The first coach of the train had wooden seats; and the second held an Australian Army nurse, a couple of Australian Army sergeants, an army field stove, and a supply of food. It was a three-day trip. For the first twenty-four hours, no one spoke to me but the sergeants.
Then MacArthur sent for me. He ran Sutherland and Huff off and began a nonstop lecture that lasted several hours. Obviously, he was playing to you, vicariously , through me. He began with Japanese economics and politics and how these made the war in the Pacific inevitable. Then he discussed Japanese strategy generally and in the Philippines specifically. He had at his fingertips a literally incredible encyclopedia of dates, names, and figures (tonnages, distances, etcetera).
By the time it was over, I was dazed. Using the word very carefully, the man is clearly a genius. I shall never think of him again as just one more general. It seems to me now that he fits in the same category as Roosevelt and Churchill. I also believe that, like Roosevelt and Churchill, he sees himself as a latter-day Moses, divinely inspired to lead his people out of the desert. In this connection, he feels a personal obligation to the Filipinos.
MacA. seems to understand that Roosevelt’s decision to aid Britain (and the Russians) first is irrevocable and that, as a good soldier, he will of course support it. But he also makes it plain that he believes the decision was the wrong one, made because (a) Churchill can play Roosevelt like a violin (and I rather agree with that), and (b) George Marshall, who has Roosevelt’ s ear, is determined that MacArthur shall not be allowed to demonstrate his military genius (which, of course, is absurd).
General Marshall (MacA. ‘s Deputy C/S; not the other one, obviously) boarded the train at a small station several hours before we got to Adelaide the next afternoon. I started to leave, but MacA. motioned for me to stay. Marshall then confirmed what I had told MacA. in Darwin ; that there were no troops to speak of in all of Australia; and that there was doubt that Australia itself could be held.
Marshall said something to MacA. about creating a "Brisbane Line" ; the Australian General Staff was planning to abandon the northern ports, including Darwin, to the Japanese, and attempt to hold the population centers along the southern and eastern coasts.
"They can just forget that, " MacArthur said. "We shall hold Australia. "
Logic told me, Frank, that that was highly improbable. But my heart told me that we would indeed hold Australia. Mac-Arthur had just said so.
Marshall also reported that two companies of the 182ndInfantry and a company of Army Engineers had landed on Efate with orders to build an airfield, "whatever the hell that means. "
Without reference to a map,and more important, without my having told him thatAdmiral King had ordered the recapture of Rabaul-and if I hadn’t told him, who else had this knowledge and could have?- Mac-Arthur explained that Efate was an island in the New Hebrides, about 700 miles southeast of Tulagi, and that "someone with a knowledge of strategy" had seen the establishment of an air base there as essential to the recapture of Rabaul, which was itself essential to deny the Japanese a chance to make a successful landing on the Australian continent.
Marshall also told him that there would be reporters waiting for him in Adelaide, and that some sort of a statement would be expected.
The two of them started to work on that, and were still working on it when he arrived at Adelaide. This is, essentially verbatim, what he said there :
"The President of the United States ordered me to break through the Japanese lines for the purpose, as I understand it, of organizing the American offensive against Japan, a primary object of which is the relief of the Philippines. I came through, and I shall return. "
If you want to know what he‘s thinking, Frank, I suggest you study that short speech carefully. It wasnot off the cuff.
The Commissioner of Railroads had sent his own private car to Adelaide, where it was attached to the Melbourne Express. From Adelaide to Melbourne, the track is standard width. I scurried around getting a sleeper on the train, and had just succeeded when Huff found me. I was, so I was informed, to have one of the staterooms in the private car. I don’ t know who was more surprised, Huff or me.
We got to Spencer Street Station, Melbourne, just before ten a.m. the next day. We backed in, with MacA. standing like a politician on the rear platform of the private car. There were half a hundred reporters in the station, and even an honor guard.
MacA. delivered another speech, which I am sure was as carefully prepared as the
"I shall return" speech in Adelaide. In it, again just about verbatim, he said, "success in modern war means the furnishing of sufficient troops and materiel to meet the known strength of the enemy. No general can make something out of nothing. My success or failure will depend primarily upon the resources which the respective governments place at my disposal."
He cold-shouldered General Brett and General Royce at the station, rather cruelly I thought; and I think he‘s going to hold a grudge about the B-17s. There is no excuse for it that I can see. Nor-as I just learned from Huff-is there any excuse for recommending the award of a Presidential Unit Citation to every unit on Corregidor except the 4thMarines. His reason for not giving it to the Marines, again quoting Huff, is that "they have enough publicity as it is. "
He also, politely, refused the offer of several mansions and moved into the Menzies. I can only wonder what will happen when he finds out that lowly Captain Pickering, USNR, occupies an identical apartment directly above him.
I don’t think he has made up his mind what to do about me, and for the moment, at least, I am considered a memberpro tem of the palace guard.
One final thing: I learned from the Australians that they have left behind, on various islands now (or about to be) occupied by the Japs, former colonial officers, planters, missionaries, etcetera. They are calling these people "Coast-watchers," and they feel they will be able to provide very valuable intelligence. They have commissioned them into the Royal Australian Navy Reserve, so they’ll be under the Geneva Convention. I suspect that they are just whistling in the wind about that.
Admiral Leary does not seem to be impressed with their potential, I am. If we have anybody who speaks Japanese, and who can be spared, I suggest you send them over here now to establish a relationship with the Coastwatchers.
I really hope this is what you were hoping to get from me.
Respectfully,
Fleming Pickering, Capt., USNR.
(Eight)
Walker Hasslinger’s Restaurant
Baltimore, Maryland
1 April 1942
The basic principles of both leadership and organization have evolved over many centuries. Among the most important of these principles is the chain of command. The military services, and for that matter any organization, may be thought of as a pyramid. Authority and responsibility flow downward from the pinnacle, passing through progressively junior levels of command. Simplistically, if the first sergeant of an infantry company, for example, wants a PFC to load a truck with sandbags, he does not stop the first PFC he encounters and tell him to do so. Instead, he tells a platoon sergeant, who tells a section leader, who tells a corporal, and the corporal selects the PFC who gets the sandbags loaded.