15. “It would seem that irrational animals are able to choose. For choice ‘is the desire of certain things on account of an end,’ as stated in Ethics iii, 2, 3. But irrational animals desire something on account of an end: since they act for an end, and from desire. Therefore choice is in irrational animals. Further, the very word electio (choice) seems to signify the taking of something in preference to others. But irrational animals take something in preference to others: thus we can easily see for ourselves that a sheep will eat one grass and refuse another. Therefore choice is in irrational animals. Further, according to Ethics vi, 12, ‘it is from prudence that a man makes a good choice of means.’ But prudence is found in irrational animals: hence it is said in the beginning of Metaph. i, 1 that ‘those animals which, like bees, cannot hear sounds, are prudent by instinct.’ We see this plainly, in wonderful cases of sagacity manifested in the works of various animals, such as bees, spiders, and dogs. For a hound in following a stag, on coming to a crossroad, tries by scent whether the stag has passed by the first or the second road: and if he find that the stag has not passed there, being thus assured, takes to the third road without trying the scent; as though he were reasoning by way of exclusion, arguing that the stag must have passed by this way, since he did not pass by the others, and there is no other road. Therefore it seems that irrational animals are able to choose. On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiii.] says that ‘children and irrational animals act willingly but not from choice.’ Therefore choice is not in irrational animals. “I answer that, Since choice is the taking of one thing in preference to another it must of necessity be in respect of several things that can be chosen. Consequently in those things which are altogether determinate to one there is no place for choice. Now the difference between the sensitive appetite and the will is that, as stated above (Q[1], A[2], ad 3), the sensitive appetite is determinate to one particular thing, according to the order of nature; whereas the will, although determinate to one thing in general, viz. the good, according to the order of nature, is nevertheless indeterminate in respect of particular goods. Consequently choice belongs properly to the will, and not to the sensitive appetite which is all that irrational animals have. Wherefore irrational animals are not competent to choose. Not every desire of one thing on account of an end is called choice: there must be a certain discrimination of one thing from another. And this cannot be except when the appetite can be moved to several things. “An irrational animal takes one thing in preference to another, because its appetite is naturally determinate to that thing. Wherefore as soon as an animal, whether by its sense or by its imagination, is offered something to which its appetite is naturally inclined, it is moved to that alone, without making any choice. Just as fire is moved upward and not downward, without its making any choice. “As stated in Phys. iii, 3 ‘movement is the act of the movable, caused by a mover.’ Wherefore the power of the mover appears in the movement of that which it moves. Accordingly, in all things moved by reason, the order of reason which moves them is evident, although the things themselves are without reason: for an arrow through the motion of the archer goes straight towards the target, as though it were endowed with reason to direct its course. The same may be seen in the movements of clocks and all engines put together by the art of man. Now as artificial things are in comparison to human art, so are all natural things in comparison to the Divine art. And accordingly order is to be seen in things moved by nature, just as in things moved by reason, as is stated in Phys. ii. And thus it is that in the works of irrational animals we notice certain marks of sagacity, in so far as they have a natural inclination to set about their actions in a most orderly manner through being ordained by the Supreme art. For which reason, too, certain animals are called prudent or sagacious; and not because they reason or exercise any choice about things. This is clear from the fact that all that share in one nature, invariably act in the same way” (Summa Theologiae, I–II, 13, 2).
16. “Nullus peccat ex hoc quod utitur re aliqua ad hoc ad quod est. In rerum autem ordine imperfectiora sunt propter perfectiora, sicut etiam in generationis via natura ab imperfectis ad perfecta procedit. Et inde est quod sicut in generatione hominis prius est vivum, deinde animal, ultimo autem homo; ita etiam ea quae tantum vivunt, ut plantae, sunt communiter propter omnia animalia, et animalia sunt propter hominem. Et ideo si homo utatur plantis ad utilitatem animalium, et animalibus ad utilitatem hominis, non est illicitum, ut etiam per philosophum patet, in I Polit. Inter alios autem usus maxime necessarius esse videtur ut animalia plantis utantur in cibum, et homines animalibus, quod sine mortificatione eorum fieri non potest. Et ideo licitum est et plantas mortificare in usum animalium, et animalia in usum hominum, ex ipsa ordinatione divina, dicitur enim Gen. I, ecce, dedi vobis omnem herbam et universa ligna, ut sint vobis in escam et cunctis animantibus. Et Gen. IX dicitur, omne quod movetur et vivit, erit vobis in cibum” (Summa Theologiae II–II, 64, 1).
