Many in Britain had welcomed Napoleon's rise to supreme power. However enthusiasm for the First Consul began to ebb away when news of his ambitious plans for an invasion of England became known. When Napoleon had been put in command of the Army of England back in 1798 he had inspected the troops and ships assembled in the French ports and had wisely decided that they were not capable of mounting a successful invasion. He now had the power and resources to assemble an invasion force on an altogether different scale, and he approached the task with his usual energy and attention to detail. Within days of the resumption of hostilities following the breakdown of the Peace of Amiens, orders were sent out for the building of 150 landing craft, and on 24 May 1803 contracts were placed for a further 1,050 vessels. 'We must have a model of a flat-bottomed boat able to transport 100 men across the Channel,' Bonaparte wrote to Rear-Admiral Decrès, the Minister of Marine, on 29 May. 'There should be a mortar in the bows and stern. Such a boat should not cost more than £200 to £250.' On 5 July Napoleon issued orders for the purchase and construction of 2,410 more vessels, including shallow-draught troop carriers, bomb vessels and fast coastal luggers. Private shipyards all over France and Belgium were engaged in the work and invasion craft were even built on the Quai D'Orsay in the centre of Paris.
To accommodate this armada of invasion craft, Napoleon ordered many French harbours to be enlarged and protected by additional forts. At Boulogne, extensive new quays were built and a large artificial basin was excavated, and less ambitious works were carried out at the smaller ports such as Ambleteuse and Etaples. Ten new gun batteries were built along the Normandy coast in an effort to protect the invasion vessels from the frequent attacks made by British ships. The biggest concentration of troops, the Grand Army of 114,000 men, was assembled on the hills above Boulogne, creating an extended town of military huts, clearly visible in contemporary pictures on the green hills above the port. Napoleon made a number of surprise visits to the various ports and harbours to check on progress, and inspect the troops.
'I went on Friday to visit the harbour at Boulogne, and arrived quite unexpectedly,' he wrote on 5 November 1803. 'I took the greatest interest in inspecting all the works and preparations for the great expedition.' Two days later he was writing, 'On Sunday I spent the day visiting the new ports of Ambleteuse and Wimereux, and making the troops quartered there go through their manoeuvres. The works are progressing satisfactorily.' It was a refreshing change from his administrative duties in Paris and he was in his element. Returning to Boulogne on 12 November he noted, 'I spent the whole of yesterday at the harbour, either on horseback or in a boat, which means that I was soaked the whole of the day. But unless one is prepared to face the rain at this season, one would never do anything; fortunately for me, it suits me perfectly, and I have never been better in my life.'
In addition to assembling his invasion craft he ordered a company of guide-interpreters to be formed to accompany the invading army, and even instructed Chaptal, the Minister for Home Affairs, to get a special song written for the invasion, to be set to the music of the Chant du départ. 'And while you are about it,' he instructed, 'have a number of songs written on the same subject, to go to different tunes.' By May 1804 there were more than a thousand landing craft and gunboats available and he was planning the invasion for the late summer of that year. In July he made another tour of the invasion ports and on this occasion revealed his inability to understand the real problems of mounting an amphibious operation. In addition to his genius as a military commander Napoleon had an extraordinary ability to get things done, but he consistently failed to understand what every sailor and fisherman understood and that was the crucial importance of the weather and the tides in any operation involving sailing ships.
Early on the morning of 20 July he decided to hold a general review of the fleet at Boulogne. He sent orders to Vice-Admiral Bruix, who was in command of the invasion flotilla, to take the fleet to sea and anchor in the roadstead while he went for his daily ride on horseback. A strong south-westerly wind had been blowing the previous day and there was a heavy swell off the harbour entrance but it was evident to any experienced seaman that a strong gale was imminent. Admiral Bruix therefore decided that the review would have to be postponed to another day. When Napoleon returned from his ride to inspect the fleet he was furious to find that his orders had been disobeyed. Bruix explained that there was a storm on the way and he did not wish to risk the lives of his men. Napoleon overruled him and they nearly came to blows. Rear-Admiral Magon took the fleet to sea and anchored offshore.
During the afternoon the wind swung round to the north-east and rose to gale force, accompanied by thunder and lightning. The fleet was ordered to weigh anchor and seek shelter but the breaking waves at the entrance of Boulogne Harbour made it too dangerous to enter and so most of the ships and boats headed for Etaples. Forty-two of them reached it safely but four gunboats, two shallops and two caiques were driven ashore at Boulogne and wrecked. More than 200 men were drowned. Napoleon insisted on getting into a boat and leading the rescue efforts and was nearly drowned himself. A report sent to the Minister of War two days later by Marshal Soult played down the disaster and made much of Napoleon's rescue attempt. Soult described 'an extremely unfortunate event which caused the loss of a few soldiers and damaged several of the ships . . . His Imperial Majesty himself passed the night on the shore, and in the surf, directing the salvage operations, and his august presence was of the greatest comfort to the unfortunate men on the wrecks.'
By August it was evident that the invasion would have to be delayed to the following year. Napoleon returned to Fontainebleau to embark on negotiations with the Pope and the arrangements for his coronation as emperor. However he remained as determined as ever to land his invincible French soldiers on English soil and march on London: 'With God's help I will put an end to the future and very existence of England.' During the winter of 1804-5 he drew up fresh plans for the invasion. Apart from the weather, and the problem of getting large numbers of vessels out of the various French ports on a single tide, the greatest obstacle was the British Navy. Small sailing vessels loaded with soldiers were extremely vulnerable to attack from patrolling frigates, let alone from a fleet of ships of the line. It was therefore essential that the French gain control of the Channel for at least twenty-four hours while the armada of invasion craft made the crossing. Napoleon's solution was a Grand Strategy which was admirable in theory but fatally over-estimated the capabilities of the French Navy. He planned that the French fleets would break out of their naval bases, cross the Atlantic and recapture from the British a number of West Indian islands, including Martinique, St Lucia and St Dominique. This would cause the British to send a major naval force across the West Indies. While they were away from Europe, the French fleets would combine forces, hurry back across the Atlantic and sail up the English Channel. He believed that their superior numbers would enable them to sweep aside any opposition and provide cover for the invasion flotilla.