It is obvious that all the fuss with the transfer of islands is just a way to observe the reaction of the population and of the political organizations. In case of a large-scale protest campaign (throughout the entire Russia and not just in Khabarovsk, whose residents are all convinced that nothing depends on them) the power would maybe have to go back on its word and cancel the signed agreements. In case of a deathly silence broken only by sporadic protest actions we should expect further territorial losses. Vova is preparing to visit Japan and that means that the Kuril Islands could repeat the fate of Amur’s. Then we could even expect to lose Kaliningrad.
Putin doesn’t behave like society’s servant but like a bad tsar (actually, even tsars didn’t give up land; they conquered it), thinking that Russia is his feudal estate that he can use as he pleases. Even the dumbest people must realize that he’s a danger to Russia and our people. The slogan ‘Our fatherland is in danger! Everybody against Putin!’ becomes more and more urgent. /…/
Rem Latipov. Khabarovsk”
The fifth NBP congress on November 30th 2004 adopted a resolution that categorically condemns the transfer of the islands.
“THERE IS NO ‘INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM’, THERE IS A WAR IN CHECHNYA”
In their “long list of claims” to Putin the Decembrists put the following as number nine:
“9. The victims of Nord-Ost and Beslan. There is no ‘international terrorism’, there is a war in Chechnya that you weren’t able to win and now you don’t have the courage to stop. Confess that this war is not for national interests but for your personal ratings, for your ‘tough guy’ reputation.”
The National-Bolsheviks have absolutely justly formulated the first part of their accusation. In fact, it was not agents of international terrorism who committed the terrorist acts of 1999-2005 (years of Putin’s rule), but wreckers sent from Chechnya. This circumstance is indicated not only by the national composition of the wreckers’ “commandos” killed in the Center on Dubrovka (Nord-Ost) and in Beslan and in all “commandos” we know that have committed the terrorist acts, – almost all of them, the overwhelming majority, are Chechens, but also by a simple comparison. Think about it: there are no terrorist acts on the territory of our neighbor Ukraine; there are no terrorist acts on the territory of our neighbor Belarus. Yet we have a common history and we equally live today in History’s post soviet period. Then why they do not have terrorism while we do? The answer is simple: neither Ukraine, nor Belarus lead a war in Chechnya.
President Putin and his group did not win the war in Chechnya since being men of violence from education and life experience, they know only how to employ police, violent measures for solving political problems. But political problems cannot be solved by police methods a priori. This is why when they suppressed Ichkeria’s army with the help of aviation and artillery, superior technical might, the federal forces have only forced this army to switch to a guerrilla war. This is a war in which wrecker groups that are sent into the Russian Federation are now the principal operational method. Result: the war is not won; it became a guerilla war. What Putin’s group really succeeded in doing (and what did not exist during the first Chechen campaign in 1994-96), is the creation of a civil war in Chechnya. Some clans of Chechens realized that they could not overcome Russia in a frontal war. Such clans (I could name the principal ones: Kadirov, Yamadayev and Alkhanov) joined the federal troops in order to gain victory over the opposing clans (or groups of militants) subordinated to Maskhadov and Basayev. They were gaining psychological and military skills with Russia’s help. In its turn Russia willingly let them organize and arm themselves and it was pleased to transfer a part of the burden of the Chechen war on them. However gradually but naturally the roles switched: today the federals are practically fighting for the interests of the Kadirov, Yamadayev and Alkhanov clans since the Russian interest for Chechnya is exclusively applied, moral, I would say. But certainly not territorial. I will gladly explain what I mean. Russia is leading a war in Chechnya, the nazbols were right: for Putin’s personal ratings, for his “tough guy” reputation. But I will add – also for the reputation of a tough Russia and for the quite false supposition that if they “release” Chechnya other North Caucasian and Muslim republics will follow suit. The supposition is false because by releasing Chechnya, the negative impression of this “release” could be balanced by taking into Russia the fertile lands of Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia. I will note that besides, in other North Caucasian republics the population is mostly Russian or mixed. Chechnya and the Chechens are rather a huge exception from the rule, than the rule.
And so. A civil war in Chechnya is in fact, Putin’s group achievement. Until now the situation of a civil war worked for Putin. However everything is changing before our eyes and will change not in Putin’s favor. The thing is that both the Kadirovs and Yamadayevs are just as Chechen as Maskhadov (was, of course) or Basayev. They are not supposed to like Russians and all the more Russians on their land. They keep showing this more and more. Not so long ago, in summer 2005 Ramzan Kadirov said that there is no more need to send Russian policemen in Chechnya, that Chechnya’s police is already strong enough; they are numerous and can face the militants in the mountains. What is this if not a diplomatic request to withdraw the troops? Yes, this is a diplomatic request to withdraw the Russian troops. It is justly formulated and the Russian policemen themselves will be glad not to ride to Chechnya’s deathly spaces. And what did the terrorists, or wreckers, request in Nord-Ost and Beslan from Putin? The withdrawal of Russian troops. So it turns out that we, Russia, are losing Chechnya both ways. Both in case of Basayev’s victory (today it appears as problematic) and in case of Kadirov’s victory Chechnya will not be Russian. And I am so right!
Now more about the motives that led Putin to war in Chechnya. I will add another one to the ones enumerated by the nazbols. In essence Putin might have given Chechnya to Kadirov Senior right after he was elected president of the Chechen republic. This did not happen because president Putin does not lead this war only for his ratings and the image of a tough guy but also for maintaining the de facto state of emergency regime that reigns in Russian cities. If Chechnya is released, there will be no pretext for the police State in the RF to continue its existence. The wrecker groups will stop to send suicide bombers from Chechnya – then good-bye, metal detectors and searches, they will have to remove part of the police from the streets and a part of the hatred for the Caucasians will disappear. Even the society we have will ask for relaxation in the end when it will see that the Chechens have gotten to their business after the Russian troops finally left their territory. I formulate it again: Putin needs the Chechen war to sustain the police State in Russia, to limit the personal and political rights of the citizens in order to keep and reinforce his power. The nazbols haven’t said this, but I do.
Let us try to understand how many human lives president Putin costs to Russia; what is the war in Chechnya expressed in losses of human lives. I will cite some numbers: Moscow Business Times on 16.08.2005 writes: “For the first and second military campaigns in Chechnya 106 thousand people have died. This was told by the head of Chechnya’s State Council Taus Jabrailov. ‘According to our estimates about 150-160 thousand people have died during the first and second campaign in Chechnya. Of them, 30-40 thousand are Chechens’, Jabrailov said on a press conference. According to him there was a lot of victims among civilians during the first campaign. Mostly among the Russian-speaking residents of the republic who had nowhere to go from the cities, in contrary to the Chechens who were hiding at their relatives homes in the mountains. Jabrailov added that these numbers include the total number of losses, including the federal forces and the law enforcing bodies as well as the militants. Last week the Defense Ministry published the number of losses of the federal troops from the beginning of the second Chechnya campaign. According to this data 3 459 military have died in Chechnya from 1999 and 32 have disappeared.”