt to solve its problems on the basis of a permanent British
guarantee? The answer in our judgment to both these questions must be an emphatic,
No." Then, after repeating its contention that the only purpose of the Covenant was to
secure delay in a crisis for consultation, it continued:
“The idea that all nations ought to consult how they are to deal with States which
precipitate war without allowing any period for enquiry and mediation is the real heart of
the League of Nations, and, if the British Commonwealth wants to prevent a recurrence
of the Great War, it must be willing to recognize that it has a vital interest in working out
with other nations the best manner of giving effect to this fundamental idea. . . .
Decisions as to the rights and wrongs of international disputes, and of what common
action the nations should take when they are called together to deal with such an outlaw,
must be left to be determined in the light of the circumstances of the time.... The view of
The Round Table is that the British Commonwealth should make it perfectly clear . . .
that it will accept no further obligations than this and that the Covenant of the League
must be amended to establish beyond question that no authority, neither the Council nor
any arbitral body it may appoint, has any power to render a binding decision or to order a
war, except with the consent of the members themselves.”
The bitterness of the Group's feelings against France at the time appears in the same
article a couple of pages later when it asked: "Or is the proposal implicit in the Protocol
merely one for transferring to the shoulders of Great Britain, which alone is paying her
debts, some part of the cost of maintaining that preponderance which now rests upon the
European States which profit most by it.... It is sheer rubbish to suggest that France needs
military guarantees for security.... What France really wants is a guarantee that the allies
will maintain a perpetual preponderance over Germany. This we can never give her, for
in the long run it makes not for peace but for war."
In another article in the same issue, the Protocol was analyzed and denounced. The
final conclusion was: "It is our firm conviction that no alternative is acceptable which
fails to provide for the free exercise by the Parliaments and peoples of the Empire of their
judgment as to how to deal with any disturbance of the peace, or any threat of such
disturbance, on its merits as it arises. That has been the guiding principle throughout the
political history of the British peoples. The methods of the Protocol belong to another
world, and, if for no other reason, they should be rejected."
The Protocol was officially rejected by Austen Chamberlain at a session of the
Council of the League of Nations in March 1925. John Dove, Lionel Curtis, Philip Kerr,
and Wilson Harris went to Geneva to be present at the meeting. After the deed was done,
they went to visit Prague and Berlin, and ended by meeting Lady Astor in Paris. From
Geneva and Paris, John Dove wrote to Brand letters which Brand later published in his
edition of The Letters of John Dove.
One of the reasons given by Austen Chamberlain in 1925 for rejecting the Geneva
Protocol was the opposition of the Dominions. That the Milner Group was able to affect
Dominion opinion on this subject is clear. They could use men like Massey and
Glazebrook in Canada, Bavin and Eggleston in Australia, Downie Stewart and Allen in
New Zealand, Smuts and Duncan in South Africa.
More important than the Milner Group's ability to influence opinion in the Dominions
was its ability to influence decisions in London. In much of this latter field, Lord Esher
undoubtedly played an important role. It is perfectly clear that Lord Esher disliked
collective security, and for the same reasons as The Round Table. This can be seen in his
published Journals and Letters. For example, on 18 February 1919, in a letter to Hankey,
he wrote: "I fervently believe that the happiness and welfare of the human race is more
closely concerned in the evolution of English democracy and of our Imperial
Commonwealth than in the growth of any international League." On 7 December 1919, in
another letter to Hankey, he wrote: "You say that my letter was critical and not
constructive. So it was. But the ground must be cleared of debris first. I assume that this
is done. We will forget the high ideals and the fourteen points for the moment. We will
be eminently practical. So here goes. Do not let us bother about a League of Nations. It
may come slowly or not at all. What step forward, if any, can we take? We can get a
League of Empire." Shortly afterwards, writing to his heir, the present Viscount Esher, he
called the League "a paper hoop." The importance of this can be seen if we realize that
Lord Esher was the most important factor on the Committee of Imperial Defence, and
this committee was one of the chief forces determining British foreign policy in this
period. In fact, no less an authority than Lord Robert Cecil has said that the Geneva