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U. Lins, Dangerous Language — Esperanto under Hitler and Stalin, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-54917-4_4

promotion of the teaching of such languages; instructional classrooms should not be made available for this purpose.[356]

Although this decree, canceling official permission for such instruction granted in 1924, merely confirmed the continued silent suppression of teaching of this kind (all radio courses in Esperanto were closed down immediately after the seizure of power), it nonetheless provoked widespread discussion in the press, which tended to interpret the decree as a total pro- hibition of Esperanto.[357] In reply to a memorandum sent to the government shortly before the decree, Walther was notified on 3 June by the Ministry of Internal Affairs that work on behalf of Esperanto 'is not prohibited, but also will not be supported by the state'. Informing the members of the leader- ship and the group leaders about this response, Walther 'urgently' requested that all members send him excerpts from their private correspondence that might document 'that the Esperantists, through their world auxiliary lan- guage, are working abroad for the [German] people and fatherland'.[358]

At almost the same time, the first expression of official opinion arrived regarding the efforts of German Esperantists to have Esperanto serve the Nazi ideology and thereby ignore the humanist origins behind the language and movement. It was clearly negative. In a semi-official com- mentary on Rust's decree, ministerial counselor Kohlbach delivered the following lesson to the Esperantists:

As in most international efforts, the driving impulse of the Esperanto movement is a desire to secure the advent of eternal peace among the peo- ples. [...] Even if today many German Esperantists distance themselves from such political fantasies [...], the original driving idea behind a move- ment is nonetheless difficult to dispel. But even greater than the danger of self-delusion [.] is the risk that elements unalterably opposed to the pres- ent form of the state and to any effort at national self-preservation will use the cover of such a movement to pursue their old goals, both within and beside it.[359]

This was still a relatively moderate statement compared to the tone used by NDEB. In April 1935 that organization declared its opposition to 'the limitless glorification of Zamenhof, which is unfortunately still in style in some German Esperanto circles'. It continued by spewing out the follow- ing offensive utterance: 'between the Jewish-pacifist goals of the "inter- nal idea" of this Zamenhof and our Fuhrer's desire for peace there lies a racially conditioned and hence abysmally profound contrast'.[360] This was a level of betrayal of the Esperanto tradition never before experienced.

This constant battle on two fronts made GEA's situation more and more complicated. In fact, we must attribute the Association's repeti- tion of Nazi slogans and its opportunism not so much to specifically Nazi tendencies as to a high degree of political blindness—the result of a longstanding tradition of ignoring the political implications of work for Esperanto. We should also take into consideration the fact that at the time the vast majority of the German people was equally blinded and that much more prominent figures than Behrendt or Walther paid homage to the regime with elaborate declarations of loyalty. It would be unjust to condemn the entire GEA membership as infected with the brown virus. As German Esperantists explained when the war was over, only for the sake of appearance and through gritted teeth did they pretend 'that their Esperanto club was in harmony with "national concepts"' to ensure its continued existence.[361] A few, for example the publisher Ellersiek, revealed the limits of their willingness to adapt quite early on or even protested directly against injustices. After the GEA group in Magdeburg intro- duced the Aryan Paragraph in 1934, for example, it immediately lost not only its single Jewish member but also about a quarter of its members through voluntary resignation.[362]

How little the attitude of GEA came from sincere conviction was evi- dent also in the statements of NDEB. To some extent, GEAs Nazi devia- tion was excusable, given the constant pressure and slanderous utterances on the part of NDEB, which never tired of blaming GEAs leaders for their insincere and 'reactionary' attitude, finally coming to the conclusion that most Esperantists in Germany, in spite of everything, continued to march, consciously or unconsciously 'along the old much-traveled paths of the Jewish illusion of brotherhood among the peoples'.[363] It remains for us to note, however, the sad fact that GEA increasingly presented itself as a 'militant patriot brigade'—the kind of organization into which ten years earlier Albert Steche had refused to transform it.

As late as 1935, Walther was apparently still unaware of the futility of his battle against the regime's disapproval on the one hand and NDEB's insults on the other. Emphasizing that GEA was ready to review hostile Esperanto publications from abroad, on 23 June he asked the Ministry of Internal Affairs to 'protect' the association against slanderous articles in the press to the effect that German Esperantists harbored unpatriotic thoughts and engaged in unpatriotic activities, and to declare that GEA, led by a member of the party, continued 'its work in accordance with its constitution' and that officials and teachers were entitled to join as mem- bers.[364] But the Ministry refused—'for reasons of principle'—to make such a declaration,[365] with the result that the GEA found itself in the delicate position of being neither prohibited nor officially confirmed as acting legally.

Soon afterward, NDEB learned its limitations too. From its deal- ings with the authorities, among them the Ministry of Propaganda, it concluded that 'recruitment for Esperanto linked to National Socialism is not desired'. As a result, in a meeting in Leipzig on 18 August, it decided to dissolve its local groups, cease recruitment for Esperanto in Germany and limit itself only to the 'practical use' of the language for Nazi pro- paganda abroad; at the same time it threatened GEA with drastic con- sequences if it too did not give up on recruitment within the country.u

Neither GEA nor NDEB could know how closely their conflict was being watched by the SS Security Service. Among comments internal to the SS were the observation that even after the departure of the 'politi- cal charlatan Behrendt', little had changed in GEA, and complaints that the Ministry of Propaganda had twice provided financial support for Esperanto publications (which GEA with 'foolish lack of caution' had announced to the world).[366]

At around the same time, in the summer of 1935, the political police insisted to the ministries that all Esperanto organizations be liquidated. On 26 June, Reinhard Heydrich, deputy of the Politische Polizeikommandeur der Lander, Heinrich Himmler, drew the attention of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the fact that 'recently the Esperanto movement has been engaged in very lively activity'. As an example he mentioned that, among 36 people arrested in March 1935 in Dusseldorf for treason against the state, no less than 29 were Esperantists.[367] Because 'a large part of the membership of the Esperanto unions are suspected of anti-state activity' and because, on the other hand, it was not possible to check their correspondence on such a large scale, Heydrich recommended the dissolution and prohibition of all such organizations and the confiscation of their property.[368]

While the Ministry of Science and Education supported Heydrich's proposal, the Ministry of Propaganda, led by Joseph Goebbels, in fact had scruples about direct prohibition at this stage. In a letter of 23 October the Ministry (undoubtedly mindful also of the Berlin Olympics to take place in the summer of 1936) expressed concern about the international reaction such a step might have:

Among the millions of adherents of Esperanto abroad there is certainly a large number who are not political and see only the idealistic side of work for Esperanto. These people will receive the impression that because of activities in their opinion totally benign, as is indeed the learning of a new language, in Germany even associations of this kind are persecuted. This opinion will naturally be promulgated in the abundant pamphlets distrib- uted by Esperanto organizations throughout the world. Also the foreign press will use such an occasion to launch propaganda against Germany.