Phaedo [(trans. Gallop)]

'Certainly.'

10 'And again fire, when cold advances, will either get out of the way or perish; but it will never endure to admit the coldness, and still be what it was, namely fire and also cold.' e 'That's true.'

'The situation, then, in some cases of this kind, is as follows: not only is the form itself entitled to its own name for all time; but there's something else too, which is not the same as the form, but 5 which, whenever it exists, always has the character of that form.

Perhaps what I mean will be clearer in this further example: the odd must, surely, always be given this name that we're now using, mustn't it?'

'Certainly.'

'But is it the only thing there is—this is my question—or is there something else, which is not the same as the odd, yet which one must 104 also always call odd, as well as by its own name, because it is by nature such that it can never be separated from the odd? I mean the sort of thing that happens to threeness, and to many other instances. Consider the case of threeness. Don't you think it must 5 always be called both by its own name and by that of the odd, although the odd is not the same as threeness? They aren't the same, yet threeness and fiveness and half the entire number series are by nature, each of them, always odd, although they are not the same as b the odd. And again, two and four and the whole of the other row of numbers, though not the same as the even, are still, each of them, always even. Do you agree or not?'

'Of course.' 5

'Look closely then at what I want to show. It is this: apparently it's not only the opposites we spoke of that don't admit each other. This is also true of all things which, although not opposites to each other, always have the opposites. These things too, it seems, don't admit whatever form may be opposite to the one that's in them, but 10 when it attacks, either they perish or they get out of the way. Thus c we shall say, shan't we, that three will sooner perish, will undergo anything else whatever, sooner than abide coming to be even, while remaining three?'

'Indeed we shall,' said Cebes.

'Moreover, twoness isn't opposite to threeness.' 5

'Indeed not.'

'Then not only do the forms that are opposites not abide each other's attack; but there are, in addition, certain other things that don't abide the opposites' attack.'

'Quite true.' 10

'Then would you like us, if we can, to define what kinds these are?'

'Certainly.'

'Would they, Cebes, be these: things that are compelled by what- d

ever occupies them⁷⁰ to have not only its own form, but always the form of some opposite⁷¹ as well?'

'What do you mean?' 5 'As we were saying just now. You recognize, no doubt, that whatever the form of three occupies must be not only three but also odd.'

'Certainly.'

'Then, we're saying, the form⁷² opposite to the character that has 10 that effect could never go to a thing of that kind.'

'It couldn't.'

'But it was that of odd that had that effect?'

'Yes.'

'And opposite to this is that of the even?' 15 'Yes.'

e 'So that of the even will never come to three.'

'No, it won't.'

'Three, then, has no part in the even.'

'No part.' 5 'So threeness is uneven.'

'Yes.'

'So what I was saying we were to define* the kind of things which, while not opposite to a given thing, nevertheless don't admit it, the opposite in question⁷³—as we've just seen that threeness, while not opposite to the even, nevertheless doesn't admit it, since it always 10 brings up its opposite, just as twoness brings up the opposite of the odd, and the fire brings up the opposite of the cold, and so on in a 105 great many other cases—well, see whether you would define them thus: it is not only the opposite that doesn't admit its opposite; there is also that which brings up an opposite into whatever it enters itself; and that thing, the very thing that brings it up, never admits 5 the quality opposed to the one that's brought up.⁷* Recall it once more: there's no harm in hearing it several times. Five won't admit the form of the even, nor will ten, its double, admit that of the odd. This, of course, is itself also the opposite of something else; never- b theless, it won't admit the form of the odd. Nor again will one-and-a half, and the rest of that series, the halves, admit the form of the whole; and the same applies to a third, and all that series. Do you

follow and agree that that is so?'

'I agree most emphatically, and I do follow.'

'Then please repeat it from the start; and don't answer in the exact terms of my question, but in imitation of my example. I say this, because from what's now being said I see a different kind of safeness beyond the answer I gave initially, the old safe one. Thus, if you were to ask me what it is, by whose presence in a body, that body will be hot,⁷⁵1 shan't give you the old safe, ignorant answer, that it's hotness, but a subtler answer now available, that it's fire. And again, if you ask what it is, by whose presence in a body, that body will ail, I shan't say that it's illness, but fever. And again, if asked what it is, by whose presence in a number, that number will be odd, I shan't say oddness, but oneness; and so on. See whether by now you have an adequate understanding of what I want.'

'Yes, quite adequate.'

'Answer then, and tell me what it is, by whose presence in a body, that body will be living.'

'Soul.'

'And is this always so?'

'Of course.'

'Then soul, whatever it occupies, always comes to that thing bringing life?'

'It comes indeed.'

'And is there an opposite to life, or is there none?'

'There is.'

'What is it?'

'Death.'

'Now soul will absolutely never admit the opposite of what it brings up, as has been agreed earlier?'

'Most emphatically,' said Cebes.

'Well now, what name did we give just now to what doesn't admit the form of the even?'

'Un-even.'

'And to that which doesn't admit the just, and to whatever doesn't admit the musical?'

. 'Un-musical, and un-just.'

'Well then, what do we call whatever doesn't admit death?'

'Im-mortal.'

'But soul doesn't admit death?' 5 'No.'

'Then soul is immortal.'

'It's immortal.'

'Very well. May we say that this much has been proved? Or how does it seem to you?'

'Yes, and very adequately proved, Socrates.' 10 'Now what about this, Cebes? If it were necessary for the un- 106 even to be imperishable, three would be imperishable, wouldn't it?'

'Of course.'

'Or again, if the un-hot were necessarily imperishable likewise, then whenever anyone brought hot against snow, the snow would 5 get out of the way, remaining intact and unmelted? Because it couldn't perish, nor again could it abide and admit the hotness.'

'True.'

'And in the same way, I imagine, if the un-coolable were imperishable, then whenever something cold attacked the fire, it could never 10 be put out nor could it perish, but it would depart and go away intact.'

'It would have to.'

b 'Then aren't we compelled to say the same thing about the im-mortal? If the immortal is also imperishable, it's impossible for soul, whenever death attacks it, to perish. Because it follows from what's been said before that it won't admit death, nor will it be 5 dead, just as we said that three will not be even, any more than the odd will be; and again that fire will not be cold, any more than the hotness in the fire will be. "But", someone might say, "what's to prevent the odd, instead of coming to be even, as we granted it c didn't, when the even attacks, from perishing, and there coming to be even in its place?" Against one who said that, we could not contend that it doesn't perish; because the uneven is not imperishable. If that had been granted us, we could easily have contended 5 that when the even attacks, the odd and three depart and go away. And we could have contended similarly about fire and hot and the rest, couldn't we?'