Three weeks later – New York
The phone rang three times before Ambassador Hansen could rouse himself from his sleep to answer it. "Hello," he said, as he checked his alarm clock. It was just after eleven.
"Mr. Ambassador," said Decker Hawthorne, "I'm sorry to disturb you, but I've just heard that about thirty minutes ago, at 5:30 a.m. Israeli time, there were an undisclosed number of nuclear explosions in Israel." The sleep suddenly rushed from Hansen's brain as his eyes opened wide.
"The Russians?" Hansen asked.
"The reports are very sketchy so far. It's not clear who's responsible, and there have been no official statements from the Russians."
"Decker, is there any chance there's been a mistake?"
"No, sir. I don't think so. The detonations were detected by U. S., U.K., and Chinese satellites."
"Okay, hold on a second while I switch on the telly." A moment later Decker heard the sound of Ambassador Hansen's television through the phone. "Okay, I'm back," Hansen said, but he and Decker stayed silent as each listened to the report just being read.
"CNN has just learned that the United States has scrambled Strategic Air Command bombers. The State Department has emphasized that this is only a precautionary measure and that SAC has been ordered to remain in U.S. air space pending further orders."
"What the hell is going on?!" Hansen asked.
"I don't know, sir," Decker answered, stating the obvious.
"Do you have the Russian Ambassador's phone number?"
"I have Ambassador Kruszkegin's number right here, sir," Decker said and then relayed it to Hansen.
"Okay," Hansen said. "I'll call Kruszkegin. You call Jackie, Peter and Jack and have everyone get to the office ASAP."
The phone rang only once at Ambassador Kruszkegin's residence before it was answered by an official sounding "Hello."
"This is Ambassador Jon Hansen," he said. "I would like to speak with Ambassador Kruszkegin immediately on a matter of utmost importance."
"I'm sorry, Ambassador Hansen," the voice answered. "Ambassador Kruszkegin is in a meeting right now and cannot be disturbed."
"I'll take it," Hansen heard Kruszkegin say in the background. Obviously the person who answered the phone had lied.
Ambassador Kruszkegin stood by the phone wearing a finely woven black and gold silk dressing gown, his warm Italian slippers protecting his feet from the cold marble floor. "Good evening, Jon," he began. Jon Hansen liked Kruszkegin as a person and respected him as an adversary. For his part, Kruszkegin was fond of referring to Hansen as "a man who has failed to notice that Britain no longer rules the world." Kruszkegin had found that, when possible, it was more productive to cooperate with Hansen than not to.
"Jon," he continued, anticipating Hansen's question, "I honestly do not know what is happening in Israel. I've just spoken with the Foreign Minister in Moscow and he swears that we have not launched an attack. I believe they are just as confused as we are."
Hansen was surprised that Kruszkegin had even taken his call; the straight answer was even more unexpected. Hansen knew the Russian well enough to have a pretty good idea when he was lying and when he was telling the truth. Right now he seemed to be telling the truth; at least as far as he knew the truth. "Thank you, Yuri," Hansen said. Kruszkegin's straightforward answer left little else to be said.
British Mission, New York (1:57 a.m.)
Ambassador Hansen's senior staff members watched the news reports on television as they awaited his arrival. "Does anyone know what's going on?" Hansen asked as he walked in the door just before 2:00 a.m. New York time.
"The Russians claim that they had nothing to do with it," began Jack Redmond, Hansen's legislative assistant. "They say that the attack was against the Russian troops in Israel's mountains."
This was a new twist on the story. "How the hell could that happen?" Hansen asked, incredulously. Redmond shook his head.
In the brief silence, Hansen's attention turned to the reporter on television. "There is speculation at the State Department," the reporter said, "that the attack on Israel could be the result of some internal power struggle inside the Russian government. The battle for power and control of policy has been heated, to say the least. Hard-liners like Foreign Minister Cherov and Defense Minister Khromchenkov want to lead Russia back to communism and world power, while others like President Perelyakin favor a more moderate approach. The Russian invasion of Israel still has many analysts unsure of who's in charge."
Jack Redmond shrugged his broad shoulders as Hansen looked at him for his comment. "It's possible," he said. "But it doesn't really answer the big questions. We know that no cities were hit; apparently the missiles fell in the wilderness areas of the country. That would seem to support Russia's assertion that it was their troops that were hit, but I can't imagine any kind of political situation so bad that one group of Russians would bomb another."
"Okay, let's assume for a moment that the Russians are telling the truth: that they're not responsible for the bombing," Hansen said. Which country with the capability to launch a nuclear attack would actually do it?"
No one had an answer.
"Mr. Ambassador," Decker interjected, "whoever launched the attack, the Israelis have apparently taken advantage of the confusion. There are reports of fighting between Russians and Israelis in every major city, and Israeli resistance fighters apparently have taken over all of the television and radio stations."
Hansen ran his hand over his head and thought for a second. "Is it possible," he asked, "that this whole thing could be the work of the Israelis?"
Tel Aviv (10:30 a.m. Israel, 3:30 a.m. New York)
Deep beneath the streets of Tel Aviv the mood was bright and hopeful. Phase one of the plan had been a complete success: the Russians had been totally unaware of the transfer of control from the Strategic Defense Control Facility to the Off-Site Facility; the evacuation of civilians had taken place with only a few slight delays; the Gideons had been launched (much to the surprise of Russian security teams guarding the missile silos); and all of the designated targets had been hit. It was now five hours since the launch.
In the streets of Israel, citizens were attacking the occupying Russians troops. In the mountains near Mizpe Ramon, an Israeli squadron had surprised the security force outside the Strategic Defense Control Facility, and was now preparing to wait out the surrender of those inside. It would be useless to try to force them out; the facility, with its three-foot thick steel walls and doors, was impervious to anything, with the possible exception of a direct hit by a multi-megaton nuclear warhead. When the Russians invaded four months earlier, those in control of the facility had surrendered it only after they were ordered to do so by the Israeli Defense Minister. Though the facility had been completely overridden by the Off-Site Facility and was therefore useless to the Russians, it would likely be a long wait before the occupants surrendered.
Any celebration would have to wait, however: phase two required the full attention of Colonel White and his team at the Off-Site Facility. While the Israelis would soon be able to secure the weaponry warehoused at the Russian camps, those in Colonel White's team had the immediate responsibility of directing Israel's strategic defense against a possible retaliatory nuclear strike from the Russians.
Scott Rosen estimated that Israel's strategic defense could eliminate ninety-seven percent or more of anything the Russians might send at them in a full scale attack. The throw-weight of the Russian nuclear arsenal had been substantially reduced since the collapse of the Soviet Union, but a full scale attack would still mean that several soft targets – that is, cities – could be hit. If the attack were of a lesser scale – a "limited" response – the strategic defense could probably destroy all incoming warheads. The most likely scenario was that the Russians would choose a strong but limited response in order to reduce the possibility of a response from the West. What everyone hoped for, however, was that the Russians – realizing that Israel was once again in control of its own strategic defense – would see that a nuclear attack would ultimately prove futile, and therefore they would not launch at all. There was no way to be certain how the Russians would respond and each person in Colonel White's team understood that every warhead that got through meant the deaths of tens of thousands of their countrymen.