The Israeli cocked his head in Tom’s direction with newfound respect. “Yes,” he said. “It is a good idea.”
“Then I’m ready.”
Salah examined Tom up and down. Tom started for the door, but Salah cut him off. “Wait-” The Israeli slapped the file folder he was carrying onto the chair, rummaged through the drawer of the steel desk, pulled out a wrinkled olive-drab barracks cap, shook it energetically, then slapped it against Tom’s upper arm. “Here-put this on,” he said brusquely. “You have an American-style haircut.”
13
10:26A.M. Tom pulled the cap on and followed the Israeli. They walked down a long corridor, turned right, descended a flight of stairs, and turned left, entering another ominous, dimly lit corridor lined with heavy gray steel doors.
Interesting. The room where Tom had changed clothes had a concrete floor. So did the corridor. The steps he’d just descended were also concrete, with steel edges. But the floor in this corridor was covered in inch-thick, hard rubber-like the nonslip pads sometimes used in restaurant kitchens. Their footfalls made no noise whatsoever.
Tom worked to keep his emotions under control. It was difficult. He had actually run agents who were terrorists. His first had been a courier for Al Jihad-a handover on his first overseas tour when he’d worked under consular cover in Cairo. There’d been a car bomber in Sudan-a worker bee in the Muslim Brotherhood who was occasionally loaned out to al-Qa’ida. And of course there was Rashid in Paris. Rashid had what-half a dozen Israeli scalps on his belt. But this was different. He’d never interrogated a jailed terrorist before, never got up close and personal.
More pertinent: Tom had had only three days in which to prepare for this one-shot deal. That was like having no time at all. Prior to agent meetings, you often went back over months and months of reports, memorizing the tiniest details, so that if there were contradictions or fabrications, your internal b.s. detector sounded and they could be identified, highlighted, and probed. You asked your developmentals the same question twenty different ways, perpetually searching for minute inconsistencies or tiny discrepancies, because one word could make the difference between success and failure; between a unilateral asset and a double agent; between that agent’s life and their death.
That’s why the bloody recruitment process took so long. Tom shook his head. God-the damn 9/11 Commission was already leaking stories about putting more CIA agents, as they often incorrectly called them, on the street. Either the commission was made up of ignoramuses, or they’d all seen too much TV or read too much Tom Clancy.
The way they talked, all you had to do was hire someone, give him or her six months of training, andpoof, presto change-o, a full-grown case officer-Smiley out of the head of Zeus. It didn’t work that way. It could take years to learn the ropes, even if you were talented. You needed mentoring. There wasn’t a day that Tom didn’t silently thank Sam Waterman for taking the time to inculcate the dark arts of tradecraft into him.
The commission acted as if you could stroll into a bar in London’s Shepherd’s Market, spot a suspicious-looking Yemenite Arab sipping a bourbon daiquiri, sidle up next to him, have a ten-minute conversation, and all of a sudden said Arab tells you precisely where Saddam Hussein has cached his weapons of mass destruction, or in precisely which cave in Tora Bora Usama Bin Laden is currently hanging his kaffiyeh.
Jeezus. Didn’t anybody realize it doesn’t work that way? First of all, for every ten pitches you make, you strike out nine times. In Cairo, Tom had botched his first attempt to recruit an agent. He’d pitched an Egyptian Army major attached to the Mukhabarat el-Khabeya (military intelligence service) whom he’d cultivated for more than six months. The officer had looked at him as if he were crazy, stood up, and said, “Do not ever try to contact me again or I will have you arrested.” Recruiting was a risk-intensive business. And when you did finally snare a target, the information you received most of the time was piecemeal-a fragment of a puzzle, not the whole thing.
Didn’t people understand that HUMINT-for HUMan INTelligence gathering-was like paleontology? You probed and you dug and you prodded and you excavated for what seemed like forever. And then, after an excruciatingly and often interminable period of time, you might-if you’re smart, and talented, and above all lucky-you might discover a tiny intelligence fossil that is, perhaps, a single part of a much-larger life-form. And yet from this microscopic shard-which may, by the way, have been planted by an evil archaeologist working for one of your adversaries-Congress and the 9/11 Commission, and, for that matter, the misguided and ill-informed American public insist it is not only possible to divine what sort of creature the fossil could have come from, but also tell you exactly where the entire skeleton of the creature can be found.
In real life, the recruitment process could take months of careful gumshoeing to make sure the opposition wasn’t screwing with you. In the field, you had to watch your emotions so you didn’t get sucked in. In the field, enthusiasm was the enemy of thoroughness. You developed a mental sonar that was never turned off. That’s what had killed McGee. He lacked the sensors to realize he was developing a double. Or a dangle. Or a provocateur. Or an assassin. Achieving that highly developed defensive awareness took years.
It looked easy in the movies. Or in fiction. But in real life, becoming a productive, streetwise case officer doesn’t happen overnight. And spotting, assessing, developing, and then recruiting a single agent is a laborious, time-intensive, painstaking process. Charlie Hoskinson, who’d recruited the of the Syrian president, said it had taken him the better part of his three-year-tour in Damascus to do so. Bronco Panitz, who was 4627’s CEO, had been promoted to the Senior Intelligence Service on the strength of two Soviet recruitments, a process that had taken him more than four years on two continents-only to lose them both to Aldrich Ames.
So when the 9/11 Commission or the fools on the House or Senate intelligence oversight committees wrote reports with prose that readit is imperative for CIA to increase its human intelligence capabilities immediately, Tom and the rest of his fellow intelligence professionals had to laugh. George Tenet-a disaster as DCI-had boldly told Congress that the DO wouldn’t be up to speed for another five years. Everyone at Langley who had an ounce of sense knew Tenet grossly understated the case to make himself look better. The evidence? Tom’s own curriculum vitae belied the DCI’s assertion.
Tom had spent seventeen years and seven months at CIA. He’d entered training just after Labor Day of 1985, recruited straight out of Dartmouth College. In late March 1986, he’d been assigned to headquarters-spending seven months at NE Division as a desk officer trainee to learn the bureaucratic ropes. During that time, he managed to take a number of the advanced tradecraft courses offered in Washington: lock-picking, secure communications, and the “guerrilla driving course” out in West Virginia at Bill Scott Raceway, where he learned how to run roadblocks and make bootlegger’s and J-turns. Then it had been a year at the Foreign Service Institute’s language school in Rosslyn, Virginia, followed by nineteen months in Tunis, in FSI’s immersion Arabic program.
Tom’s first overseas tour hadn’t commenced until June 1989, when he began work under consular cover at the Cairo embassy. And even then he was a greenhorn with no field experience. And little chance of receiving much in the immediate future.
His chief in Cairo, John, was a prissy, non-Arab speaker who’d spent eighteen years as a reports officer before being brought into the Directorate of Operations under DCI Robert Gates’s “cross-fertilization” program that larded DO with inexperienced analysts, academic reports officers, and secretaries-all in the name of EEO diversification. A GS-15 on his second (and final) go-round for promotion to the Senior Intelligence Service, got so fidgety when the subject of recruitments was brought up he was known around the embassy as Twitch. The situation wasn’t improved by Tom’s immediate superior, a chronic alcoholic named McWhirter who signed out to interview developmentals but actually spent his afternoons sipping vodkas on the rocks in the bar of the Méridien.