17. Though it may not be the first, the most famous gesture of renewed respect for animals is the celebrated passage in Montaigne (“Apology for Raymond Sebond,” Essays II, 12), in which, in addition to defending the existence of a linguistic faculty in animals (since he does not see how their ability to complain, rejoice, call upon each other for help and utter amorous invitations can be defined otherwise), he observes how the constructive behavior of birds and spiders evinces a capacity for choice and thought: “Take the swallows, when spring returns; we can see them ferreting through all the corners of our houses; from a thousand places they select one, finding it the most suitable place to make their nests: is that done without judgment or discernment? And then when they are making their nests (so beautifully and so wondrously woven together) can birds use a square rather than a circle, an obtuse angle rather than a right angle, without knowing their properties or their effects? Do they bring water and then clay without realizing that hardness can be softened by dampening? They cover the floors of their palaces with moss or down; do they do so without foreseeing that the tender limbs of their little ones will lie more softly there and be more comfortable? Do they protect themselves from the stormy winds and plant their dwellings to the eastward, without recognizing the varying qualities of those winds and considering that one is more healthy for them than another? Why does the spider make her web denser in one place and slacker in another, using this knot here and that knot there, if she cannot reflect, think or reach conclusions?” (The Complete Essays. Translated and edited with an introduction and notes by M. A. Screech, Penguin Books, 1991, pp. 508–509).
18. Dante Alighieri, Il Convivio (= The Banquet), translated by Richard Lansing, New York: Garland, 1990.
19. “Canis autem diversas significationes habet, nam ut diabolum uel Iudeum siue gentilem populum significant. Vnde propheta dominum precatur dicens in Psalmo: Erue a framea anima meam, et de manu canis unicam meam. Nam in meliore parte canis ponitur, ut in Ecclesiaste ubi scriptum est: Melior est canis uius leone mortuo. Hic leonem diabolum, canem uero gentilem vel hominem peccatorem accipiendum puto, qui deo melior dicitur: Quod ad fidem et pententiam posit venire, hinc de Iudeis scrptum est: Conuertantur ad uesperum et famem patientur, ut canes circuibunt ciuitatem. Canes intelleguntur muti sacerdotes uel inprobi ut in ecclesia: Canes muti non ualentes lactare. Canes Iudei in Psalmo: Quoniam circumdederunt me canes multi. Canes populus gentium ut in euangelio: Non est bonum sumere panem filiorum et mittere canibus ad manducandum. Canes heretici ut in Deuteronomio: Non inferes precium canis in domum dei tui. Et in apostolo: Videte canes uidete malos operarios uidete concisiones. Canis uero uoracissimum animal, atque inportunum, consueuit illas domus latratibus defendere, in quibus edacitatem suam nouit, accepto pane saciate, his merito conparantur Iudei qui Christianae fidali munere salo contigit, ut qui ante fuit persecutor Christiani nominis, postea diuino munere iungeretur apostolis. Canes homini rixosi uel detractors alter utro se lacerantes, ut in apostolo: Quod si inuicem mordetis et comedetis uidete ne ab inuicem consumamini. Catuli abusiue dicuntur, quarumlibet bestiarum filii, nam propriae catuli canum sunt, per diminutionem dicti. Lynciscile dicuntur ut ait Plinius canes nati ex lupis et canibus. Cum inter se forte miscuntur, solent et Inde feminas canes noctu in si alligatas admitti, ad tigres bestias a quibus in siliri et nasci, ex eodem faetu canes adeo acerrimos et fortes, ut in complexu leones prosternant. Catuli ergo significant gentiles, unde est in evangelio, quod Sirofaenissa mulier, cui dominus ait: Non est bonum sumere panem filiorum et mittere canibus, respodit ei dicens: Etiam domine. Nam et Catelli edunt de micis quae cadunt de mensa dominorum suorum. Mensa quippe est scriptura sancta quae nobis panem uitae ministrat. Mice puerorum interna sunt misteria scripturarum, quibus humilium solent corda refici. Non ergo crustas, sed micas de pane puerorum edunt. Catelli quia conversi ad fidem, qui erant despecti in gentibus non littere superficiem in scripturis sed spiritalium sensuum, quia in bonis attibus proficere ualeant inquirunt” (Rabanus Maurus, De naturis rerum VIII).