Mao Zedong On Dialectical Materialism

(a24) Ye Qing says: “Understanding the basic character of the Chinese economy is obviously a study of a state of rest and consequently is a question undoubtedly established on the basis of formal logic”.
(b24) When he discusses the study of the economic character of China this eclectic distortion is even more evident. He considers that understanding the basic character of the Chinese economy is obviously a study of a state of rest, and consequently is a question undoubtedly raised on the basis of formal logic. In Ye Qing’s opinion it is only the study of the development of China’s society that is the study of a state of motion and a dialectical question. The study of “form, quality, and relation, etc.”, however, are studies of states of rest. This is such obvious eclecticism! In fact, quality and relation are the starting point of development. Without this starting point there is no development. Ye Qing himself says, “Economics needs to be understood before it is known at what stage of evolution Chinese society is, and what revolution is needed”. As to this starting point: although we cannot regard it as development itself, if we are faithful to dialectics, we at least need to see within it the original motive force of development, as well as a variety of specific contradictions. This, then, is not something formal logic can grasp. Naturally, if you definitely base yourself on formal logic and advance this question, of course, that suits you, but this way you only see one side or it becomes formalism. This is to say: you want to use the deductive method, so first you adopt a general formula, then, you look to see what the nature of the Chinese economy is, then, relying on this formula, you determine China’s needs. For example, feudal society needs a capitalist revolution, this is a general formula. The answer to your research tells you that China’s economy is a feudal one, thereupon, you say China needs a capitalist revolution and the establishment of a capitalist society. In formal logic this, naturally, is very coherent. But, do the specific conditions of Chinese society comply with this formula? Your deduction cannot manage this. However, Chinese society cannot comply with your deductive formula. Although Chinese society is feudal, its special conditions do not permit that it will undergo a Western European style capitalist revolution, nor do they permit the establishment of capitalist society. This can only be done through dialectical study, for none of this can be seen by the deductive method of formal logic. In understanding Chinese economics, people who are faithful to dialectics must implement it. They cannot assign a domain to it here, thus giving empty formalism room to establish itself. (Plekhanov, esteemed by Ye Qing, made the mistake of formalism precisely because of this kind of thing.)

This is wrong; this is eclecticism. According to his opinion, it is only the study of the development of China’s society that is the study of a state of motion and a dialectical question. Form, quality, and relation, etc., are only the study of states of rest and ought to belong to formal logic. Is not this obvious eclecticism?

Quality and relation and such questions are the starting point of development; although it cannot be regarded as development itself, if we are faithful to dialectics, we should at least see in them the motive force of development, see in them specific contradictions; can formal logic do this? Formal logic only sees one side; it can only become formalism. For example, feudal society needs a capitalist revolution; this is a formula. Because China’s economy is feudal it is then said that China needs a capitalist revolution and the establishment of capitalist society. In formal logic, this kind of deduction is very coherent, and we can only say this, but China’s specific conditions are denied. The specific conditions of China do not permit that it will be restricted historically to a capitalist revolution, nor do they permit the establishment of capitalist society. All questions like this are questions that formal logic cannot solve, only dialectics can. The formalism of Plekhanov to Ye Qing cannot solve any question.

(a25) Two thousand years ago Greek sophists regarded motion as innumerable points of rest in space, and therefore concluded that there are only innumerable points of rest and no motion. Ye Qing says rest is the cessation of motion and motion is the accumulation of rest; this is the return to life of sophism.
(b25) First, he says motion is the accumulation of rest, and rest is the cessation of motion. This is just like Mr Zhang says, not only does it eclectically combine rest and motion, but it does it to the extent that as a result it eliminates motion in rest. Two thousand years ago Greek sophists had already developed this theory. They regarded motion as the sum total of innumerable points of rest in space and consequently concluded that there are only innumerable points of rest and no motion. Who would have thought that sophism would return to life in the mouth of “twentieth century” Ye Qing. This truly makes people want to “acclaim it as the height of perfection”.

(a26) Lenin says, “a simple judgement is also a unity of contradiction. For instance, the proposition ’Ivan is a man’ has the meaning of ‘the particular is equal to the general’”. Formal logic often makes this kind of proposition, “a youth is a shop-assistant”, but not, “a youth is a youth”, and this is because formal logic itself cannot strictly abide by the law of identity without making itself untenable. When formal logic uses this kind of proposition it naturally has not considered that it contains a contradiction, and therefore it cannot be said that this is an application of the law of the unity of contradiction. However, we cannot deny that this kind of proposition in essence contains a unity of contradictions.
(b26) Secondly, in formal logic the proposition “the youth is a shop-assistant” is common, and this must be so for formal logic becomes untenable if strictly according to the law of identity one is only able to say “the youth is a youth”. When we say “the youth is a youth” contains a contradiction, it is to indicate that formal logic itself cannot strictly abide by the law of identity. When formal logicians use this proposition they naturally have not thought that it contains a contradiction, and therefore this proposition is certainly not an application of the law of the unity of contradiction. But we still cannot deny that this kind of proposition in essence contains a unity of contradictions. Ilyich, in his Philosophical Notebooks, says, “a simple judgement is also a unity of contradiction. For instance, the proposition ‘Ivan is a man’ has the meaning of ’the particular is equal to the general’”. It is not known whether Ye Qing understands this point or not.

(a27) Ai Siqi says: “Things that are different are not contradictions, for instance, a pen, ink, and chair are not contradictions. But if the principles of development and change are understood then it is known, that under certain conditions, things that are different are able to transform themselves into contradictions. If at the same time and place two definite things begin to act on each other in a mutually exclusive fashion, then they become contradictions. For instance, a shop-assistant and a writer are basically without contradiction, but if a certain shopassistant has an interest in writing and thinks of becoming a writer, the two then become mutually exclusive within an entity and form a contradiction. If it is thought only such things as good and bad, male and female are contradictions and other things cannot transform themselves into contradictions, then, it is a formalistic differentiation. Is this distinguishable from Zhang Dongsun’s formalistic division of “contrary, contradiction, and opposition”? The basic principle is correct but the formulation “difference is not contradiction” is not. One should say that, under certain conditions, all things that are different are contradictions. A person sits at a chair, dips a pen into ink to write an essay. Because a person and writing, these two definite conditions, temporarily unites the things that are in contradiction, one cannot say these differences are not contradictions. When a cook prepares food, he takes firewood, rice, oil, salt, sauce, vinegar, and vegetables and, under certain conditions, unites them. Under certain conditions, a shopassistant and a writer are also able to unite. Part work-part study can unite work and study. Difference is each and every thing, all being under certain conditions, conntradictions; therefore, difference itself is contradiction; this is what is called a concrete contradiction. Ai’s formulation is unsatisfactory (Mao Zedong’s opinion).
(b27) Thirdly, things that are different are certainly not contradictions, and so such things as a pen, ink, and a chair are not contradictions. However, if dialectics is truly “understood” and the principles of development and change are understood, then ii must be known that under certain conditions things that are different can alsj transform themselves intj contradictions if at the same time and place these two different things begin to act on each other in a mutually, exclusive fashion. For example, a shop assistant and writer are two different, totally unrelated things. However, if someone who is a shop-assistant is very interested in writing as well as dissatisfied with his or her existing state of affairs and thinks hard about becoming a writer, at that time two different things – a shopassistant and writer, within an entity, become mutually exclusive. Can you say this is not a contradiction? Can you say this shop-assistant has not experienced a contradiction in his or her life? If you insist that only good and bad, male and female, etc. can be considered contradictions and other things cannot transform themselves into contradictions, then what is the difference between this formalistic method of differentiation and Zhang Dongsun’s division of “contrary, contradiction, and opposition”, etc. Can this be the thinking of a person who “understands” dialectics?

(a28) The formula “A is B or not B” of the law of the excluded middle, in fact, contains a contradiction: that is, “A is not A but is B”, or “B can be B or not B”; Hegel has already criticised this.
(b28) Fourthly, in formal logic, “a youth is a shop assistant” suits only the formula A is A of the law of the excluded middle; everybody understands this. But the focus of our attention is to indicate: can a proposition of formal logic fundamentally find a role in dialectics and be “under the jurisdiction of moving logic”? We do not want to classify the law of the excluded middle with the law of the unity of contradiction. The formula “A is B or not B”, in fact, already contains a contradiction: that is, “A is not A but is B” or “B can be B or not B”; Hegel has already criticised this. But, perhaps for Ye Qing it is not easy to understand because from start to finish he only knows how to use a formal mind to carry out rigid classification, and he is unaware of development and change.

(a29) Although external cause may not be overlooked, it cannot determine necessity in things. What determines necessity is internal change. Ye Qing says, “one must acknowledge the interaction of internal and external cause”. This is mechanical interaction where the two sides are with out a relative superiority or inferiority. This, then, forms Ye Qing’s eclectism. Dialectical interaction is not like this. In it, the two sides are distinguished by a primary and secondary significance.
(b29) Although external cause may not be overlooked, it cannot determine necessity in things. What determines necessity in things is internal cause. At this point the two must be distinguished in terms of superiority and inferiority. Ye Qing says dialectics must acknowledge interaction.

Ye Qing’s question is admitted, “Mechanics need an external motive force: water encounters external heat and vaporizes; the evolution of organisms is due to the environment; are these not facts?” This is not a question of simple denial. However, at the same time the activity of the thing itself in [this process of] change must be acknowledged; this is the determining factor in [the process of] change in things. Mechanics has movability; water has the property of vaporization; it is the nature of organisms to evolve. Because of this, external causes such as motive force, heat, and the environment have a function. Internal cause determines the necessity of change in things, not external cause.
Therefore, there must be an interaction between internal and external cause. However, one knows that when speaking of interaction there is the difference between mechanical and dialectical interaction. Mechanical interaction is reciprocal. The two sides are without a relative superiority and inferiority. This kind of interaction can only form Ye Qing’s eclecticism. In dialectical interaction, however, the two sides are distinguished by a primary and secondary significance. In the interaction between internal and external cause dialectics stresses the primary determining function of internal cause. This is what is meant by saying “what is called the occurrence of internal action, then, is considered to be the reason for necessity in things”. Ye Qing has put several questions to me, “Mechanics needs an external motive force, is this not a fact; water encounters external heat and vaporizes, is this not a fact; the evolution of organisms is due to the environment, is this not a fact?”

I naturally reply “yes”. I cannot simply deny it. However, acknowledging these facts is not the same as acknowledging that external cause determines necessity. If you ask, “Motive force causes mechanical movement, is this necessity? Heat causes water to vaporize, is this necessity?” I naturally will answer in the affirmative. However, if you again ask, “Well then, is not the determination of this ‘necessity’ precisely motive force, heat, etc.?” To this I will reply in one word “no”. Why is the answer “no”? Because Ye Qing himself must acknowledge that, “External cause must depend on internal cause to become external cause. If mechanics lacks dynamism, motive force cannot become the motive force of mechanics. If water lacks the property of vaporization, heat then becomes the heat of water and it cannot vaporize”.