The Berchtesgaden conference gave a great boost to the Austrian Nazis. They heralded their impending victory by a series of boastful acts of violence, and all of Schuschnigg’s efforts to stem the tide came too late. In order to offer last-minute opposition to the open disintegration of state power, he decided on the evening of March 8 to call a plebiscite for the following Sunday, March 13. In this way he hoped to refute, before the eyes of the whole world, Hitler’s claim that he had the majority of the Austrian people behind him. But Berlin immediately objected, and he was forced to drop his plan. Urged on by Göring, Hitler decided to take military action against Austria if necessary; for Ribbentrop had reported from London that England was not in the least disposed to fight for this troublesome leftover of the Versailles Treaty. Without England, Hitler knew, France would not intervene.
For a time it seemed that the German grab for Austria was stirring old allergies in Mussolini and forcing Italy toward a rapprochement with England. On March 10, therefore, Hitler sent Prince Philip of Hesse to Rome with a handwritten letter in which he spoke of the Austrian conspiracy against the Reich, the suppression of the nationalistic majority, and the prospect of civil war. As a “son of the Austrian soil” he had finally been unable to look on, inactive, he continued, but had decided to restore law and order in his homeland. “You, too, Your Excellency, could not act differently if the fate of Italy were at stake.” He assured Mussolini of his steadfast sympathy and once again pledged the inviolability of the Brenner Pass as the boundary between Germany and Italy: “This decision will never be amended or altered.” After hours of excited preparation, shortly after midnight he issued Directive No. 1 for Operation Otto:
If other measures do not succeed, I intend to march into Austria with armed forces in order to restore constitutional conditions there and to prevent further outrages against the nationalistic German population. I personally shall command the entire operation…. It is to our interest that the entire operation proceed without the use of force, with our troops marching in peacefully and being hailed by the populace. Therefore every provocation is to be avoided. But if resistance is offered, it must be smashed by force of arms with greatest ruthlessness….
For the time being no security measures are to be taken on the German frontiers with other countries.
The terse, self-assured tone of this document almost entirely concealed the mood of hysteria and indecision in which it had come into being. All reports from members of Hitler’s entourage speak of the extraordinary chaos surrounding the decision, the panicky confusion that overtook Hitler on the verge of this first expansionist action of his career. A multitude of overhasty mistaken decisions, choleric outbursts, senseless telephone calls, orders and cancellations of orders, followed in quick succession during the few hours between Schuschnigg’s call for a plebiscite and March 12. Once again, to all appearances, those “damaged nerves” were giving trouble. First, the military leadership was told in great excitement to prepare an operational plan within a few hours. Hitler flared up at Beck and later Brauchitsch for their remonstrances. Then he canceled his marching order, then issued it again. In between came pleas, threats, misunderstandings. Keitel later spoke of the period as a “martyrdom.”
If Göring had not taken the initiative at the moment he did, the public and thus the world would presumably have realized how much psychotic uncertainty and irritation Hitler showed in situations of great pressure. But Göring, who because of his part in the Fritsch affair had every interest in the operation and its obscuring effects, vigorously pressed the vacillating Hitler forward. Years later, Hitler remarked, almost stammering, with the admiration of a high-strung man for another’s phlegmatic, cold-blooded temperament:
The Reich Marshal has gone through a great many crises with me. He’s ice-cold in crises. In times of crisis you cannot have a better adviser than the Reich Marshal. The Reich Marshal is brutal and ice-cold in crises. I’ve always noticed that when it’s a question of facing up to a decision he is ruthless and hard as iron. You’ll get nobody better than him, you couldn’t find anybody better. He’s gone through all the crises with me, the toughest crises, and was ice-cold. Whenever the going was really hard, he turned ice-cold….
On March 11 Göring issued an ultimatum demanding the resignation of Schuschnigg and the appointment of Seyss-Inquart as Austrian Chancellor. Upon instructions from Berlin, the Nazis all over Austria poured into the streets that afternoon. In Vienna they thronged into the chancellery, filled the stairways and corridors, and settled down in the offices until, toward evening, Schuschnigg announced his resignation over the radio and ordered the Austrian army to retreat without offering resistance to the invading German troops. When President Miklas stubbornly refused to appoint Seyss-Inquart as the new Chancellor, Göring, in one of his many telephone conversations with Vienna, gave one of his go-betweens characteristic instructions:
Now listen closely: The important thing now is for Inquart to take possession of the entire government, keep the radio and everything else occupied…. Seyss-Inquart is to send the following telegram. Write this down:
“The provisional Austrian Government, which after the resignation of the Schuschnigg Government regards its task as the restoration of peace and order in Austria, addresses to the German Government an urgent appeal to support it in its task and to help it to prevent bloodshed. For this purpose it requests the German Government to dispatch German troops as soon as possible.”
After a brief dialogue, Göring said in conclusion: “Now then, our troops are crossing the frontier today…. And see to it that he sends the telegram as soon as possible…. Present the telegram to him and tell him we are asking—he doesn’t even have to send the telegram, you know; all he needs to say is: Agreed.” And while the Nazis throughout the country began to occupy the public buildings, Hitler at last issued the marching order at 8:45 P.M.—even before Seyss-Inquart had been informed of his own appeal for help. Hitler rejected a later request from Seyss-Inquart to stop the German troops. A bare two hours later, the impatiently awaited word from Rome arrived: at half-past ten Philip of Hesse telephoned, and Hitler’s reaction revealed how much tension he had been under:
Hesse: I have just come back from the Palazzo Venezia. The Duce accepted the whole affair in a very, very friendly manner. He sends you his cordial regards.
Hitler: Then please tell Mussolini I shall never forget him for this.
Hesse: Very well, sir.
Hitler: Never, never, never, whatever happens…. As soon as the Austrian affair is settled, I shall be ready to go through thick and thin with him, no matter what happens…. You may tell him that I thank him ever so much; never, never shall I forget.
Hesse: Yes, my Führer.
Hitler: I will never forget, whatever may happen. If he should ever need any help or be in any danger, he can be convinced that I shall stick to him, whatever may happen, even if the whole world were against him.73
On the afternoon of March 12, to the peal of bells, Hitler crossed the border at his birthplace, Braunau. Four hours later, he passed flower-decked villages and hundreds of thousands of persons lining the streets to enter Linz. Just outside the city line the Austrian ministers Seyss-Inquart and Glaise-Horstenau awaited him; with them was Heinrich Himmler, who had gone to Vienna the previous night to begin purging the country of “traitors to the people and other enemies of the State.” With palpable emotion Hitler delivered a brief address from the balcony of the town hall to a crowd waiting in the darkness below him. In the speech he evoked once more the idea of his special mission: