Cooke's first lieutenant was William Pryce Cumby. He was thirty-four and, unlike his captain, he had no previous experience of enemy action. He had served in frigates and ships of the line, and spent several years with the Mediterranean fleet under St Vincent engaged in the blockade of Cadiz. Before joining the Bellerophon in November 1804 he had commanded a naval cutter on the east coast and served briefly with the Sea Fencibles at King's Lynn. He was to prove heroic under fire at Trafalgar when he had to take over command of the ship from the captain, and his account of the action (written at the request of his son Anthony) is one of the most vivid and personal of the many eye-witness descriptions.
When the news reached England in May 1805 that Villeneuve had escaped from Toulon, Captain Cooke and the Bellerophon were despatched to the Straits of Gibraltar with a squadron led by Vice-Admiral Collingwood. They arrived off Cadiz on 31 May only to learn that Villeneuve had set off for the West Indies, taking with him several of the Spanish ships from Cadiz. While Nelson set off in pursuit of the enemy fleet, Collingwood and his squadron took up a position off the port to keep watch on the remaining Spanish warships in the harbour. They were there when Villeneuve returned from the West Indies, fought Admiral Calder off Finisterre and retreated into Ferrol. They were still there on 20 July when Nelson came back exhausted after his fruitless pursuit of the enemy fleet and stepped ashore at Gibraltar. He had been at sea without a break for two years and returned to England to recuperate, leaving Collingwood to take charge of the fleet.
In mid-August Villeneuve again managed to evade the blockading squadrons. He led his fleet out of Ferrol and headed south to join his forces with the Spanish ships in Cadiz Harbour. The Bellerophon and several other ships of the squadron were in Gibraltar and others were scattered along the coast when Collingwood, with only three ships of the line, a frigate and a bomb vessel under his command, round thirty enemy warships bearing down on him. He had no option but to make a hasty withdrawal but as soon as Villeneuve's fleet had entered Cadiz Harbour he resumed his position off the entrance. He sent a message back to England to warn the Admiralty of the current position of the Combined Fleet and proceeded to make signals to an imaginary fleet on the horizon to encourage Villeneuve to remain in harbour until reinforcements arrived.
The Bellerophon sailed from Gibraltar early on the morning of 23 August and rejoined Collingwood's squadron off Cadiz later the same day. By the time Nelson came out from England on 28 September the squadron had grown to a fleet of twenty-seven ships of the line. Nelson had orders from the Prime Minister and the Admiralty to engage and destroy the Combined Fleet of France and Spain. 'It is, as Mr Pitt, knows, annihilation that the country wants - not merely a splendid victory.' The only problem was luring the enemy fleet out of Cadiz Harbour. The problem was solved by Napoleon, who became so impatient with Villeneuve's failure to head north and support his planned invasion of England that he despatched Vice-Admiral Francis Rosily to replace him. When news of this reached Villeneuve he decided that he had no option but to take his fleet to sea and face the consequences.
THIRTEEN
Victory or Death
1805
No other fleet in Britain's long naval history approached a major battle with a keener sense of anticipation or with a greater confidence in its ability to win than did the British fleet off Cape Trafalgar in October 1805. Many of those present had already taken part in sea battles or single-ship actions and were fully aware of the dangers but, as one of the Bellerophon's crew later wrote, 'I can assure you I felt not the least fear of death during the action, which I attribute to the general confidence of victory which I saw all round me.'
There were many reasons for this widespread feeling of invincibility. The first and most obvious was that the British seamen knew that they were superior to their enemy in every essential respect. In particular they were superior in seamanship, shiphandling and gunnery, all of which were crucial in the confusion of a sea battle. Unlike the ships of France and Spain which, apart from the brief and desperate foray to the West Indies, had spent years blockaded in their naval bases, the British ships at Trafalgar had been more or less constantly at sea since the outbreak of the war with France. Their officers were experienced in navigating and keeping station in all weathers and in some of the most treacherous waters in the world. Their crews were constantly drilled in gunnery and their accuracy in firing from a moving platform and their rate of fire were formidable. Moreover the British not only knew the weaknesses of their enemy but were used to winning. In the past ten years British fleets had been victorious in a succession of battles, notably those of the Glorious First of June, Cape St Vincent, Camperdown, the Nile and Copenhagen. And in Nelson they had a commander-in-chief in whom they had total confidence and who inspired a devotion and loyalty among all ranks which had a remarkably unifying effect.
A less obvious but equally powerful reason for the determination and spirit of the British seamen was that they truly believed that they were fighting for the defence of their country and for their homes and families. When the Bellerophon left Plymouth in September 1804 the entire south coast was in a state of readiness to repel the invasion flotilla which Napoleon had gathered in the French ports. Every English sailor knew that the navy was all that stood between Napoleon's armies and the conquest of their country. Collingwood spoke for many when he wrote that he felt 'as if the welfare of all England depended on us alone'. There was also a strong feeling among British sailors that they wanted to put an end to the dreary task of blockading the enemy ports, and to confront and defeat the enemy once and for all so that they could return home to their anxiously waiting families. What they dreaded was that the enemy would elude them. Much of this is summed up by the reaction of the Bellerophon's, Lieutenant Cumby when the combined fleet of French and Spanish ships was first sighted coming out of harbour:
Our joy at the prospect this afforded of an opportunity of bringing the enemy's fleet to action, and consequently terminating the blockade which we had been so long and so disagreeably employ'd was considerably checked by the apprehension that it was merely a feint on their part and having no intention of giving us battle that they would re-enter the harbour of Cadiz so soon as they discovered us in pursuit.