" ‘If things work out,’ Sir?"
"Commander Feldt can be difficult," Pickering said. "Both the Army and the Navy have sent people up there. He told both groups to ‘sod off.’ Can you guess what that means?"
"I think so, Sir," Banning said, smiling.
"I’m hoping that he will see you as someone who has come to be of help, not take charge. If he does, then you can rent a house for your people up there. In the meantime, it might get a little crowded, so we’ll put them up in my house, here."
"Your house, Sir?"
"Against what I suppose is the inevitable:-my being told to vacate these quarters-I rented a house." He saw the confusion on Banning’s face. "A number, a large number, of MacArthur’s Palace Guard want me out of here; I am too close to the Divine Throne."
"I understand, Sir," Banning said, turning from the mirror where he was tying his field scarf to smile at Pickering.
"I’ll call. Right now, as a matter of fact, and have the house activated. If I had known you would have that kid with you, I would already have done it."
"Activated, Sir?"
"It comes with a small staff. Housekeeper, maids, a cook. Since I’m not in it, I put them on vacation."
"That sounds fine, but who pays for it? I’m not sure I’m authorized to put my people on per diem."
"Frank Knox’s Confidential Fund will pay for it," Pickering said, "but let me make it clear to you, Banning, that you’re authorized to do about anything you damned well please. You answer only to me."
He went to a telephone and gave the operator a number.
"Mrs. Mannshow, this is Fleming Pickering. I’m glad I caught you in. Do you think you could get those people to come off Ninety Mile Beach and start running the house starting tomorrow?"
He looked at Banning and smiled, and gestured for Banning to make himself another drink.
(Six)
top secret
Eyes Only-The Secretary of the Navy
DUPLICATION FORBIDDEN
ORIGINAL TO BE DESTROYED AFTER ENCRYPTION AND TRANSMITTAL TO SECNAVY
Menzies Hotel
Melbourne, Australia
Wednesday, 20 May 194 2
Dear Frank:
I thought it appropriate to report on the status quo here, especially the thinking of the General, insofar as the Battle of the Coral Sea and other events seem to have affected it.
But before I get to that, let me report the arrival of my own reinforcements. Major Ed Banning arrived yesterday, together with his advance party, one ferocious Marine paratrooper who must be all of seventeen. The balance of his command is still in Hawaii, trying to get on an airplane for the trip here. If it could be arranged to get them a higher priority without causing undue attention, I suggest that it be provided to them. In my judgment, it is more important to get Banning’s people here and integrated with the Australian Coastwatchers than it is to send more Army and Marine colonels and Navy captains here so they can start setting up their empires.
Banning, of course, carried your let ter, for which I thank you (and the check, for which I thank you even more; if Banning has to start chartering fishing boats, etc., his operation can become very expensive, very soon). And he brought me up to date on Albatross operations in Hawaii, in particular their effectiveness vis-a-vis what happened in the Coral Sea.
I am very impressed with Banning, but fear that he is less than pleased with me. He made it clear that he considers himself to be under my orders, which I immediately made use of by forbidding him even to think about going behind Japanese lines himself. Because of his Japanese language skills and understanding of their minds, for one thing, and for another, because I think he knows too much about Albatross, he is too valuable to risk being captured.
Now to the Generaclass="underline"
Until he learned that the Japanese had occupied Tulagi, I really didn’t think he paid much attention to the fact that the border between his area and Nimitz‘s had been moved from 160 degrees east longitude, where the Joint Chiefs originally established it, to where it is now. But after the Japs took Tulagi, he became painfully aware that Nimitz now had responsibility for both Tulagi and Guadalcanal, the much larger island to the south.
He is now convinced that the new division of responsibility was established-the line changed-by his cabal of enemies, Marshall and King again, to deny him authority over territory he considers essential to his mission of defending Australia. I am finding it harder and harder to fault his logic and support that of the JCS.
The argument, I know, is that it is the Navy’s responsibility to maintain the sea lanes, and that was the argument for putting the border at 160 EL. MacArthur counters that this would hold water only if the Navy were occupying the land in question and using it for that purpose. And, of course, they are not, and have shown no indication that they intend to.
All of this was exacerbated when he learned that the day after he had surrendered Corregidor, General Wainwright went on the radio in Manila and ordered all forces in the Philippines to lay down their arms. This enraged him for several reasons, not necessarily in proportion to their importance to the war.
He seemed most enraged (and found it another proof that George Marshall stays awake nights thinking up new evil things to do to him) by the fact that Wainwright, apparently encouraged by Washington, no longer considered himself subordinate to MacArthur, and thus surrendered Corregidor on his own-without, in other words, MacA.‘s authority to do so.
Second, he is absolutely convinced that Wainwright, again encouraged by Washington, went even further than that, by assuming authority for all U.S./Filipino Forces in the Philippines, an authority MacA., with reason, believed he still retained, having never been formally relieved of it.
General Sharp, on Mindanao, was specifically ordered to surrender by Wainwright. According to MacA., Sharp had 30,000 U.S./Filipino troops, armed, and in far better shape insofar as ammunition, rations, etcetera, than any others in the islands. It is hard to understand why they were ordered to surrender. As it turns out, MacA. has learned that Sharp paid only lip service to Wainwright’s orders and encouraged his men to go to the hills and organize as guerrillas. He himself and most of his immediate staff felt obliged to follow orders, and they surrendered.
MacArthur feels a sense of shame (wholly unjustified, I think) for the loss of the Philippines. And he has an at least partially justified feeling that he is being treated unfairly by Washington in his present command.
Two days after Corregidor fell, he cabled General Marshall (ignoring the implication that Marshall couldn’t figure this out himself) that the Japanese victory in the Philippines will free two infantry divisions and a large number of aircraft that they will probably use to take New Guinea, and then the Solomons.
They will then cut his supply routes to the United States, which would mean the loss of Australia.
MacA. proposed to go on the counterattack, starting with the recapture of Tulagi, and then establishing our own presence on Guadalcanal. In his mind (and in mine) he tried to be a good soldier and to "coordinate" this with South Pacific Area Headquarters. But he was (a) reminded that Guadalcanal and Tulagi are not "within his sphere of influence" and that (b) under those circumstances it was really rather presumptuous of him to ask for Navy aircraft carriers, etcetera, to conduct an operation in their sphere of influence, but that (c) he was not to worry, because Admiral Nimitz was already making plans to recapture Tulagi with a Marine Raider battalion.