The high-minded goals of Dr. Zamenhof and the bourgeois Esperantist propagandists concerning the brotherhood of peoples and worldwide har- mony were, [...] like all petty-bourgeois illusions, aids to imperialism.
Accordingly, the ideological content of Esperanto had to be reformulated and more importance given to the proletarian elements in the language.
SEU declared its solidarity with the Theses,[892] but Spiridovich refused to sing along with the chorus of approbation. He agreed that his own work contained 'crude errors'. For example, he admitted that he 'com- pletely bypassed the problem of the class-based, proletarian character of national literary languages constructed by the proletariat'—which was indirect recognition that he had not given attention to the progressive influence of the Russian language on the vocabulary of the once less- developed minority languages. But his reply amounted to a justification of his central argument, namely that orientation to the goal of the world- wide triumph of communism had to be valid also for linguistics, and that therefore the most important task of that discipline was to build the future language of Communist society. Citing Lenin, Spiridovich insisted that the entire effort of the proletariat should be directed to the 'definitive goal'—which in no way prevented it from the dialectical capability 'of establishing and solving urgent tasks in the conditions of every concrete moment. The authors of the Theses, Spiridovich objected, had engaged in a 'leftist' flight from the requirements of the transitional period. They evidently saw the flowering of nations and languages 'not as a stage in the building of communism but as sufficient to itself', while for him the pro- cess was 'a necessary step in the construction of the future world language .[893]With Spiridovich's plea not to lose sight of the longer view, theoretical discussion of the worldwide language of communism essentially ended. Over the Theses, Spiridovich was still dealing with people who, like him, distanced themselves from Marr; but in the same year came new attacks. This time, Marr's supporters attacked not only Spiridovich but also Drezen and the entire Iazykfront. A book published by the Academy of Sciences sharply criti- cized the work of Drezen and Spiridovich. Its authors asked rhetorically: 'Can such formalism hidden under revolutionary phrases about Esperanto as the language of the proletariat be tolerated in the era of proletarian dictatorship?' They questioned whether the line of argument of Drezen and Spiridovich conformed with Marxism. The international language will develop, they added, only through a united world economy in the era of developing com- munism, and it will be a language with entirely new qualities 'incorporating all major achievements of the national languages'.[894] About Esperanto they had nothing good to say. Its claims as the 'language of the proletariat' were summarily dismissed: 'The fact that proletarians conduct international cor- respondence in it does not make it proletarian.' The publications of Drezen and Spiridovich (his 'Marxist phraseology' evidently seemed particularly pro- voking) were seen as damaging 'because they constitute an attack by class enemies in the linguistic field of the ideological front'.[895]
Against accusations of this kind there was no defense. By the end of 1932, if not before, SEU's theoretical journal had lost all confidence that the Esperanto movement could expect any profit from the dispute among the linguists. It grew increasingly clear that further participation in theo- retical debate would only put SEU at risk of accusations of ideological deviation. The veteran Esperantist Andrei Andreev noted soberly that the question of evolution toward a universal language was a problem 'more political than strictly linguistic'.[896]
Andreev was aware of precedents. The dissolution of the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers in April 1932 showed that insistence on a proletarian, class point of view was unsuited to the period at the end of the First Five-Year Plan. The Party had so strengthened its rule that it could now afford to distance itself from slogans about the growing class struggle. Emphasizing the 'proletariat' was no longer necessary after the people had become, with much suffering and sacrifice, though not without enthusi- asm at the progress achieved, melded into a united Soviet people. In educa- tion, as early as autumn 1931, the direction changed, leaving no room for theories about 'the withering away of the school'; polytechnic education and other radical experiments were followed by the development of fac- tory-style authoritarian learning. Reforms introduced in 1932-33 brought regimentation also to the university system. Children of non-proletarian origins were given much easier access to higher education. And while the Marxist, highly politicized intellectuals lost influence, the 'fellow-travelers' once again advanced. Bourgeois specialists reacquired leading positions in the economic machine. Administrative competence, combined with ide- ological fidelity, had more negotiable value than enthusiasm for cultural revolution and knowledge of Marxist theory.
Memories of the communist utopia continued as a source of enthu- siasm for the work of socialist construction; but, while they made the painful efforts of the present more bearable, in comparison with the 'pres- ent tasks' they were relegated to the background. At the same time, the Party understood quite clearly that the socialist utopia contained its unset- tling elements because it allowed people to measure the present in terms of Marxist goals for the future. This was why Stalin had, in the autumn of 1931, condemned the vain theorizing of Communist intellectuals. A fur- ther year elapsed before the Soviet Esperantists finally concluded that it was no longer wise to generate theoretical contributions.[897] Linking their fate to Iazykfront had turned out to be a miscalculation; there were signs that the temporarily pressured Japhetic school had succeeded in keeping the goodwill of the Party. Another, perhaps more important, reason for silence was the new trend in Soviet nationality policy. Although Stalin had still maintained in the Congress of 1930 that among nationalist deviations the chief danger was Great-Russian chauvinism, by 1931 the assaults of the leadership in Moscow were directed exclusively at another form of deviation—local nationalism.
Developments in Ukraine assumed symbolic significance in this regard. After a campaign lasting several months, in February 1933 Skrypnyk was forced to resign from his office as People's Commissar for Education. In June an ultimatum from the Central Committee ordered that he publicly reject his nationalist deviation. Skrypnyk remained intransigent, but, finally, after continued assaults, chose suicide as a last resort.[898] All this took place amidst an enormous human catastrophe: in 1932-33, fol- lowing the merciless campaign of collectivization ordered by Stalin, 3.5 million people died of hunger.
The disappearance of Skrypnyk was, particularly for the Esperantists of Ukraine, a heavy blow, because of all the Soviet leaders he was the only one who took Esperanto seriouslyi 24 and, despite his criticism of the Esperantists' excessive fervor, he clearly endorsed its right to dissemination in the Soviet Union. More generally, Skrypnyk's death and Stalin's new campaign against local nationalism shed dramatic light on how the Party's position on the nationalities problem had changed—and this in the few short years since Stalin had warned against Great Russian chauvinism, the very means by which Skrypnyk and his fears were elimi- nated. During the 17th Congress in January 1934 Stalin simply turned Lenin's principles concerning the prime danger of the nationalities prob- lem upside down. Pointing to Skrypnyk's 'deviations', he named the local nationalism of Ukraine as a precedent-making example of the principal danger to fraternal cooperation among the Soviet peoples.[899]
Beyond this change in priorities, however, Stalin did not reformu- late the principles of Soviet nationalities policy.i 26 His statement still stood: national cultures and languages should continue to flower in the Soviet Union to create the conditions for their unification in the world Communist society. He did not find it opportune to adapt official theory to the new reality, even if the vision of the future had long since dimmed and present priorities had also changed—namely no longer the equality of nations but all-Soviet patriotism, increasingly dominated by Russian symbols, prevailed. Under these circumstances the Soviet Esperantists' efforts to develop a profile as revolutionary vanguard in the battle for the future universal language met a brick wall. Much as the thesis of 'the withering away of the state' had no importance in the present, so the unification of nations and languages was a matter for the distant future.