“What about the air regeneration units?” Stepanov asked.
Lukin replied, “We have enough potassium superoxide cartridges in Compartment One to sustain us for eight days, assuming the battery will power the regeneration units for that long. The men aft have enough cartridges to last ten days, since they have access to the cartridges in Compartments Five and Nine.”
Stepanov ordered, “Pass the word to secure all unnecessary equipment. We need to ensure the battery can power the air regeneration units until we run out of cartridges. Also, I want every man to minimize his activity to reduce the amount of oxygen consumed and carbon dioxide produced.”
“There is one more issue,” Kovaleski added. “Hypothermia. The water temperature under the polar ice cap is minus two degrees Centigrade, below zero because salt water freezes at a lower temperature than pure water. It won’t be long before temperature in the compartment drops below freezing.”
“We can don our survival suits,” Lukin replied. “They’re designed to protect us during an escape into frigid waters. We have one hundred and sixty-five suits split evenly between the compartments with escape hatches. There should be fifty-five suits in Compartment One, which means we have enough for everyone here.”
“Good idea, Chief Ship.”
They had enough air regeneration cartridges to last eight days, assuming they didn’t freeze to death in the meantime. However, no one would miss Dolgoruky until they failed to report in at the end of patrol. It would be two months before the Fleet realized disaster had befallen them. They would be dead by then.
“What do we do now, Captain?” Lukin asked.
“We wait,” Stepanov answered, “and pray the American submarine also sank and their Navy comes looking for it.”
“If the Americans reach us first, what then? We cannot abandon Dolgoruky and let them board her.”
Stepanov contemplated Lukin’s assertion, then replied, “We will deal with it when the time comes.”
13
Established in 1882, the Office of Naval Intelligence is the United States’ oldest intelligence agency. Tasked with maintaining a decisive information advantage over America’s potential adversaries, ONI’s focus on naval weapons and technology was why Christine O’Connor, along with Captain Steve Brackman in the passenger seat of her car, were entering the forty-two-acre compound of the National Maritime Intelligence Center, only a short drive from the White House. Christine stopped in visitor parking, and after retrieving a notepad from her briefcase on the backseat, she and Brackman approached the four-story building.
Waiting inside the lobby was Pam Bruce, a supervisor in the three-thousand-member organization. After introducing herself, she said, “We have the appropriate experts waiting upstairs.”
Pam escorted Christine and Brackman to a third-floor conference room occupied by two men in their fifties. “Greg Hartfield”—Pam pointed to the man on the left—“is our senior expert on Russia’s Borei class submarines, and Stu Berman is our premier expert on the Bulava missile.”
After introductions were complete, Christine spent several minutes providing the background on the new nuclear arms reduction treaty being negotiated with Russia, culminating with Russia’s refusal to allow U.S. inspectors to board their Borei class submarines or inspect the Bulava missile. When she finished, she asked, “Why would the Russians take this position?”
“I’ll go first,” Hartfield said, “and provide an overview of the submarine, then Stu can follow up with the Bulava missile.” Christine opened her notepad as Hartfield continued, “Russia has eight active ballistic missile submarines: one Typhoon, a Delta III, and six Delta IVs. All are approaching their end of life, with three slated for retirement in the next eighteen months.
“Enter the new Borei class. Russia plans to build eight total, and the last five will be an improved version with twenty missile tubes instead of sixteen. The first Borei class submarine, Yury Dolgoruky, was launched several years ago, but has been plagued with material problems and software issues with its missile launch system, which delayed its commissioning for five years. Even after it was commissioned, her initial patrol was postponed repeatedly by issues with its new Bulava missile, which is Stu’s area of expertise.”
Greg Hartfield fell silent and Berman began. “Originally, the Borei submarines were supposed to carry an upgraded version of the R-39 missile designed for the Typhoon class. However, after the first three test firings resulted in catastrophic failures, the R-39 upgrade program was terminated. Instead, Russia developed the Bulava, an entirely new missile. It too was plagued with problems, due to the shortened timeline to develop a new missile quickly enough to support the Borei class submarines.
“Each missile has a range of six thousand, two hundred miles, and can be equipped with up to ten warheads, although there is some debate on the maximum number. The warheads are fully shielded against electromagnetic pulse damage and have a yield of one hundred fifty kilotons each. The Bulava is highly advanced, and we believe it is capable of evasive maneuvering and may have decoys that can be deployed to fool anti-ballistic missiles.
“As I mentioned, the Bulava missile was plagued with problems, with six of the first twelve test launches being failures. It appeared they had resolved the problems, because the next six launches were successes, and the Russian Navy accepted the missile into service two years ago. However, missile production was suspended eighteen months ago and all missiles were recalled.”
“Why did they halt production?” Christine asked.
“Most likely for an upgrade. What type, we don’t know. They must be back in production, however, because they loaded missiles aboard Dolgoruky, which raises some concerns.”
“What concerns?” Christine asked.
“Missile production hasn’t resumed at their manufacturing facility, yet Dolgoruky was able to load out. That means there is a second production facility we know nothing about, and without the ability to target it for intelligence gathering, we’re completely in the dark as to what kind of modifications they’ve made and what type of payload is installed.”
“That would certainly explain why they don’t want us to inspect the Bulava missile,” Christine said. Turning toward Hartfield, she asked, “Do you know of any reason why the Russians wouldn’t want START inspectors aboard Borei class submarines?”
Hartfield answered, “It’s possible the launch system displays the number and type of warheads loaded on each missile, as well as its countermeasures, so operators can monitor their status as the missile is spun up and target packages are assigned. That’d be my guess.”
Christine asked Captain Brackman, “Do you have any questions?”
Brackman shook his head. “I think we’ve covered everything.”
Christine turned back to the two men. “Thank you, gentlemen. You’ve been very helpful.”
14
After two days, the emergency lanterns in Compartment One were starting to dim. Stepanov had divided them into four sets, so that all together, they would last eight days. As the light decreased, so had the temperature. It was just above freezing. Although their survival suits guarded against hypothermia, it was still painfully cold. Thankfully, the air regeneration canisters generated heat as they produced oxygen and absorbed carbon dioxide, and Stepanov’s men took turns gathered around the air regeneration unit.