Although London society continued to enjoy itself there is no doubt that the invasion was regarded as a serious threat. In the City of London the Lord Mayor presided over a meeting of merchants and bankers at which it was unanimously resolved that 'in view of the enemy's purpose of utterly destroying the Constitutions of these Kingdoms' a subscription for voluntary contributions would be opened at the Bank for the defence of the country. The sum of £46,534 was raised by the end of the meeting and other patriotic funds were established and attracted considerable support. The Admiralty decided that fifteen post-captains and seventy-five masters and commanders should be employed along the coast to command the Sea Fencibles: these were a maritime version of the later home guard and consisted of volunteers drawn from those local seamen who had escaped the activities of the press gangs - mostly fishermen, smugglers and seamen engaged in the coastal trade, who were armed, organised and given protection against impressment.
In the West Country, where he had recently moved with his wife and baby son, the poet Coleridge expressed his concerns about the invasion in a long and deeply felt poem, 'Fears in Solitude'. He was living in a cottage among the Quantock Hills beside the Bristol Channel and the thought of his native land being rent by 'carnage and groans' filled him with dread:
What uproar and what strife may now be stirring
This way or that o'er these silent hills —
Invasion, and the thunder and the shout,
And all the crash of onset; fear and rage,
And undetermined conflict . . .
For Coleridge, as for most of his countrymen, it was Britain's 'fleets and perilous seas' which were seen as the country's strongest defence, and with good reason. The French and Spanish fleets were effectively penned into their respective naval bases by British ships, and the remains of the Dutch fleet, after being defeated by Admiral Duncan at the Battle of Camperdown the previous October, had retreated to the Texel. During the course of his tour of the Channel ports Napoleon rapidly came to the conclusion that it was too hazardous to send an army of 30,000 troops across the Channel. He sent a blunt report to the Directory in Paris:
Whatever efforts we make, we will not, within a period of several years, gain the superiority of the seas. To perform a descent on England without being master of the seas is a very daring operation and very difficult to put into effect. If it is possible, it would be by surprise, by escaping from the squadrons blockading Brest or the Texel, then arriving in small boats during the night and after a crossing of seven or eight hours, at daybreak on the coast of Kent or Sussex. For such an operation we would need the long nights of winter. After the month of April, it would be increasingly impossible.
He pointed out that there was a shortage of boats and of experienced seamen and he strongly recommended that the invasion should be postponed. Instead he suggested that France should mount an expedition to Egypt.
There were several reasons behind this startling proposition. Napoleon's principal argument was that an invasion of Egypt would open up a route to India and enable France to strike at England's richest possession. France had already conquered Corsica and Corfu; by occupying Egypt and turning it into a French colony she would fulfil her destiny and become the great power of the Mediterranean. And, from a practical point of view, an Egyptian expedition would be an easier and less dangerous operation than an invasion of England: the Mamelukes, the ruling caste in Egypt, were unlikely to put up much resistance and would be easily crushed by French troops; the summer weather in the tideless Mediterranean would offer fewer obstacles to an invasion fleet than the strong tides and frequent gales of the English Channel; and there was no threat from the British Navy which had withdrawn from the Mediterranean in the autumn of 1796 - this followed the Spanish declaration of war on Britain and the need to have the British Mediterranean fleet closer to home so that it could rapidly reinforce the Channel fleet at the first sign of the threatened invasion of England.
On 5 March the Directory in Paris gave the go-ahead to the Egyptian expedition. During the next three months the troops and ships were assembled at Toulon and nearby ports and harbours. On 19 May the bulk of the great armada set sail from Toulon and was joined during the next few days by convoys from Genoa and Corsica. There were thirteen ships of the line, six frigates and corvettes, and 400 transport vessels carrying 31,000 troops. The invading army included 2,810 cavalry soldiers, more than 1,000 horses, and 171 field guns. There was also a select band of 167 scientists, engineers and artists who were there at Napoleon's request to explore, observe and record the ancient civilisation of Egypt, and to bring the benefit of French knowledge to a backward and undeveloped country. Napoleon himself travelled on board the flagship of the invasion fleet, the impressive three-decker L'Orient of 120 guns.
The Admiralty in London had known since April that the French were planning some sort of amphibious operation in the Mediterranean. The British consuls at Leghorn and Naples sent home reports of ship movements and the French newspapers continued to be a valuable source of information. Lord St Vincent in the Bay of Cadiz had discovered from various sources that a fleet of thirteen ships of the line had sailed from Corfu to Toulon, and that an expedition was being assembled at Genoa, Marseilles and other ports. But where and what was the objective? Naples and Sicily were thought to be the most likely targets but other theories were that the expedition was aimed at Portugal or Ireland or was intended to drive the British fleet from Cadiz.
St Vincent decided to send a squadron into the Mediterranean to investigate the French preparations at Toulon and to find out what was going on. Both he and the Admiralty in London were agreed on the man who should lead this critical but potentially dangerous reconnaissance mission. 'The appearance of a British squadron in the Mediterranean is a condition on which the fate of Europe may at this moment be stated to depend,' wrote Lord Spencer, the First Lord of the Admiralty, to St Vincent, 'I think it almost unnecessary to suggest to you the propriety of putting it under the command of Sir H. Nelson, whose acquaintance with the part of the world, as well as his activity and disposition seem to qualify him in a peculiar manner for that service.'
The previous summer, while the Bellerophon had remained with the rest of St Vincent's fleet blockading the Spanish fleet in Cadiz, Nelson had sailed to the Canary Islands to attack the Spanish port of Santa Cruz at Tenerife. The attack was made on a blustery night and was a disaster. The British suffered heavy loss of life, and Nelson, who insisted on leading the landing parties himself, was hit by a musket ball as he scrambled ashore from his barge. He suffered a compound fracture of the right arm just above the elbow and was hastily rowed back to his flagship where the surgeon amputated the arm. In a letter to St Vincent accompanying his official report on the unsuccessful action he requested a frigate 'to convey the remains of my carcass to England.' He added a despairing postscript to his letter: 'A left-handed admiral will never again be considered as useful, therefore the sooner I get to a very humble cottage the better and make room for a better man to serve the state.' St Vincent was well aware of the difficulties posed by an amphibious operation which involved landing a force on a beach under enemy fire and was generous in his response. 'Mortals cannot command success: you and your companions have certainly deserved it by the greatest degree of heroism and perseverance that was ever exhibited . . .' and he arranged for Nelson to be sent home in the frigate Seahorse.