In Switzerland Pakbo had one main source of value. This was "Salter." His identity was never known to me but I suspect that he was a Yugoslav and from the type of information that he produced it might well have been the Yugoslav military attaché. Apart from providing in- I formation, Salter also acted as a rather tenuous link between Rado and the British. Salter was in touch with the British military attaché and it was through Pakbo and Salter that Rado put out his feelers for a possible "safe house" with the British should his position become I untenable in Switzerland. Rado did this when he saw that the "heat was on" and that it was only a matter of time before he was picked up or had to go into hiding. He actually made his approach and received a favourable reaction from the British. Rashly, he also put the suggestion to the Centre - who turned it down at once and ever after suspected Rado of, at the best, leanings towards the democracies and at the worst downright treachery. An interesting example of the different attitude of "allies" allegedly fighting the same war against a common enemy.
My own sources also were three in number. This is mere coincidence and not any mystic belief by the Centre in the virtue of uneven numbers.
My first source was "May." She acted as cut-out between me and Humbert Droz of the Swiss Communist Party. Droz had formerly been Secretary of the Comintern and had, in fact, preceded Dimitrov in that post. He had been previously in touch with another Russian network in Switzerland but had not had contact since 1939. I contacted him in 1941, on instructions from Moscow, who wished him to form his own network and supply such information as he could obtain from just over the frontier. This was not really a difficult or dangerous task as workers streamed to and fro over the German border with comparative ease, and there was an ample supply of Party comrades as potential recruits. Droz agreed to do this, but before he could take any steps he was arrested by the Swiss authorities for secretly reforming the Swiss Communist Party. He was released a few months later but abandoned the Communist Party and joined the Social Democrats, of which party he later became Secretary.
Helena Schmidt was a most useful source and veteran of the network, which had employed her for some twenty years. She was the contact between the network and the "cobbler" (maker of illegal passports).
My third source was never really a source of mine but was rather an unpleasant incubus thrust upon me by the Centre. George and Joanna Wilmer (cover names "Lorenz" and "Laura") were old established members of the Russian Intelligence Service. Of allegedly Swiss nationality, they had been born in Russia and had worked abroad for the Centre since 1926, in France, Japan, and the United States. I was given their real, name by the Centre, who instructed me to contact them and take and transmit their material. Unfortunately Moscow was unable to give me their address. By the intelligent use of the telephone directory (an invaluable source and one so frequently neglected by enquiry agents of all kinds) I managed to locate them in their villa near Lausanne. I was treated by them with the utmost suspicion at first, and it was only after a great deal of difficulty that I managed to get any material from them- and then it was of a very low-grade nature. They were both always trying to discover my real name and address, but I am glad to say without success. There is now no doubt that at some period prior to the war they had been "got at" by the German Intelligence Service and were working as "double agents" for the Germans, i.e., supplying false information to the Russians, which information had been supplied to them by the Germans. I warned Moscow repeatedly, and repeatedly expressed my doubts as to their bona fides, but the Centre would have nothing of it.
These then are the sources from which Rado obtained his information for the Red Army. Drawn from all walks of life and all nationalities, there is no common factor to account for their activities as spies for the Red Army. They were in the main efficient and loyal, and their efforts did in some way assist the Allied cause and lead to the defeat of Nazi Germany. Let them be honoured for that.
I now turn to the most valuable source that the network had- the one man who supplied information from the very heart of Germany, whose contacts extended not only into the Wilhelmstrasse and the Bendlerstrasse but also into all places of authority in the Third Reich - Lucy.
ONE AGAINST HITLER
Who was Lucy? He was the most important actor in this peculiar drama, but he never came into the limelight. His supporting cast can only be dimly seen and hazily described; their names unknown and even their roles are undefined. Lucy, snugly ensconced in neutral Switzerland, held in his hand the threads which led back to the three main commands in Germany and also could, and did, provide information from other German government offices. Where he got his information and how it came were his own secrets. Even his own identity was for a long time shrouded in mystery. I can only give the facts as known to me, and the deductions that I can draw. The rest of the story is Lucy's- and Lucy is not talking.
First of all- what did Lucy produce? The answer to this is simple. Lucy provided Moscow with an up-to-date and day-to-day order of battle of the German forces in the East. This information could come only from the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht itself. In no other offices in the whole of Germany was there available the information that Lucy provided daily. Not only did he provide the day-to-day dispositions on the eastern front, but also Lucy could, and did, provide answers to specific questions. It frequently happened that Moscow had lost sight of such-and-such an ersatz division. An enquiry was put through Lucy and in a matter of days the answer would be provided, giving the composition, strength, and location of the unit in question.
As far as Moscow was concerned, this was obviously the most important function Lucy could perform. Russia, fighting with its back to the wall and scraping up its last resources, was obviously vitally interested in trustworthy information regarding the armed forces ranged against her- and this Lucy supplied. Anyone who has fought a battle from the General Staff angle will know what it means to be able to place the flags of the enemy on the map and plan the disposition of one's own troops accordingly, in as complete confidence in the authenticity of the information as if one had been in the headquarters of one's opposite number. Lucy put Moscow in this position, and the effect of the information on the strategy of the Red Army and the ultimate defeat of the Wehr- macht is incalculable.
If Lucy had confined himself to producing information regarding the German Army, that would have been in itself sufficiently remarkable, and as such he could have amply justified himself in Soviet eyes. But his sources went further. Not only did he provide information on the troop dispositions, information which could only have come from the O.K.W. in the Bendlerstrasse, but he also produced equally good information emanating from the headquarters of the Luftwaffe and the Marine Amt, the German Admiralty. These last two sources were subsidiary, as the Centre was naturally primarily interested in troop movements; but Lucy could and did provide information on German aircraft and German naval shipping, and occasionally threw in reports on German economic and scientific production. For example, I remember that in 1941 he supplied information regarding the manufacture of flying bombs and plans for the construction of ten-ton rockets. In effect, as far as the Kremlin was concerned, the possession of Lucy as a source meant that they had the equivalent of well-placed agents in the three service intelligence staffs plus the Imperial General Staff plus the War Cabinet Offices.