Lord Robert Cecil, a friend of Esperanto, warned the Commission to remember that a world language was needed not only by intellectu- als but above all by the people themselves.1 08 But in truth this forum was conceivably the least suitable place to deal with the question of Esperanto—a language which (as Nitobe emphasized favorably and Rio
Branco feared) was not primarily a means of communication for intel- lectuals. The Commission, established in May 1922, consisted initially of 12 members. Its stated goal was education for international solidarity and strengthening the League's influence in the service of peace. In fact, however, according to Privat, 'it was obliged to limit its activities by con- cerning itself only with university and library cooperation. More humane fields were too controversial'.[198]
Before such a Commission, the supporters of Esperanto accordingly found themselves in a hopeless position, facing political pressure from France and the prejudices of intellectuals. The chairman, the French phi- losopher Henri Bergson, privately assured Privat of his sympathy, but he was obliged to subordinate his personal opinion to the instructions that he received from Paris.[199] Esperanto's chief opponent turned out to be the Swiss member Gonzague de Reynold, professor of history and French literature at the Universities of Berne and Fribourg. Although he focused his public criticism on the linguistic inadequacy of Esperanto and argued for the Latin language 'familiar to Catholics and intellec- tuals', he was evidently more disturbed by the fact that—as he wrote privately—'behind Esperanto or Ido lurks an internationalist and revolu- tionary mysticism'.m
The degree to which the problem extended beyond the framework of linguistic discussion was alluded to—more elegantly than by Rio Branco—by the Frenchman, Julien Luchaire, who was (under Berard) general inspector of public instruction. He contested the assumption that there was even a need for an international means of communication among 'non-intellectuals', given that (as he put it) the mass of the people in the various countries came into contact with one another through their 'leaders' and through translation. By this logic, then, international con- tacts should remain a monopoly of a chosen few, and it was inadvisable to open the door to worldwide relations among the lower classes through the easily learned means of communication known as Esperanto.[200]
7n this atmosphere of francophone hegemony and disdain for the masses, Esperanto had no chance. On 1 August 1923, the Commission decided not to take up the question of teaching Esperanto in schools, defending the position that, above all, what was necessary was 'to aim to favor the study of living languages and foreign literatures'.[201] Nitobe commented that in 20 years' time this decision would be remembered as a sign that the League of Nations lacked good sense.
In September 1923, when the Fourth Assembly convened, the French delegate, furnished with instructions from his government 'to expel Esperanto definitively',[202] proposed that the League adopt a sharper version of the Commission's decision; in this new version, the League was to recommend explicitly the learning of foreign national languages in preference to an artificial auxiliary language. But with this proposal France pushed the acquiescence of the other delegates too far. Several delegates protested, explaining that, while they did not wish to insist on Esperanto, they also had no wish to accept wording that seemed directed against Esperanto, 'since this movement had many friends in their countries'.[203]
France was obliged to withdraw its proposal, leaving as the only valid decision the acceptance of the report of 1922 on Esperanto's positive achievements. This was hardly a negligible success on UEA's part, but it fell considerably short of its expectations. Somewhat con- soling was the fact that in September 1924 the new government of Edouard Herriot nullified Berard's decree—and also the fact that in the same month the Fifth Assembly accepted, without opposition from France, a recommendation to treat Esperanto as a 'clear' lan- guage for telegraphy.
As we know, the League of Nations steadily lost its early promise because no member state was ready to yield any part of its national sovereignty, the League's decisions were not carried out and the great powers, when needed, sabotaged its activities. Not only did the politi- cal influence of the League remain limited, but the moral authority expected of it remained unformed. An example in this regard was the Commission on International Intellectual Collaboration which 'failed completely to bring them [the intellectuals of the various countries] into a common front against the dangers of national hatreds and national ambitions'.[204]
The treatment of Esperanto helps explain the League's ultimate fiasco. Pressure from the great powers succeeded in sidelining an ini- tiative of China, Japan and several smaller nations whose aim was to use Esperanto to contribute to neutralizing conflicting national inter- ests and also to advance education for international solidarity as the League's spiritual foundation and unifying device. The idea that the states could advance the worldwide popularization of the League's ide- als by declaring their sympathy for the dissemination of Esperanto collided with France's timorous concern for the dominant position of the French language. In defending their position, the French did not even advance as a primary argument the possible linguistic unsuitabil- ity of Esperanto, though insistence on the inadequate expressiveness of an artificial language tended not to miss its mark. On the contrary, Esperanto's enemies found themselves in a kind of silent agreement with its friends in recognizing the fact that they were indeed dealing with a functioning language; indeed they were all too aware of its func- tionality, as Berard's decree and Luchaire's elitist arrogance implied, tor- mented as they were by the thought that international communication might escape the oversight of the 'leaders' and become the property of 'non-intellectuals' as well.
Given the ideas prevailing in the Commission on International Collaboration, we can readily understand why the Commission failed in its task of creating a sense of world solidarity that could advance the League and provide support for increasing its authority in the face of national egotism. The French campaign against Esperanto in the League of Nations[205] was clearly dictated by great power concern that the League might live up to its name by becoming not just an optional debating chamber but an international forum to which the nations would have to yield some of their privileges. While the Esperantists, still too naive, failed to envision the provocative nature of their demand that all the world's children should learn two languages, one national and the other international, their opponents, early on, foresaw the political conse- quences that would ensue if the League were to encourage the learning and use of a neutral means of international communication. Its oppo- nents were fully aware of the floodgates that such support for Esperanto would open. Raul do Rio Branco, in his speech, revealed his opposition to the idea of the League as 'super-State' 1 [206] and Gonzague de Reynold expressed a similar opinion: 'there is a constant battle to wage against all those who would make of the League of Nations, not only a super-state but a super-church as well, against all the utopist internationalists. ... I am referring to Esperanto.'[207]
Workers and 'Neutralists'
At the height of the French agitation against Esperanto, Edmond Privat pointed out that 'Even after Mr. Hanotaux's intervention at the League of Nations, not a word of anti-French feeling appeared in the Esperanto press—and quite rightly'.[208] Certainly it was tactically correct to avoid provoking France unnecessarily, but we must also recognize that UEA felt itself insufficiently strong as an international pressure group to mount a more energetic defense of its position in the face of the selfish interests of one nation. It not only indulged the French but also failed to reveal French linguistic imperialism, the French intellectuals' arrogant neglect of the need for international communication on the part of the lower levels of society and France's elitist way of thinking—all factors playing an essential role in the effort to drive Esperanto off the League of Nations agenda.