“No, sir. The center is at Fort Gordon in Augusta, Georgia.”
“Augusta?” responded Zvi Avner. “You mean where the Masters is played?”
“Yes.”
“Why in God’s name there?”
“The NSA is building a large data and operations center there. The Americans wanted a spot outside of the Washington area where our guys could come and go away from all of the prying eyes.”
Avner, an avid golfer, chuckled at the thought. “I didn’t realize there was anything in that town other than Augusta National.”
Aitan was impatient to get back on the topic. “Anyway, the bad news for us is that the Iranians have finally figured out what has been causing so much unexpected damage to their centrifuges. They will clean the worst of Myrtus off their network in time.”
“What’s the good news?” asked Prime Minister Cohen.
“The good news is that there is a lot more to Myrtus and our other worms,” Aitan continued. “The Iranians are focused on what the world calls Stuxnet, but we have much more underway. Despite the fact that Myrtus was discovered in early June, we still have contact with their network and we still have a lot of activity, much of it destructive. Our software is embedded in parts of their network in a way that is probably impossible to eradicate without tossing out one hundred percent of their hardware, including computers, servers, printers, routers, firewalls and even cell phones. They would have to throw out all of that on one day and start over the next day with brand new hardware that is clean. And in my opinion, they cannot buy hardware, other than isolated equipment, without us getting to it and corrupting it first in our favor.”
“What does this virus mean now that it is out of Iran and out in the world?” The question came from Amit Margolis. His mind was thinking about the future, thinking about the counter attack sure to come some day.
“That is a good question, Mister Margolis,” responded Aitan. “This technology is like any other. Once mankind has understood something and developed it, it is impossible to keep a monopoly on it — not that we had a monopoly anyway. Russia, China, Japan, Korea, Germany, the U.K., all of these nations could produce what we have done and probably have. But your point is right, all of the analysis and publication of research on Stuxnet will help the second tier countries come up the curve. That includes Iran and every other Muslim nation for that matter.
”As for Myrtus itself, we have programmed safeguards into the worm. First, it targets very specific industrial controllers, namely the type and configuration that is, to my understanding, unique to Natanz. The Americans, in particular, were very sensitive to the worm migrating into the U.S. or another western nation. So, for example, Myrtus targets centrifuges operating at 1,064 hertz. Only the Iranians and Pakistanis operate their centrifuges at this frequency cycle. The Americans also insisted on a drop dead date for the worm. The current date is June 24, 2012, although we can extend that through updates if needed. And as the prime minister and defense minister know, we have some of the more exotic aspects of the worm encrypted in a very strong cipher that we don’t think anyone can crack.
“But none of that means that the Iranians and everyone else won’t learn from the code that is being discussed and analyzed publicly at the moment. There is nothing we can do about that.”
Aitan paused briefly to await a follow-up question. None came. “Mister Prime Minister,” he continued, “I can report that the revelation of Myrtus has led the Chinese to enter into serious negotiations with Tehran to bring in Chinese computer technicians to help defend their networks.”
Eli Cohen already was fully aware of this developing aspect of the Iranian problem. He had been updated daily over the phone by Mossad Director Levy and occasionally by Aitan. But the minister of intelligence and atomic affairs had made the statement to inform the other men in the room. Zvi Avner had not been previously informed. “How serious?” Avner asked.
“Mossad believes that a group of a dozen or more Chinese computer technicians will fly into Tehran in October. We think they will set up shop in the basement of a classroom building at Tehran University.”
“To hell with these Chinese bastards,” exclaimed the defense minister. “They are getting in bed with Persian devils. They will get what they deserve.”
Prime Minister Cohen had earlier been dismissive of his old partner’s histrionics regarding China, but he was beginning to think of China as an active enemy. It was one thing to supply weapons, it was another to supply warriors — and Cohen had come to think of cutting-edge computer hackers and programmers as combat soldiers. Worse for Cohen was the knowledge of the many years of cooperation between Mossad and the Chinese intelligence agency, the Ministry of State Security, or MSS. Director Levy had asked him the week before if he wanted Mossad to reduce or end cooperation with the MSS. Cohen had told him to make no changes.
“This is becoming too serious to ignore,” Cohen said. He looked at Schechter and Margolis to his right. “Can you add this Chinese cyber center in Tehran to your target list?”
“Yes, sir,” Schechter responded.
“Mister Prime Minister,” interjected Chief of Staff Fishel, “I would strongly advise against targeting the Chinese. I don’t think we want to pick a fight with them.”
“Exactly my words earlier this year when the first reports of discussions came in.” Cohen stopped and looked down at the Esther presentation. He wanted a cigar but had not brought one with him this morning. But he had his water. He took a sip. “Thank you, Natan. I know you are giving me sound advice.” He turned back to Schechter. “Can we make contingency plans on this? We have a year to see what develops.”
“Yes, Mister Prime Minister. We will do that.” Schechter had no issue with striking the Chinese or anyone else threatening his country. “You know, sir, the Americans hit the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in ’99, if my memory serves me. They begged forgiveness claiming an accident, but I have my doubts.”
“It was no accident,” Aitan added. He and Levy had discussed the American attack over the prior few weeks, holding the lessons learned in reserve in the event that the prime minister hardened his stance as he just had. “The CIA had good intelligence that the Chinese were acquiring parts of the F-117 stealth fighter shot down over Yugoslavia in late March. All of these parts were being collected at the embassy. On May 7, 1999, the Americans put five satellite guided bombs into the embassy building. President Clinton profusely apologized and blamed the attack on faulty maps. There were demonstrations in China and relations hit a low, but all things were patched up with time.”
“Mister Prime Minister,” said Fishel, “we are not the United States.”
“And of course, Natan,” Cohen responded, “we are not talking about attacking the Chinese embassy. This is a secret operation by the Chinese. As far as they know, we have no knowledge of it. If we hit them tomorrow as part of a broad strike, I bet they would not ever say a word.”
“You are absolutely right.” The support came from Avner, who was very much in line with Schechter’s approach. “They will keep their damn mouths shut out of embarrassment, but they will know Goddamn well that we targeted them intentionally. Fuck them.”
“Okay, gentlemen,” said Cohen. “I know where everyone stands. We have a year. Let’s do some contingency planning and keep our eyes on how this develops. Yavi, what else?”
“Lead Vault continues to develop and gain momentum.” Aitan spent more than ten minutes updating Fishel, Schechter and Margolis on the operation that was systematically depriving Iran of the raw material needed to build centrifuges and other nuclear program components. More than a dozen intelligence agencies were actively involved, led by Mossad and the CIA, but actively utilizing MI6 and the intelligence agencies of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, Japan, Korea, Germany, France and others. When he was done, everyone in the room was satisfied that more was being done to starve the Iranian program than they could think of short of a military strike.