Villeneuve was also preparing for action. Ever since he had heard the news that Napoleon intended to relieve him of his command and that Vice-Admiral Rosily was on his way to replace him, he had determined to venture forth and save his reputation by leading the Combined Fleet into battle. But he did so with a heavy heart. In theory his thirty-three ships of the line should have been more than a match for Nelson's twenty-seven but he knew only too well how unprepared his forces were. Writing from Cadiz to Decrès, the Minister of Marine, back in August, he had revealed his deep concerns about Napoleon's ambitious plans: 'I beg of you to believe that nothing can equal the despair that I am suffering from them and the horror of the situation in which I find myself.' He warned that the state of equipment of his ships, and the lack of co-operation and intelligence 'did not allow of encountering the slightest obstacles without suffering irreparable injuries, dispersion and the ruin of the project, making us the laughing-stock of Europe.' His forebodings were backed up by the conclusions of a Council of War which he called on board his flagship Bucentaur on 8 October: All present recognised that the ships of the two allied nations are for the most part badly armed, through the weakness of their crews; that many of them have not yet exercised their crews at all at sea . . . and that the enemy in the offing is much more powerful than ours.'
Now that he was at sea Villeneuve put a brave face on the situation. His final instructions to his captains issued on the morning of the battle were as resolute as could be expected in the circumstances. What is particularly interesting about these instructions is that he anticipated with remarkable accuracy the method of attack which Nelson would adopt: 'The enemy will not confine himself to forming in a line of battle parallel with our own and in engaging us in an artillery duel.' This of course was the traditional way in which sea battles were fought. Recalling, perhaps, the tactics used by the British in previous actions, he warned his captains that the enemy 'will endeavour to envelop our rear, to break through our line and to direct his ships in groups upon such of ours as he shall have cut off, so as to surround and defeat them.' He reminded them that 'a captain who is not under fire is not at his post', and concluded, 'every effort must be exerted to go to the assistance of the ships assailed and to close on the flagship, which will set the example.'
In the great cabin of the Bellerophon Captain Cooke and Lieutenant Cumby had breakfast together as they usually did at 8 o'clock. When they had finished their meal and the captain's servants had removed their plates Captain Cooke told Cumby that he had something which he wanted to show him. He unfolded a piece of paper and handed it to Cumby. It was Nelson's memorandum to all his captains in which he set out his instructions for the conduct of the battle. It began, 'I have made up my mind that the order of sailing is to be the order of battle . . .' and went on to describe how he intended to cut through the enemy line near the centre and then turn and overpower all the enemy ships from the centre to the rear of their line before the vessels at the front of the line could come to the rescue of their beleaguered and outnumbered ships at the centre and rear. Nelson had originally intended to attack with his fleet arranged in three lines but, as both fleets were smaller than he anticipated, he changed this to two lines. He would lead the weather column into action and Collingwood would lead the lee column. His memorandum concluded, 'Captains are to look to their particular Line as their rallying point. But, in case Signals can neither be seen or perfectly understood, no Captain can do very wrong if he places his Ship alongside that of an Enemy.'
When Cumby had finished reading the document Cooke asked him whether he understood the Admiral's instructions. Cumby told him that they were so distinct and explicit that it was quite impossible that they could be misunderstood. Cooke expressed his satisfaction at this and said that he wanted Cumby to be aware of the instructions so that he would know how to proceed in case he, the captain, should be 'bowl'd out' during the action. Cumby recorded his reply: 'On this I observed that it was very possible that the same shot which disposed of him might have an equally tranquilizing effect on me and under that idea I submitted to him the expediency of the Master (as being the only other officer who in such case would remain on the Quarter Deck) being also apprised of the Admiral's instructions.' Cooke immediately agreed with this and Overton was summoned to the great cabin and he too read through Nelson's memorandum. Only one of the three men present would live to see the day out.
It was now time for the first lieutenant to carry out his duty of inspecting the ship, so that he could report back to the captain that all was in order and the ship was ready for action. Most of the gun crews had stripped to the waist and had handkerchiefs bound tightly around their heads and over their ears to deaden the noise of the guns. Some of the men were sharpening their cutlasses in readiness for boarding or repelling boarders when the time came. On reaching the lower deck Cumby made his way along the line of guns and gun crews until he reached George Saunders, the ship's fifth lieutenant, who was in charge of the seven foremost guns. Saunders drew his attention to some of the gun barrels 'where the zeal of the seamen had led them to chalk in large characters on their guns the words, "Victory or Death": a very gratifying mark of the spirit with which they were going to their work.'
The same spirit was evident throughout the ship. One of the midshipmen later wrote, 'One would have thought that the people were preparing for a festival rather than a combat, and no dissatisfaction was expressed except at the state of the weather, which was calm, and prevented our quickly nearing the enemy.' The slow speed at which the two opposing fleets approached each other was one of the most memorable features of the battle for those who took part in it. With the westerly breeze behind them, the British ships set all possible sail but so light was the wind that most of them were averaging no more than 2 or 3 knots. This meant that six hours elapsed between the first sighting of the Combined Fleet and the moment when the ships were close enough to open fire.
Surprisingly, with such an extended time to wait for battle to be joined, the British sailors remained remarkably cheerful. The music no doubt helped. Several ships had bands on board. These varied considerably in size and quality: a few captains had bands made up of professional musicians and several ships were able to muster some volunteer musicians from their crews, but everyone later recalled the sound of stirring tunes thumping across the calm water. 'Rule Britannia', 'Hearts of Oak' and 'God Save the King' were played with patriotic fervour and it is recorded that the band on the Tonnant, the ship immediately ahead of the Bellerophon, played 'Britons, Strike Home', a tune popular among the seamen at the time. No doubt the thought of prize money also kept many sailors' spirits up. The midshipman who remarked that people seemed to be preparing for a festival also noted that, 'so confident were our people of success, that though we were bearing down on a superior fleet, they were employed in fixing on the number of their prizes, and pitching upon that which should fall to the lot of each of our ships.' Although an ordinary seaman could expect no more than a tiny proportion of the value of any ship captured (for every £1,000 of a captain's share of a prize, a seaman's share in a 74 was around £2) there was always the hope that it would be enough for them to retire from the sea and find an easier life ashore.