'Then you too wouldn't accept anyone's saying that one man was larger than another by a head, and that the smaller was smaller by that same thing; but you'd protest that you for your part will say 101 only that everything larger than something else is larger by nothing but largeness, and largeness is the reason for its being larger; and that the smaller is smaller by nothing but smallness, and smallness is the reason for its being smaller. You'd be afraid, I imagine, of meeting 5 the following contradiction:64 if you say that someone is larger and smaller by a head, then, first, the larger will be larger and the smaller smaller by the same thing; and secondly, the head, by which the larger man is larger, is itself a small thing; and it's surely monstrous b that anyone should be large by something small; or wouldn't you be afraid of that?'
'Yes, I should,' said Cebes laughing.
'Then wouldn't you be afraid to say that ten is greater than eight by two, and that this is the reason for its exceeding, rather than 5 that it's by numerousness, and because of numerousness? Or that two cubits are larger than one cubit by half, rather than by largeness? Because, of course, there'd be the same fear.'
'Certainly,' he said.
'And again, wouldn't you beware of saying that when one is added to one, the addition is the reason for their coming to be two,65 or when one is divided, that division is the reason? You'd c shout loudly that you know no other way in which each thing comes to be, except by participating in the peculiar Being66 of any given thing in which it does participate; and in these cases you own no other reason for their coming to be two, save participation in 5 twoness: things that are going to be two must participate in that, and whatever is going to be one must participate in oneness. You'd dismiss those divisions and additions and other such subtleties, leaving them as answers to be given by people wiser than yourself; but you, scared of your own shadow, as the saying is, and of your d inexperience, would hang on to that safety of the hypothesis, and answer accordingly. But if anyone hung on to67 the hypothesis itself, you would dismiss him, and you wouldn't answer till you should have examined its consequences, to see if, in your view, they
5 are in accord or discord with each other; and when you had to give an account of the hypothesis itself, you would give it in the same way, once again hypothesizing another hypothesis, whichever should e seem best of those above, till you came to something adequate; but you wouldn't jumble things as the contradiction-mongers do, by discussing the starting-point and its consequences at the same time, if, that is, you wanted to discover any of the things that are. For them, perhaps, this isn't a matter of the least thought or concern; 5 their wisdom enables them to mix everything up together, yet still be pleased with themselves; but you, if you really are a philosopher, 102 would, I imagine, do as 1 say.'
'What you say is perfectly true,' said Simmias and Cebes together. Echecrates. Goodness, Phaedo, there was reason to say that! It seems marvellous to me how clearly he put things, even for someone 5 of small intelligence.
Phaedo. Exactly, Echecrates. That was how it seemed to everyone there.
Echecrates. And to us who weren't there but are now hearing it. Tell us, though, what were the things that were said next?
10 Phaedo. As I recall, when these points had been granted him, and b it was agreed that each of the forms was something, and that the other things, partaking in them, took the name of the forms themselves, he next asked: 'If you say that that is so, then whenever you say that Simmias is larger than Socrates but smaller than Phaedo, you 5 mean then, don't you, that both things are in Simmias, largeness and smallness?'
'I do.'
'Well anyhow, do you agree that Simmias' overtopping of Socrates isn't expressed in those words according to the truth of the c matter? Because it isn't, surely, by nature that Simmias overtops him, by virtue, that is of his being Simmias, but by virtue of the largeness that he happens to have. Nor again does he overtop Socrates because Socrates is Socrates, but because of smallness that Socrates has in relation to his largeness?' 5 'True.'
'Nor again is he overtopped by Phaedo in virtue of Phaedo's being
Phaedo, but because of largeness that Phaedo has in relation to Simmias' smallness?'
'That is so.'
'So that's how Simmias takes the name of being both small and 10 large; it's because he's between the two of them, submitting his smallness to the largeness of the one for it to overtop, and presenting d to the other his largeness which overtops the latter's smallness.'
At this he smiled, and added: 'That sounds as if I'm going to talk like a book.68 But anyway, things are surely as I say.'
He agreed.
'My reason for saying this is that I want you to think as I do. 5 Now it seems to me that not only is largeness itself never willing to be large and small at the same time, but also that the largeness in us never admits the small, nor is it willing to be overtopped. Rather, one of two things must happen: either it must retreat and get out of the way, when its opposite, the small, advances towards it; or else, e upon that opposite's advance, it must perish. But what it is not willing to do is to abide and admit smallness, and thus be other than what it was. Thus I, having admitted and abided smallness, am still what I am, this same individual, only small; whereas the large in 5 us,69 while being large, can't endure to be small. And similarly, the small that's in us is not willing ever to come to be, or to be, large. Nor will any other of the opposites, while still being what it was, at the same time come to be, and be, its own opposite. If that befalls it, 103 either it goes away or it perishes.'
'I entirely agree,' said Cebes.
On hearing this, one of those present—I don't remember for sure who it was—said: 'But look here, wasn't the very opposite of what's 5 now being said agreed in our earlier discussion: that the larger comes to be from the smaller, and the smaller from the larger, and that coming-to-be is, for opposites, just this—they come to be from their opposites. Whereas now I think it's being said that this could never happen.' 10
Socrates turned his head and listened. 'It's splendid of you to have recalled that,' he said; 'but you don't realize the difference b between what's being said now and what was said then. It was said then that one opposite thing comes to be from another opposite
thing; what we're saying now is that the opposite itself could never 5 come to be opposite to itself, whether it be the opposite in us or the opposite in nature. Then, my friend, we were talking about things that have opposites, calling them by the names they take from them; whereas now we're talking about the opposites themselves, from whose presence in them the things so called derive their names. It's c these latter that we're saying would never be willing to admit coming- to-be from each other.'
With this he looked towards Cebes and said: 'Cebes, you weren't troubled, I suppose, by any of the things our friend here said, were you?'
5 'No, not this time,' said Cebes; 'though I don't deny that many things do trouble me.'
'We've agreed, then, unreservedly on this point: an opposite will never be opposite to itself.'
'Completely.'
10 'Now please consider this further point, and see if you agree with it. Is there something you call hot, and again cold?'
'There is.'
'Do you mean the same as snow and fire?' d 'No, most certainly not.'
'Rather, the hot is something different from fire, and the cold is something different from snow?'
'Yes.'
5 'But this I think you will agree: what is snow will never, on the lines of what we were saying earlier, admit the hot and still be what it was, namely snow, and also hot; but at the advance of the hot, it will either get out of the way or perish.'