Schechter continued. “We want relatively cold air at ground level. Cold air is denser and provides more lift. As I reviewed earlier, we will have aircraft taking off near their maximum takeoff weight. We are setting our limits based on the shortest runway we have to operate from.” The general then pointed to a highlighted number on the screen that read “38.5ºC.” The temperature was equivalent to 87 degrees Fahrenheit. “That is the maximum safe takeoff temperature for the weapon load configurations in the plan. If we have to go in warmer weather, we will have to alter the plan, which, practically speaking, means we would have to reduce the number of targets we hit. That means the summer months are a problem. The winter months are a problem because that is the rainy season. If you factor in typical weather patterns along with the temperature issue, the months for us to go are — in order from best to worst — October, May, April, November, and December. We have an outside opportunity to go in January, February or March if we get lucky with an extended period of good weather that we can forecast.
“The next bullet point lays out the minimum cooperation we need from the American military. We have requested the expansion of area GPS denial to all of Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Israel. I am sure the Americans will want to degrade the entire Middle East. The Americans have agreed to this. They have plenty of bases that are potential targets, so regardless of what they think about our attack, we are confident they will do this.”
“What about our use of GPS?” Eli Cohen asked.
“We will have the codes necessary to use the military Y channel, in addition to what I reviewed earlier with our augmentation plans. The one thing I am sure of is that if and when we do launch, even the President of the United States wants us to succeed in destroying as much of the program as we can.
“Of course, everyone needs to understand that Iran uses GPS redundantly,” Schechter continued. “In other words, their GPS guidance systems receive the American civilian GPS signal and Russian Glonass. They then use algorithms and inertial guidance to compare positions and correct for degraded or scrambled signals. We will be jamming Glonass and even GPS the same as they do, but the best we can do is reduce their accuracy. So if the Iranians or Hezbollah launch missiles at us, they should not be accurate enough to hit a specific building, but they will fall within our cities or on our bases.”
General Fishel interjected. “Thank you, General. You have more than enough to worry about. The home front defense is being handled.”
“Understood. Let me return to Block G. The next thing we need from the Americans will be the current IFF codes over the region. They change their codes every twelve hours, so we will likely need two codes over the course of the operation. I do not expect an issue here, but this is the one area where the American administration could stop us cold. I cannot, in good conscience, issue the go order if we do not have the IFF codes.”
Yavi Aitan, the minister of intelligence and atomic affairs, spoke first. “Are you suggesting the Americans would attack our aircraft?” He had said what was on the mind of every member of the Kitchen Cabinet.
“The odds are low, but I can’t put them at zero. If they refuse to issue the IFF codes to us, then that refusal is, to me, an implied threat that they might attack. The U.S. Air Force and Navy presence along our attack and egress routes is extensive. The Americans are planning to deploy a squadron of F-22 Raptors to the UAE. But that is just a small aspect of the threat we would face. The amount of American SAM capability in and around the Gulf is formidable. We will be egressing from Iran. Their entire defensive posture is oriented toward aircraft coming from Iran being hostile. Without the IFF codes, the potential for disaster is very real even if it’s unintentional.”
Zvi Avner turned to his prime minister. “I had never even considered this. Would the president refuse us?”
Eli Cohen took a long drink. “I would not have thought it possible before this president, but it is a possibility now. He doesn’t want us to attack Iran this year, or at least not before the election. That much is clear. If he thinks we won’t attack without the IFF codes, he may withhold them for that reason.”
Avner’s face started to turn red. “Just who the hell is our enemy here?”
“Calm down, Zvi,” Cohen responded. “He is not our enemy. He is just not our close friend.”
“Of course, he might not be re-elected,” Mort Yaguda interjected. The minister without portfolio had spent much of his time over the prior two years in the United States lobbying on behalf of Israel “My friends in Washington and New York think the odds are against him. He’s definitely not getting the money he did four years ago.”
“We should be so lucky,” said Avner.
“The polls have him in front of all of the Republicans,” Cohen commented.
“But they are a long way from determining who their candidate will be,” stated Yaguda. “I met with some of the most respected pollsters in the U.S. while I was there last month. They all said the same thing. The president is polling under fifty percent. The history of American elections is that if the sitting president polls under fifty percent, then the undecided voters break to the challenger late in the process.”
“All that is good,” said Cohen. His voice had a different tone. He was ready to move on. “We will see what happens. But right now I want to look at our options. Zvi and Natan, you guys are talking to your counterparts regularly. What is the sense that we would be denied what we need?”
“I have had nothing but support from my counterparts,” said General Fishel. “They would love to join us. At least they are assisting our plans to take action. But as for this key issue, there is only one way to know. We will have to ask directly.”
Cohen looked directly at Natan Fishel. “This week, Natan. I want you to meet with your counterpart this week and directly ask about each item that we need.”
General Fishel nodded his agreement.
Cohen turned back to General Schechter. “I think we have gotten too far off track. Please continue. I see some more points on your screen there.”
Schechter continued. “The next issue to discuss involves the Saudis. We need their early warning radar systems to be down when we go. General Aitan, I think you are leading this effort.”
Yavi Aitan leaned into the table. “Well, I am certainly more confident about that than we seem to be about the president and his intentions.” He cleared his throat. “Yes, the Saudis have no ambiguities. They will support us every way possible that is not overt. We have already had one test run.”
“Out of curiosity,” asked Cohen, “did you have IFF codes from the Americans?”
“Yes, absolutely. We have never been denied the codes upon request. But when we go for real, the Americans will know we are going and why we want the codes.”
General Schechter added an important point. “On the test run, our EC-707 was contacted by an American AWACS orbiting over Saudi Arabia almost immediately after entering Saudi airspace. I point this out as just another data point as we think about attempting to launch Block G without the IFF codes. Of course, the Americans have an X-band radar in the Negev as well.”