“Seriously, though, the SEALs have been training against the possibility… no, the probability… of the use of a nuclear device in a terrorist attack for a long time now.”
“Probability?” Hopke said, surprised.
“Look, back at the end of the 1980s, five nations acknowledged having nuclear weapons. Two more, Israel and South Africa, either had nuclear weapons or were thought to have all of the components, requiring only a simple assembly process to to have them ready to arm.
“Then the Soviet Empire collapsed, and any real hope of maintaining the fiction of non-proliferation was smashed forever. Where one nation — the Soviet Union — had maintained an arsenal of something like thirty thousand nuclear warheads, now there are fifteen nations, with more on the way if Russia’s internal problems continue. Most didn’t have any nukes based on their territory, or if they did, the warheads and arming codes were under firm Russian control. Other states, like Kazakhstan, inherited part of the arsenal but pledged to renounce nuclear weapons. But there were still others, like Ukraine, that felt they needed to keep the nukes based on their territory to maintain their newfound independence, just in case the Russian bear gets hungry again.”
“Hell,” MacKenzie said, “even if one of the new governments promises to disassemble all of the weapons it controlled, how could such a promise possibly be monitored?”
“Even more dangerous, though,” Murdock continued, “you have an awful lot of very desperate people running around in a state that has collapsed to near anarchy in some areas. Much of the modern Russian economy — and that means a lot of the government — is controlled by the Russian mafia. It’s an open secret that half a million hard-currency dollars will buy you a small nuke on the weapons black market. And there are generals and scientists and technicians, all of them with access to nukes and all of them knowing that pretty soon they’re not going to have a job. The temptation to sell a few weapons here and there, maybe to some guy from Iran or Libya, must be overwhelming in cases like that.
“Anyway, one of the major nightmares of the people back in the Pentagon whose job it is to think about such things is the one about how easy it will be to slip a small nuclear device into a major U.S. port aboard a freighter, an oil tanker, even a pleasure boat. It wouldn’t even have to be an atomic bomb. A few pounds of plutonium, stolen from a breeder reactor facility somewhere, or purchased from North Korea and scattered on the winds or the waves by a charge of conventional high explosives, could poison hundreds, even thousand of square miles. If that happened inside a major city…”
“Plutonium is more than a component of an atomic bomb,” Inge said. “It is the single most toxic substance known to man.”
“Affirmative,” Murdock said. “And if you do have the wherewithal to build a bomb, you don’t need a hell of a lot of the stuff. Modern nukes aren’t quite small enough to fit inside a suitcase… but they’re terrifyingly close.”
“I have heard,” Hopke said, “that a bright chemistry student might be able to extract the necessary radioactives to construct a small A-bomb.”
“Theoretically,” Murdock said, nodding. “Still, the preferred method of nuclear-club wannabe states like Libya and of terrorists worldwide is to steal the stuff… or to buy it from people who aren’t choosy about who they sell it to. Like some rogue ex-Soviet army officer who’s hard up for cold cash. Or fun states like North Korea.”
“Is that what this Maverick Lance report is about?” Hopke asked. “Someone is trying to smuggle plutonium?”
“Oh, we know they’re smuggling plutonium, Lieutenant,” Murdock said. A Maverick Lance alert was part of the ongoing attempt by U.S. military and other government authorities to keep track of the world black market in stolen nuclear material and, where possible, to stop it. “In fact, it’s damned scary just how many groups are involved in the traffic right now. We’re here to try to find out just what it is they’re planning to do with it. The Maverick Lance alert was called because the CIA has identified several North Korean agents operating in Europe, and we think they’re part of the plutonium pipeline.”
Inge frowned. “So you in America are of the opinion that the North Koreans and the Red Army Faction are all working together somehow? To what end?”
“That,” Murdock said, “is what we would very much like to know.”
“Perhaps you should tell us, Lieutenant,” Hopke said quietly, “about this particular Maverick Lance.”
Murdock nodded and began telling them what he knew.
For years, the U.S. Department of Defense had maintained a list of code phrases that described various types of potential nuclear accidents or incidents. A NUCFLASH alert, followed by the appropriate code word, set the forces necessary to contain the problem in motion. Broken Arrow referred to such nightmare possibilities as the unauthorized or accidental detonation of a nuclear device, radioactive contamination from a damaged nuclear weapon that could threaten a populated area, or the loss or theft of a nuclear warhead. Bent Spear covered less serious contingencies… a violation of the safety procedures surrounding the maintenance or installation of nuclear weapons, for instance. At the bottom of the list was Dull Sword, a code name for events involving nuclear material that didn’t fall into the Broken Arrow or Bent Spear categories… a nuclear-armed aircraft struck by lightning in flight, for instance, with no apparent damage to aircraft or weapon, but with the possibility of damage to the weapons components.
Lately, a new category had been added to the NUCFLASH code phrase list, positioned between Broken Arrow and Bent Spear in terms of its seriousness. Maverick Lance referred to any case where it was believed that unauthorized individuals had access to nuclear weapons, weapon parts, or radioactive nuclear materials… such as plutonium. “Unauthorized individuals” included anyone of any nationality operating in any country who would not normally have access to such materials; a Russian Strategic Rocket Forces weapons technician would not trigger a Maverick Lance alert; an ex-Soviet general trying to sell a tactical nuclear warhead to the Russian mafia or a Libyan agent most certainly would.
Murdock reached down and opened his briefcase. Inside was a file folder containing several photographs, as well as a stack of laser-printed hard copy. He laid one of the photographs on the table before them, face up. It showed an Oriental businessman and a woman, possibly his wife, standing in what appeared to be a customs line. The angle of the photo indicated that it had been taken from up high, probably through a security camera mounted well above the customs counter.
“This is Kim Doo Ok and his wife, Madam Kim… at least according to their passports. Britain’s MI5 picked them up at London’s Heathrow Airport two days ago and placed them under surveillance.
“According to South Korean intelligence, however, the man is Major Pak Chong Yong and the woman is Captain Chun Hyon Hee, both members of North Korea’s Special Operations forces.”
“What are they doing in England?” Inge wanted to know.
“Meeting this man,” Murdock said, sliding another photograph to the table top. It showed Pak and Chun from a different angle, speaking with a tall Occidental man with knife-thin features and dark hair. “John Patrick O’Shaughnessy. Also known as Jack Mallory or Jack O’Malley. Former member of the IRA, then of the Provos. With the new truce in force between England and the IRA, he seems to have joined one of the smaller hawk factions that’s holding out for war with Great Britain to the bitter end.”