Encouraged by successful revolts in Tunisia and Egypt, the people stood their ground. The regime took aim and began firing. In Tunisia the military had refused to take orders from the government, effectively rendering the state impotent in quashing the uprising. The people won. Although violent, the protests in Egypt quickly led to political concessions and the eventual resignation of the government. The people won again. The Benghazi protesters hoped for similar success, but neither dynamic was present in Libya. The army started shooting, arrests were made and people disappeared. But the people had had enough and they kept fighting. By mid-February 2011 Libya was in full revolt.
With thousands of contract workers from all over the world caught up in the turmoil, several nations mounted evacuation operations, plucking their people from the desert and the harbours. Even China flew in. North Korea, fearful that talk of revolt would come home and germinate, made her citizens sit it out. Britain got the RAF and the Royal Navy to go in, pick up our people and bring them home. With civil war ramping up, economic production faltered and the everyday necessities of life became scarce. The side that could last the longest as time trickled through the hourglass would win. Libya was besieging itself.
The political opposition set up in Benghazi, and Libya’s second city became the regime’s primary target. At the same time, the central coastal city of Misrata became a rebel stronghold. Gaddafi mobilized his military and the fighting began. NATO got involved, promising the UN a No Fly Zone to take ‘all necessary measures’ to protect civilians under Article VII of the UN Charter. In the UN Security Council ten ‘yes’ votes and zero ‘noes’ were recorded. Germany, India and Brazil abstained. Notably, China and Russia abstained too. Their decision not to veto UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1973 effectively allowed the NATO mission to shift to regime change – ‘all necessary measures’ had a wide interpretation. Good news for France, Britain and the USA, who all wanted rid of Gaddafi. The morality of the decision to protect the people of Libya appeared to be coincidental. But politics isn’t about morality. At the heart of politics lies power. If power, its reinforcement, its culture and the promotion of its likeness reflects high moral values then that is a good thing. But it is not the main consideration – that is power itself.
UNSCR 1973 was passed on 17 March, and two days later a French jet destroyed a regime tank, thus beginning an intervention that would end with Gaddafi’s pitiless death, blown up, captured by a rampaging mob, sodomised with a bayonet and shot on 20 October. The NATO mission was called Operation Unified Protector. The British contribution was Operation Ellamy.
Enforcing a No Fly Zone was easy work. Once the regime’s air defence systems were taken down the jets could fly without threat. Targets were found, analysed and destroyed. The regime’s military were hit whenever they showed themselves and the siege continued. But Gaddafi had long been a survivor, and the regime adapted. They hid in hospitals and schools, knowing NATO would not strike there. Gaddafi’s soldiers did the same. They hid their armour, used technicals and travelled in buses. The rebels’ much wished-for breakthrough did not happen. They were ordinary citizens with guns; they had no military structure or tactics and they were being hammered by the regime. They were determined but disorganized, and thousands died as Gaddafi took his chance to extinguish the fires of revolt with as much force as he could muster.
Then stalemate took hold. The anticipation of April led to nothing, and May brought the rebels and NATO no closer to winning. Politicians looked around for what else they could throw at the problem, and we were chosen. An introductory mission near Brega, big media exposure and resolute words from Paris and London made us part of the campaign. We were there to cause problems, get in Gaddafi’s mind, prove NATO was willing to take risks and was unwavering. I was told to have a ‘cognitive effect’ on the regime by striking wherever NATO saw it best to use us, by making noise and menacing the regime, by taking down the targets others were unable to hit. And by not getting shot down.
Muammar’s seventh and youngest son, Khamis Gaddafi, was a career soldier. Schooled in the West and with military training in Russia, he was a genuine operator. His father had put him in charge of the elite 32 Brigade, based west of Tripoli at the Al Maya barracks. When the revolution began they mobilized to crush the resistance in Misrata, an easy task with their tonnes of heavy metal and thousands of shells. They lodged the 10,000-strong formation in the area of Zlitan, about 30 miles west of Misrata on the central coastal belt. Another 20 miles further west sits Al Khums, home to the Libyan Special Forces (SF). Khamis’ brigade was elite in its own right, and the pairing with the SF worked well. He had tanks, armoured fighting vehicles, artillery and technicals. And he had the very best anti-aircraft weapons. ZSU 23-4, SA-7, SA-7b, SA-18 and SA-24 were all part of his arsenal, and everyone was driving around in pickup trucks with a ZU-23 stuck on the back. The SF had fast boats and small-team patrols capable of getting behind the rebel front line and causing mayhem.
Together they surrounded and cut off Misrata in late February, then waited for the city to die. Their modus operandi was straightforward. They hid in farm buildings on the outskirts of the city. Periodically they would break cover, fire a barrage of artillery into the city and sneak back into hiding before NATO could find them. They blocked the roads, and anyone attempting to leave the city was arrested; when the jails filled up, regime snipers kept the population contained. At the same time the SF would dart up and down the coast, inserting patrols to sever rebel communications, kill them in their safe places and create the fear of being surrounded in a forlorn and helpless siege.
With fifty miles of depth to hide in, Khamis’ forces were well dispersed; there was no need to concentrate men on the front line where they would be vulnerable to both a rebel breakout and NATO jets. Misrata was being squeezed. Thousands lay injured in hospitals with scarce medical supplies. The Royal Navy halted any meaningful pro-Gad maritime operations, thus allowing a fragile opportunity to link with Benghazi. But this link was precarious and supplies were always well below the requirement. Overloaded ships would dock at night, often under artillery attack, offload rebels and equipment, load up with wounded and then head back to Benghazi. The slow, poorly coordinated sea lane was Misrata’s only lifeline, but it was not enough to keep the city from gradually, agonizingly, slipping into hell. Khamis had time on his side and he was steadily strangling the city. Day by day, barrage after barrage was edging Misrata towards defeat.
NATO kept up the air strikes and the Royal Navy patrolled the coastal zone, even lending gunfire on several occasions. But Khamis still looked strong. The rebels needed to take the fight to 32 Brigade and move the front line away from the city. If they could advance west Khamis would have fewer places to hide and NATO could find and strike them. If they moved the front line away from the city the siege would be lifted, supplies would move quicker, the wounded would get the help they needed and more rebels could join the fight. But time favoured Khamis. The longer the impasse continued the weaker NATO looked. At the same time Misrata was suffocating and Khamis was looking at a shiny new medal, higher rank and a bigger palace.
Chapter 7
The Zlitan Raids
The night after the first mission, 6,000 hours of flying skill in the hands of JB lined up the perfect Hellfire and Reuben Sands put it straight into a BM-21 multi-launch rocket system dug in next to a house outside Brega. NATO had considered the target three times before and rejected it as too risky due to the proximity of the building. Chris James had convinced them we could do it without damaging the building. When the Hellfire hit, the truck and weapons were destroyed, leaving the house untouched. The Targets people in Italy sat up. The Apache was now a compelling option in an air campaign that was at risk of stalling.