Letters with this kind of content Bassler regarded as essentially an insult to his connection with the Soviet Union: 'We know all this and believe it. We are communists, after all.' Instead of using battle cries and news- paper rhetoric, Bassler suggested, Soviet comrades should write, in the 'simple, primitive language of the proletarian' about their working and club life, family, working conditions and wages. Underlining the unhelp- ful consequences of such hectoring correspondence, he mentioned that the 70-member communist cell in Leipzig had discontinued its collective correspondence with a large factory in Kharkov on the grounds that 'they didn't like reading newspaper articles' instead of real letters.[756]
In much the same way, Kampfrad complained that collective corre- spondence was hindered by the Soviet side—either by silence or with responses full of political agitation and little else. He reported that in Germany on various occasions, after much effort and under 'constant threat of dismissal', some Esperantist worker had persuaded his colleagues at work to begin correspondence with a Soviet factory, only to find that 'ninety-five times out of a hundred' the result 'was anything but happy'. Either there was no reaction or the Soviet workers replied with 'mean- ingless phrases about the construction of socialism, the magnificent Red Army, and so on' and with information long known, 'for example "we have overcome our capitalists [...] and we hope that you will overcome yours"'. After that, said Kampfrad, the German workers, who wanted to know about such things as wages in relation to living costs in the Soviet Union, generally lost interest in further contact.[757] Also Japanese workers were sadly reproachful of the Soviet Esperantists for their inertia at just the point when the workers 'were hoping to learn everything about the Soviet Union'.[758]
Silence Descends on the Soviet Esperantists
Shortly thereafter, political developments in Germany made maintain- ing relations with Soviet Esperantists impossible. With Hitler's seizure of power, the Proletarian Esperantist International (IPE), in existence for only a few months, was also destabilized, given that GLEA, its German section, dissolved by the Nazis, was one of its two pillars of support. If it was to survive as a significant organization, the IPE needed the full sup- port of its other pillar—namely the SEU.
About SEU's contribution, however, the western IPE members had reason to complain. In 1934 they could no longer contain their dissatisfaction. The complaint was raised that the 'lack of seriousness, particularly by Soviet comrades', given to correspondence was 'discred- iting' the Esperanto movement/7 In response to these criticisms, SEU attempted to defend itself, applying self-criticism and promising to be more active, also in devoting more attention to its responsibilities in IPE. That was the message delivered externally, but internally SEU had for the past couple of years taken positions that make it easier to under- stand what we have already observed, namely the waning enthusiasm of the Soviet Esperantists and SEU's neglect of the IPE. As early as 1931, the Central Committee had confessed that massive propaganda for Esperanto and efforts to achieve official recognition were useless unless the practical application of the language could be considerably expanded in the era of the Five-Year Plan: 'A single modern Esperanto-language publication on tractor production or on the use of excavators in mines would be more powerful than a million Esperanto textbooks for Soviet citizens'.[759] Citing Drezen, SEU stated, at the end of 1932: 'It must be said clearly that the Esperanto movement cannot be privileged, that the language problem and in some degree the international connections of the workers cannot be put on the agenda as principal priorities in the current period.'[760]
What lay behind these near-defeatist declarations? In September 1934, a plenary session of the SEU Central Committee considered reports on defunct or unsatisfactorily functioning groups; it was noted that both in the provinces and in Moscow the dominant opinion was that Esperanto was dead; and Demidiuk remarked that in the Soviet Union 'in general we do not hear much about Esperanto—in strong contrast to what we were hearing six or seven years ago'. Drezen, publicly, had to listen to complaints that he was not only neglecting recruitment for Esperanto but even denying its necessity.[761]
The issue of the journal Sur Posteno Klasbatala that reported on the Central Committee meeting also published a leading article on the mur- der of the Leningrad party secretary Sergei Kirov[762] threatening that soon 'we will publish material unmasking Trotskyists in the Esperantist camp' ('Brothers and fellow-thinkers of the abominable Zinovievist opposition group')[763]. But the rest of this same issue contained hints that could give SEU members hope of a new beginning. The editors introduced several changes in content, for example a column on language, a puzzles corner and a humorous section ('Red Laughs'), which somewhat softened the activist character of the journal. And there was more: a letter from a reader was published giving the impression that the wavering course of SEU would finally reach a point at which it would no longer be taboo to use the language as a mere hobby. The writer, Evgenii Blinov, appealed for a new mode of recruitment for Esperanto: one should not 'parrot, always and everywhere, the words "capitalism" and "proletariat"': such 'r-r-revolutionary' bigotry only gets in the way of the progress of the movement. Blinov did not hesitate to plead for the right to use Esperanto to express 'loving feelings' even if that did not please the 'radicals'.[764]
Blinov's plea reflected a new trend in party declarations, which now began to proclaim the achievement of a classless society and the consequent right of Soviet citizens to enjoy the fruits of their work in the building of socialism. More optimistic feelings began to prevail, while little by little the economic situation improved; as of autumn 1935, food rationing was sus- pended. A new faith in the future also stimulated the decision to revise the Soviet constitution, announced in February 1935. In meetings across the country the Party encouraged discussion of the proposed changes—includ- ing 'democratization of the electoral system', the principle of political equal- ity of all citizens and the guaranteeing of fundamental human freedoms. Although the new constitution, approved in December 1936, in no way limited the dominant position of the Party (which in practice rendered its promises merely theoretical), it nonetheless encouraged the hope that the time of extreme political pressure was over. That, in turn, seemed to imply brighter prospects for the friends of Esperanto in the Soviet Union.
That interest in Esperanto was growing again seemed evident from mem- bership trends in the Soviet Esperanto Union. In mid-November 1935 there were 13,344 members—a record number in the history of the orga- nization.[765] The British Communist Esperantist Thomas Aldworth, who vis- ited the Soviet Union in June 1936, came home with the impression that Esperanto 'has long been asleep in the Soviet Union and is now reawaken- ing'. However, at the same time the state of organization and the material resources of SEU were growing weaker. There was not even enough paper for textbooks, because the annual paper quota, gradually reduced over sev- eral years, was finally not provided to the SEU at all.[766] Aldworth confirmed that the 'dreadful lack of paper for books' and the lack of time of workers obliged 'to engage in trade training' were a great hindrance to Esperanto.[767]
When in Antwerp in August 1935 the Second IPE Congress took place, delegates from the SEU were once again absent—an absence noted all the more acutely by the fewer than 100 participants because the Congress agenda included the question of the reunification of the work- ers' Esperanto movement. This question was made particularly pressing by policy changes in the Soviet Union. Realizing that the victory of the Nazis in Germany was no ephemeral event, the Soviet Union—under slogans calling for an 'anti-fascist popular front' and 'collective security'— sought ways to achieve a broad alliance against the threat of fascism. The USSR worked to improve its relations with the capitalist governments of Western Europe and, through the Comintern, proposed common activity with non-Communist labor organizations—addressing its proposals to the same people whom until recently it had insulted as 'social fascists'.