“I can certainly see his point,” General Freeman said. “He knows that China can march right in and take Korea at any time if they choose to do so. Having a WMD arsenal, with missiles powerful enough to hold Beijing itself at risk, is the only way they can hope to deter China.”
“But if China was going to invade, they could have done it a long time ago.”
“Not with American troops stationed there,” Freeman pointed out. “We were only a trip-wire force there, true, but it was an effective trip wire. Our little forty-thousand-troop force successfully held hundreds of thousands of Chinese soldiers at bay for forty years — backed up by our nuclear deterrent, of course. The only time we ever felt threatened by the Chinese is when we started to draw down our strategic forces to the point where China believed it could withstand an American retaliation. They took a shot at subduing Taiwan, and only by stepping in with substantial firepower did they back off.”
“And now, with Korea?”
“It’s déjà vu all over again — except China might have the public opinion advantage in this one,” Freeman replied. “You are absolutely correct, sir — if Korea keeps those weapons, they’ll be perceived as the antagonizers, perhaps even as the aggressors. It is as if Cuba suddenly acquired a tremendous nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons arsenal and then dared us to ignore the fact — the world would condemn Cuba. China can claim it is a destabilizing event. The world will not only be horrified to learn that North Korea had a nuclear arsenal greater than most any other non-superpower nation on earth, but that now United Korea has those weapons. China must respond to this development.”
“How?”
“They might increase the number of troops on the border and in the region, increase the throw weight of missiles and artillery aimed at Korea — all peaceful, all on their side of the line, and all fully justifiable,” Freeman went on. “This could continue for months, even years. The world could be on the razor’s edge for an indefinite period of time, even with continuous and strenuous negotiations going on. But worse: if something happens — an accident, an error, a skirmish — all hell could break loose in the blink of an eye. We destroyed China’s intercontinental ballistic missile fleet in 1997 during the Taiwan conflict, but we didn’t put much of a dent in their medium-or short-range ballistic missile arsenal. Most of it is intact, and it’s potent.”
“And Korea no longer has all of the Patriot antiaircraft and antimissile systems it had just one month ago,” Ellen Whiting pointed out. “We took most of those systems home with us when our troops left, didn’t we?”
“Yes. Less than a third of the thirty Patriot batteries are still there,” Freeman said. “Each battery has three launchers, one radar, and six reload canisters. That’s about forty shots against aircraft — Patriots always fire in two-round salvos — and less than twenty shots against tactical ballistic missiles. This means one attack could deplete their antiaircraft and antimissile capabilities. Plus, Kwon has to face the idea of dispersing those ten batteries throughout the entire peninsula, not just the South. Thirty batteries located in South Korea protected the nation very well against just about any airborne threat — but ten batteries spread out over the entire peninsula will be stretching it pretty thin.”
“And what do we do if Kwon wants to buy more Patriots?” Vice President Whiting asked. “What do we tell him? Or what if he goes to Russia, or Israel, or Great Britain, looking for air defense equipment?”
“Let’s not get too far ahead of ourselves here,” the President said, holding up a hand. “One crisis at a time, please.” He thought for a moment, then said, “Okay. What do we have in the region right now? Anything at all we can add to increase the deterrent factor?”
“All of our assets are afloat,” Philip Freeman replied. “The America and the Eisenhower carrier battle groups are in the area. The America is in the Yellow Sea, helping move our remaining troops out of Korea; it was to have been decommissioned two years ago, but with the destruction of Indy, it’s still in service. The Eisenhower is in the Sea of Japan, standing by to help, trying to monitor the situation, and providing some cover for Japan. Not that Japan needs it — they’ve been flying regular MiG-29 patrols right up to the Korea-China-Russia frontier, with Korea’s blessing. We have two other carriers, Roosevelt and Vinson, en route to the area.”
“That’s it? No other forces near Korea?”
“Sir, that’s one-third of our carrier fleet,” Freeman acknowledged somberly. “And they all must operate with minimal forward-basing capability. Seventh Fleet was forced to move from Yokosuka to Pearl Harbor because of the Independence disaster, and all attack-capable military units were removed from Japan following the nuclear attack on the Independence. We have a few assets at Yokota and Misawa, all air defense and transport units. It took two years of hard negotiating to keep our bases on Okinawa. The units on Okinawa are there to maintain air base operations and provide fleet support only — we are prohibited from basing or staging any attack forces from there. Anderson Air Base on Guam is still uninhabitable; Agana Naval Base on Guam is just coming back up after being heavily damaged in the Chinese attack. The nearest American military base is Elmendorf Air Force Base.” When the President looked up at Freeman with a quizzical expression, he added, “In Anchorage, Alaska.”
“Anchorage!” the President exclaimed. “The closest military base we have to Korea is in Alaska?”
“The former Adak Naval Air Station in the Aleutian Island chain is thirteen hundred miles closer, but it is completely uninhabited except by caretakers — the Navy left in 1998,” Freeman said. “First-class airfield, first-class dock facilities, first-class communications facilities, enough housing and infrastructure for almost ten thousand folks — just uninhabited for two years. It’s a three-hour plane ride from Anchorage, if the weather is good.” He gave the President a wry smile. “The Navy got along well with the neighbors — the nearest civilian community of any size is over one hundred miles away.”
“My God,” the President muttered. “No nearby military facilities. What’re the next closest bases?”
“About equidistant between Anchorage and Honolulu,” Freeman said. “Over four thousand miles away — eight hours by jet.”
“God,” the President muttered again. “Philip, I need a contingency plan to deal with this, right away. If China attacks United Korea, what are we going to do about it? What will our response be? We also need to have sufficient forces in place to protect Japan, even if they don’t want us based on their soil. My thoughts are this: we place enough deterrent forces in the region to show China that we are ready to respond. At least three carrier battle groups, plus a bomber force on alert in Alaska, loaded with enough firepower to blunt a Chinese ground invasion. Philip, I need you to draw up something like that as soon as possible.”
Philip Freeman walked over to his briefcase and withdrew three copies of a thick manuscript. “Fast enough for you, sir?” he quipped, handing a copy to Vice President Whiting as well. The manuscript was entitled “United Republic of Korea Show of Force Ops Plan.”
“You’ve been busy these past few days, Philip,” the President said approvingly. “Very good. Give it to me in a nutshell.”
“You’ve given it to me already, sir,” Freeman responded. “Priority number one: increase our presence in northeast Asia without the use of foreign forward-operating bases. Priority number two: deter aggression by China or Russia against the UROK or Japan. Priority number three: be able to stop or blunt a land invasion by either China or Russia into the UROK with rapid, sustained, massive firepower.