Vice President Whiting nodded. A former Miss America runner-up, an attorney, a former state treasurer, and former governor of Delaware, the forty-eight-year-old mother of two was comfortable and knowledgeable in every aspect of government and public affairs — except what she thought of as the military stuff. President Martindale was the military freak. Her job was to formulate budget policies and communicate with the people, and she did both very well. Guns, bombs, and radar just confused and frustrated her. She relied on a thorough prebriefing and common sense when dealing with military men, who always thought the world revolved around them.
“Very impressive, General,” Whiting commented. “It is very similar to the military command centers in the United States, but yours is much more modern and up-to-date.”
“As the Republic of Korea has been in a state of war almost since our beginning, Madam Vice President,” General Park responded, “we keep this place and all of our control centers and reporting posts in a high state of readiness and modernization at all times. It is a heavy price we pay to maintain our freedom and sovereignty in the face of the Communist threat, but a price we gladly pay.”
“Of course,” the Vice President said. She had a way of disarming men’s hearts with a simple look or a special lilt of her voice, designed to completely captivate, deflate, or gain empathy from those she encountered. But it rarely worked with senior military officers. Empathy, like defeat, was not in their emotional or professional lexicon.
“Our twelve ground-controlled intercept officers monitor and control all military traffic throughout South Korea’s airspace,” General Park went on. “Each controller is responsible for a sector. There are seven major sectors, one through six plus the North Zone. All military aircraft flying within South Korea need a clearance from us before they can even start engines.”
“I notice that the airspace we see doesn’t extend all the way to the Demilitarized Zone,” Whiting pointed out. “There is also a blank area around Seoul itself. Why is that?”
“In addition to the air traffic sectors, there are separate Korean controllers that monitor and control all traffic within the capital airspace complex, the Korean Buffer Zone, and the Korean Tactical Zone,” General Park replied. “The Korean Tactical Zone, otherwise known as Prohibited Area 518, is the area north of the air traffic sectors to the Military Demarcation Line, and it is the area from which Korean air defense units will respond to any border incursions first. The Buffer Zone is a five-mile-wide strip of airspace south of the Military Demarcation Line that acts like a ‘warning track’ to aircraft operating near the DMZ. The capital airspace complex is two rings, ten and five miles radius, centered on the Blue House. Warning shots will be made on unidentified aircraft that enter the outer ring, and any aircraft not cleared to enter the inner ring will be attacked without further warning and shot down. Although American forces can enter these areas, they are under the control of separate Korean-only controllers.”
General Park noted the Vice President’s troubled expression. “It is a small but significant token of our national sovereignty, Madam Vice President,” he said. “We depend on the United States for so much of our security. Both Americans and Koreans, working side by side, handle all other military air traffic and command and control functions. But as a matter of national pride, we have insisted that control of the frontier between North and South be held strictly by us. The control center is at Taegu, with auxiliary centers at Seoul and Chongju. I will be happy to show it to you at any time.”
“Forgive me if I seemed a bit concerned, General,” Whiting said apologetically. “I don’t mean to suggest that the United States must and should be involved in every facet of Korean defense. But after seeing almost everything else relating to defense in this country so ‘joint,’ it seemed unusual to see a Korean-only command center. I’m sorry to be so… so bigoted.”
“Not at all, madam,” Park said. Somewhat embarrassed, Whiting thought she detected a look on Park’s face that seemed to say “Yes, you are bigoted,” but she thought it best to ignore it.
“Today’s exercise will involve mostly the Republic of Korea Air Force, with a few American and Japanese air defense units participating as well,” Park went on. “Our objective is to try to blunt a sneak attack by the North as they mount a massive incursion into South Korea. The attack will commence just after dawn along the flatlands of the Han River estuary, the coastline, the Uijongbu highway, and the Munsan highway south toward the capital.
“However, this will be a feint. At the same time, a second sneak attack will be mounted by a simulated North Korean strike force in the east, traveling down the coast highway toward Kangnung. Therefore, the success of our forces will depend on discipline. They must not be distracted by the initial, obvious attack toward the capital and must remain vigilant along the entire frontier for signs of enemy invasion.
“The air attacks will take place in target complexes set up here, in Restricted Area 79 southwest of Osan, Restricted Area 124 in the Yellow Sea, and in Restricted Areas 30 and 31 northwest of Kangnung,” Park went on. “Each of these target complexes is surrounded by a military operating area and an air combat maneuvering area that are set aside to allow simulated air-to-air attacks. The South Korean bombers will have to rely on their fighter protection to clear a path for them into the ranges. Although every bomber will be able to attack a target in the range — after all, this is a training exercise — the exercise scorekeepers will determine which sorties would have actually survived the enemy air defenses and made it to their targets.
“A probability-of-damage score will be computed for each attacker, and the individual and composite scores will be presented at the mass debrief session at the end of the day. These scores will be used to determine what the scenario will be for the next day. If our forces do well, the enemy may be forced to throw more firepower at us. If our forces do poorly, we may lose bases and equipment. Although this is just an exercise, we will make it as realistic as possible so we can get some authentic, true-to-life training out of it.”
Park pointed to one of the large digital screens with a small laser pointer. “Here are our air bases from which we will launch the air attacks in the west,” he said. “Seoul, Suwon, Chongju, and Kwangju will each launch a sizable fleet of F-16, F-4, and Hawk fighter-bombers, along with F-5 escort fighters, against the enemy forces in the west. Japan has deployed a number of its MiG-29 and F-15 fighters to Suwon and Seoul, and they will provide air cover for our bombers as well. They are far more capable than our F-5 fighters. The American forces are not participating in today’s battle.”
“May I ask why, General?” Vice President Whiting said.
“The scenario we devised is based on actual American force doctrine,” General Park said, his tone flat. “This doctrine states that American air forces may not act except to defend themselves or by direct order of the President of the United States, no matter what happens to South Korea. In this scenario, no American forces will be threatened. We assume Washington would take time, at least a day, perhaps two, to analyze and respond to the attack. So involvement of U.S. forces in the first day of the Communist offensive is never factored in.”