Rado therefore suggested that the best thing for the network and himself would be for him to take refuge in the British Legation (there was, of course, no Soviet representation in Switzerland and the nearest Soviet official was in Ankara or London). Once there, with him safely inside the hedge of diplomatic immunity, the network could continue functioning as before- with the one difference that the British would have to be brought into the picture. Rado himself was not in touch with the British but Pakbo, through his cut-out Salter, the Balkan service attaché, made the approach and Rado received the reply that the British were prepared to harbour him if necessary. The Swiss end of the deal was therefore settled and he had only to square the Centre. I therefore passed on to the Centre Rado's request that he should be allowed to retire from the world and take refuge with the British. Almost by return transmission I received a most emphatic "No." The Centre added that they could not understand how such an old hand as Rado could even think of making such a suggestion, as "the British would track down his lines of communication and use them for themselves."
This idea of Allied co-operation rather shook Rado, but it was not in the least inconsistent with the attitude that the Centre had adopted on previous occasions. Once, in 1942, Rado had had in his hands certain documents and plans which would have been of great value to the British as well as to the Russians, but the material was so bulky that it was impossible for us to pass it over the air. He therefore had suggested that it be handed over to the Allies - through a suitable and secure cut-out of course. The Centre's reaction was immediate. Rado received instructions to burn the information at once. From the director's point of view there was little difference between information falling into German or British hands. It was Russian information and if it could not be passed to the Centre, then the right place for it was the wastepaper basket- however valuable it might be to Russia's allies.
In the meantime I received further news from Hamel through the "fellow-travelling" warder in the jail. Hamel had been told by his interrogators that there was another transmitter working in Lausanne and that a posse of army technicians had been sent out to track it down.
I informed the Centre of this and was told that Lucy's information was still so vital that I must risk everything and continue to transmit. In the meantime, until other transmitters were available and I was able to move my residence, I was to send no information at all save for Lucy's material.
At this time I was seeing Rado twice weekly- or as near as we could make it, having regard to his fears and to my other appointments. The only point of these meetings was for Rado to pass on Lucy's material and any messages he might have about the reconstruction of the network. At our rendezvous we used to check up carefully to see whether we were being followed and this paid good dividends. On one occasion towards the end of October we had arranged to meet just inside the Pare d'Eaux Vives in Geneva. Rado arrived by taxi and entered the park. I noticed that the driver of the cab, as soon as he had been paid, drove off but stopped almost at once at a telephone kiosk into which he hurriedly shut himself. I told Rado and we decided at once that, trivial as the incident might be, we had better play for safety and we left the park at once by separate gates. We went just in time. I learnt later that the police had circulated a photograph of Rado to all cab drivers in Geneva. The driver in question had recognised his fare and rung up police headquarters. A hurry call had been sent out to the various squad cars prowling round the town and they covered all the exits. But they were too late, for Rado and I had left and arranged a somewhat less disturbed rendezvous elsewhere.
This little incident put the finishing touch to Rado's fears. From that time on it was impossible to lure him out of his hidey-hole with the local Communist Party. In fact he remained underground until he left the country a year later, and took virtually no further part in the network. His nerve had been going for some time. Small blame to him as he had been working under a strain for many years. This strain had been increased by the fortuitous addition, through the accident of war, of a number of other networks to his own. He had coped manfully with the dribs and drabs of heterogeneous networks thrown at his head and succeeded up to a point and for some time. I prefer to remember him at the height of his power as the genial cartographer to the world at large, and the successful spymaster to the favoured few, rather than as the hunted rat of his last Swiss days or the frightened, broken man of Paris and Cairo. Only the Centre knows his fate. He certainly cheated many out of their just dues, but equally he drove them to obtain the best results. He had been faithful to his masters- after his fashion.
To make matters worse, at that time the network was very short of money. Our cash reserves were down to five thousand dollars. Rado himself was completely broke and in addition had borrowed five thousand dollars from the local Communist Party and a further five thousand from Pakbo. At that time the network was costing some ten thousand dollars a month in salaries and expenses alone- quite apart from extras such as bonuses. To make financial matters worse, the director had authorised me to spend ten thousand dollars to finance a plan for the escape of the Hamels and Bolli from prison. This sum was needed as a bribe to the "fellow-traveller" warder and his colleagues. The director set great store by this plan as he was apprehensive lest Bolli, the least experienced of the three, should break down under interrogation. She knew Pakbo's and my real names and, of course, a great deal about Rado. The Hamels were not so important as they knew the names of none of the network save that of Jean Beau- champ, who had recruited them, though they knew Rado and me by sight.
I need not have worried unduly about the financial side, as matters were swiftly taken out of my hands. On the night of November 19/20 I contacted Moscow at the scheduled time, which was then half past midnight. I passed over a short message to them and then began taking down a long message which they had for me.
Three quarters of an hour later there was a splintering crash and my room was filled with police. At one-fifteen in the morning of November 20 the "doctors" took the matter into their own hands. I was arrested and the last link between the Centre and Switzerland was broken.
The arrest did not go quite according to plan, and as a result I was able to save something from the wreck. The door was meant to give at once under the axe and fly open so that I could be caught in the act. In fact the lock did not give and it was the doorframe itself which went. As a result there were about three minutes while the police were prising their way in, which breathing space I put to good use. I managed to put my set out of commission and burn the few documents I had in a large brass ash tray which I kept handy for the purpose. The conflagration was helped by the judicious addition of lighter fuel from a handy bottle- also kept for just such an emergency.
My first reaction to this somewhat unceremonious entry was that it was the Abwehr who had arrived, and the notion was not dispelled by the first remark made by the uniformed figures who poured in. A voice shouted and the comment was emphasised by a most pointed demonstration with an automatic pistol. A second glance reassured me that I was still in the hands of the democracies.
The police were accompanied by two radio technicians who attempted at once to continue radio communication but they could do nothing with my damaged transmitter. There was also present a genial bearded young cryptographer, Marc Payot, who made a fruitless search for clues to help him break the cipher. He confessed to me later, when he came to see me in prison, that he had worked on the cipher for months with no result. His initial mistake was in assuming that it was similar in type to Rado's - which of course he could now read thanks to Rado's carelessness. I learned later in Moscow that the technicians had attempted to continue communication with the Centre and a day or so later called up Moscow on my set, which they had then managed to repair. My call signs they of course knew, as they had been monitoring my traffic for months, but they made the mistake of using Rado's code- the only one they had. This at once aroused the suspicions of the Centre, who began to smell a rat, and the Moscow operators also recognised that there was a difference in transmission technique. A few trick questions from the director soon showed him that the set was being worked by the Swiss and that they were not being helped by any of the network.