101. Cf. the speech of August 22, 1939, Domarus, pp. 1234 f.
102. IMT XX, p. 397. Keitel declared in Nuremberg that the German offensive capacity would not even have sufficed to break through Czechoslovakia’s border fortifications; IMT X, p. 582.
103. Cf. Gilbert and Gott, pp. 144 ff.
104. See, for example, the report of the British chargé d’affaires in Berlin, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 2nd Series III, p. 277. For the quotation from Das Schwarze Korps, see Bracher, Diktatur, p. 399. Details on reactions to the pogrom in various parts of the Reich in Marlis Steinert, Hitlers Krieg, p. 75.
105. The speech, a key document to the understanding of Hitler’s mentality, is printed in: VJHfZ 1958:2, pp. 181 ff.
106. Notes by Legation Councillor Hewel, ADAP IV, No. 228.
107. Zoller, p. 84; the following quotation is taken from the Proclamation to the German People of March 15, which had evidently been framed before the conversation with Hácha; cf. Domarus, p. 1095.
108. Quoted in Nolte, Faschismus, p. 330; on Chamberlain’s speech in Birmingham cf. Michaelis and Schraepler, XIII, pp. 95 ff.; also Gilbert and Gott, p. 164; and Shirer, p. 454.
109. Erich Kordt, Wahn und Wirklichkeit, p. 153. For Hitler’s later criticism of the operation against Prague, cf. Le Testament politique de Hitler, pp. 119 f. For the instructions to the press of March 16, 1939, cf. Hillgruber, Strategie, p. 15.
110. Sebastian Haffner, Der Teufelspakt (p. 92), a very stimulating, sharply expressed study, which also contains the reference to the three possible courses open to Hitler.
111. C. J. Burckhardt, p. 157.
112. Thus the record of the conversation among Beck, Chamberlain, and Halifax on April 4, 1939, quoted in Freund, Weltgeschichte II, p. 122.
113. Ibid., p. 97.
114. Shirer, p. 454.
115. Gisevius, p. 363.
116. Domarus, pp. 1119 ff.
117. Cf., for example, François-Poncet, p. 282; also Grigore Gafencu, Derniers Jours de l’Europe, pp. 98 ff. For the following cf. Michaelis and Schraepler, XIII, pp. 211 f., 214 f.
118. IMTXXXIV, pp. 380 ff. (120-C).
119. Shirer, p. 471; Bullock (p. 504) expresses a similar opinion.
120. My New Order, 674 ff.
121. Quoted in Freund, Weltgeschichte II, pp. 373 f.
122. Notes of Embassy secretary Julius Schnurre on a conversation with Georgi Astachov, the Soviet charge d’affaires in Berlin, on May 5, 1939; cf. ADAP VI, p. 355; also notes of von Weizsäcker on a conversation with Soviet Ambassador Merekalov on April 17,1939; ibid., No. 215.
123. C. J. Burckhardt, p. 348. On Hitler’s hesitation and his wavering attitude, cf. p. 325 f.; also Bullock, pp. 515 f. The remark on the “pact with Satan” was made in a conference on August 28; cf. Halder, Kriegstagebuch I, p. 38.
124. ADAP VI, pp. 514 ff.
125. IMT XXXVII, pp. 546 ff.
126. C. J. Burckhardt, pp. 341 ff.
127. ADAP VI, No. 729.
128. Ernst von Weizsäcker, Erinnerungen, p. 235.
129. Georges Bonnet, Avant la catastrophe.
130. Freund, Weltgeschichte III, p. 124; here, too, p. 123, the Polish Foreign Minister’s declaration of August 23, 1939, and, p. 165, the exchange of telegrams between Ribbentrop and Hitler.
131. The Soviet judges succeeded, however, in preventing the admission of the supplementary protocol as evidence, so that it played no further part in the trial.
132. Nolte, Krise, p. 204.
133. Hans-Günther Seraphim, ed., Das politische Tagebuch Alfred Rosenbergs, p. 82. “That is,” Rosenberg commented indignantly, “about the most brazen insult that can be inflicted upon National Socialism.”
134. Report of the secretary, Hencke, dated August 24, 1939, cited in Freund, Weltgeschichte III, pp. 166 ff.
135. Hoffmann, Hitler Was My Friend, p. 103. For the remark on unused historic moments cf. Hillgruber, Staatsmänner I, p. 122.
136. Six separate versions of this address have been preserved, each differing from the others in its stresses. Cf. the comparative analysis by Winfried Baumgart in VJHfZ 1968:2, pp. 120 ff. The version cited here is to be found in: IMT XXVI, 798-PS (first part) and 1014-PS (second part). Concerning the impression the speech made on its audience cf. Erich Raeder, Mein Leben II, pp. 165 ff. and Erich von Manstein, Verlorene Siege, pp. 19 f.
137. W. L. Shirer, Rise and Fall, p. 545.
138. From notes by Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, Sir Orme Sargent, and Lord Halifax, cited in Gilbert and Gott, pp. 320 ff.
139. Birger Dahlerus, The Last Attempt, pp. 104–05; also notes by Sir Nevile Henderson dated August 31, 1939, quoted in Freund, Weltgeschichte III, pp. 372 f.
140. Note by Paul Schmidt concerning a conversation between Hitler and Attolico on August 31, 1939, 7 P.M., cited in Freund, Weltgeschichte III, p. 391. For Directive Number 1 see ADAP VII, pp. 397 ff.
141. In the negotiations with England France expressed the desire not to begin military operations until September 4: to be precise, as Bonnet stressed to Halifax, on Monday evening; cf. M. Freund, Weltgeschichte III, pp. 412 f.
142. Speech of September 1, 1939, The New York Times, September 3, 1939, p. 3.
143. Schmidt, Statist, pp. 463 f.
144. Stehlin, Auftrag, p. 234; also ADAP VII, p. 445. Shirer, Rise and Fall, p. 617, points out this noteworthy difference.
145. Gilbert and Gott, pp. 284 f.; see also p. 274 for the following episode.
146. IMT XV, pp. 385 f.
147. Nolte, Krise, p. 205.
148. C. J. Burckhardt, p. 351.
149. Karl Dönitz, Zehrt Jahre und zwanzig Tage, p. 45.
INTERPOLATION III
1. Hitler’s Table Talk, p. 661; also Hillgruber, Staatsmänner I, p. 388.
2. Rauschning, Gespräche, p. 12; also Tischgespräche, p. 172.
3. Rauschning, Gespräche, p. 16.
4. Hillgruber, Staatsmänner I, pp. 102 f. In the same conversation Hitler remarked that he would wait until the fall of 1940 before committing the U-boats “with full energy,” but that he hoped “by then to have finished with his enemies” (pp. 92 f.).
5. Thus in a strategy conference of July 31, 1944; cf. Heiber, Lagebesprechungen, p. 587; also Ernst von Weizsäcker, Erinnerungen, p. 258.
6. Thus to the members of the Bulgarian regency council during a conversation at Klessheim Palace on March 16, 1944, cited by Hillgruber, Staatsmänner II, p. 377. In the same conversation Hitler remarked that “this war can be waged all the more resolutely the less we imagine that there are any other ways to end it”; ibid., p. 376.
7. The order was couched in the form of a letter that read as follows: “Reichsleiter Bouhler and Dr. Brandt are charged with the responsibility of extending the authorization of physicians to be specified by name so that patients reasonably considered to be incurably ill may, after the most serious consideration of the state of their sickness, be granted a mercy death. Adolf Hitler.” Cf. IMT XXVI, p. 169. However, the euthanasia program could not be carried out to the extent intended, chiefly because of the protests from the churches that soon began.